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Abstract 
This thesis examines dynamics of statebuilding and social mobilisation in Afghanistan 
from 2001 to 2016 and seeks to contribute to two sets of scholarly literature. First, it aims 
to contribute to better understanding of the complexity of the post-2001 international 
intervention and statebuilding in Afghanistan. Second, it aims to contribute to broader 
literature on contentious politics by extending its theoretical insights to explore dynamics 
of social movements in the context of a fragile state 
The thesis investigates how state fragility, characterised by weakness in extending its 
authority, in providing public services, and in developing effective and legitimate 
institutions, can shape contentious politics, and whether state weakness creates conditions 
that benefit some movements over others. It combines a relational and mechanism-based 
approach with a multi-institutional view of politics and society, and highlights the nature 
and dimensions of change and conflict. This is achieved by studying four groups and three 
protest events in Afghanistan.  
Through detailed analysis of the four groups, which provide examples of broadly liberal, 
left-leaning and Islamist movements in the country, as well as analysis of three mass 
protest events, the thesis argues that the character and strength of the state has a number 
of important implications for contentious politics. First, while the institutions of liberal 
democracy, and parallel processes of exposure of Afghan society to globalisation between 
2001 and 2016, helped give rise to a new generation of activists, the highly-centralised 
institutional structure combined with institutional discouragement of political parties and 
predominance of patron-client relations drove a new generation of activists towards street 
politics. Consequently, the neopatrimonial character of the state and dominance of patron-
client relations discouraged a younger generation of activists from directly participating 
in the affairs of state. Second, based on the type and level of statebuilding programmes 
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and policies, the thesis identified four responses by the case study groups towards the 
post-2001 international intervention and statebuilding process: reformist, 
transformationist, rejectionist and partial rejectionist.  
These case studies show that while these groups tend to be ideologically oriented towards 
certain strategic responses, in general policy-level contention and social movement 
formation were undermined by deeper programmatic and foundational conflicts. 
Furthermore, these group-level responses were the outcomes of collective attribution of 
threats and opportunities in a strategic environment that was shaped by a multitude of 
actors, including non-state and anti-state actors. Mass protests were closely linked to a 
period of particular decline in state authority and capacity to provide security and services 
from 2014 to 2016. The three protest events, the largest of their kind during this period, 
were collective responses to state failures to provide security and basic public services. 
Finally, while the Islamists have tended to be more successful in building organisations 
and reaching out to masses and even assuming some state-like functions such as providing 
services, it was not clear that these organisational gains would necessarily lead to political 
advantages as in winning elections. Furthermore, the more successful Islamist 
organisations also appropriated a wide range of secular socio-economic and political 
responses which may shape their long-term political orientations.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
In mid-April 2016, Khan Wali Adel, a 24-year old man from the southern province of 
Paktiya, pitched a tent in Kabul to protest against a traditional practice known as bad in 
Afghanistan. Bad is a traditional conflict resolution mechanism that involve exchanges 
of women as compensation to aggrieved families to resolve blood disputes between 
families, clans and tribes. In his tent, Adel put up a banner in which he listed his seven 
main specific demands for abolition of the tradition, five of which were directed towards 
his own family, and the other two demands from the provincial council of Paktiya and the 
central government’s Ministry of Haj and Religious Endowments and the state-sponsored 
Ulema Council (Nawandish, 2016; Faramarz, 2016). Adel’s own two sisters had 
previously become victims of the tradition. He was outraged and began to protest after 
his family began negotiating to receive ten women in compensation for the murder of his 
two brothers. In response, Adel’s father claimed that the family’s local enemies were not 
ready to make peace and that his son, Adel, was not psychologically in a natural state 
(BBC Farsi, 2016; DW Dari, 2016).  
Until mid-October, when Adel ended his protest, his story was captured by a number of 
major national and international media outlets and news agencies. The sole protestor 
sparked debates about the situation of women rights in the country’s media, civil society 
and some governmental departments His tent near the parliament building on the Darul 
Aman Road, was visited by a significant number of people, including members of the 
Afghan parliament, prominent civil society activists and journalists (Bashardost, 2016; 
Archiwal, 2016). Despite these important successes, Adel’s protest quietly ended with no 
tangible policy change or action by state authorities against traditional practices that 
violate women’s rights.  
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 The apparent success and then sudden demise of Adel’s protest underscored broader 
dynamics and challenges of protest movements in Afghanistan’s post-2001 social, 
political and security environment. While during the Taliban rule (1996-2001) these 
forms of politics were virtually unthinkable, after the international intervention, social 
movement tactics such sit-ins and street demonstrations gained unprecedented popularity 
among a wide range of social and political groups. Protestors took to the streets to make 
claims against the state, traditional authorities, non-state militias and warlords, anti-state 
insurgents, the US and NATO forces and a number of other actors. In their efforts to 
mobilise support behind their claims, protesters worked to attract attention of media, civil 
society, traditional religious and cultural authorities, international supporters, and 
opposition political leaders and parties.  
However, the context in which these protests took place was radically different from that 
of western liberal democracies, often seen as the birthplace of modern social movements. 
The state institutions that were the target of many of these public and competitive claim-
making exercises were facing multiple challenges. After nearly four decades of continued 
instability, war and mass violence, and despite massive international efforts after 2001, 
the Afghan state faced serious challenges in enforcing its authority across its territory, in 
providing basic public services, and in developing effective and legitimate institutions. 
After nearly 16 years of international efforts at reviving the state capacity and credibility, 
the Afghan state was heavily dependent on international support, suffered from chronic 
problem of corruption and inefficiency, and faced an existential threat from a violent 
insurgency.  
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Research Aims and Questions 
In this thesis, I aim to explore the dynamics and challenges facing social movements and 
contentious politics in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2016. More specifically, I seek to answer 
two interrelated questions: First, how might state fragility shape contentious politics? And 
second, do state fragility and disruption create conditions that favour particular groups 
or forms of contention? The first question seeks to contribute to the contentious politics 
literature by examining mechanisms and processes of contention in the context of a fragile 
state disrupted by wars and foreign invasions. The second question aims to examine 
critically an emergent claim in recent years that in Muslim-majority countries ‘Islamists’ 
enjoy an advantage over their rivals in mobilising the masses.  
By studying Afghanistan’s contentious politics, I also aim to contribute to two bodies of 
scholarship. First, I seek to contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of the 
post-2001 international intervention and efforts at construction of a more liberal 
democratic state in Afghanistan. Existing scholarship extensively covers both the high 
politics of the statebuilding process and the problems and the challenges it encountered, 
including the violent insurgency by the Taliban and other militant groups. The former 
body covers different aspects and challenges of the statebuilding process, such as 
elections (Coburn & Larson, 2014; Goodhand, Suhrke, & Bose, 2016), political parties 
(Ruttig, 2006) and networks (Sharan, 2013), elite corruption and patronage-based politics 
(Partlow, 2016), and the threats and challenges presented by warlord resistance or 
integration into the state structures (Mukhopadhyay, 2014; MacGinty, 2010). The latter 
body focuses on dynamics of the insurgency (Giustozzi, 2008; Giustozzi, 2009) and the 
role of foreign powers (Motwani, 2018). I aim to complement these two strands of 
scholarship by underscoring the rise of social movement activities and peaceful 
contention and its implication for broader issues of statebuilding and political stability in 
the country.  
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Second, I aim to contribute to broader literature on social movements and contentious 
politics by employing its theoretical insights to explore dynamics of social movements in 
the context of a fragile state. In this respect, I build on the existing application of the 
social movement theories to studies of social movements in weak states and transitioning 
societies. In this respect, I specifically build on the broader approach and concept of social 
movements as developed by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2004), and the application of 
the Social Movement Theory to the studies of the Islamist Movements (Wiktorowicz, 
2004; Beinin & Vairel, 2011), and social movements in divided societies (Nagle, 2016) 
and developing countries (Ellis & van Kessel, 2009).  
Research Gaps 
This thesis builds on the axiom with the assumption that state fragility and disruption 
caused by protracted violence have profound implications for theories of social 
movements and contentious politics. Many of the movements in fragile states emerge, 
evolve or decline in highly-violent and conflict-prone environments. Consequently, war 
and violence and their consequences are important, and sometimes defining, elements of 
the social, economic and political environment in which they occur. 
As will be elaborated in chapter 2 of this thesis, the theories of social movements as they 
developed after the 1960s are built upon empirical foundations and particular conceptions 
of state and society of western societies. Consequently, when applied to contexts 
characterised by state disruption and fragility these theories, as they stand, suffer from 
three important shortcomings. First, it is a state-centric literature in that it focuses on the 
state to account for the rise and variation of contentious politics. Second, it assumes an 
interest-based model of politics in which actors engage in politics, including contentious 
politics, to secure or defend their interests. Consequently, it overlooks and underestimates 
value-based and symbolic drivers of contention. Third, when applied to societies outside 
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the liberal-democratic countries of the West, it is driven by an implicit preference towards 
the study of liberal and western-style forms of social movements.  
These normative assumptions and preferences underpin a debate about the role and 
desirability of social movements in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Studying 
illiberal movements such as the Islamists, some scholars have viewed the long-term role 
of these movements with scepticism. For example, a working paper of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (Ousman, 2012, p. 36) contends that radical 
Islamist movements in fragile states of Sub-Saharan African operate as ‘exit movements’, 
‘delegitimises state institutions’ and ‘weakens the social infrastructure’. By contrast, 
another strand of scholarly and policy debate focuses on the positive impacts of political 
activism and protest movements. Social movements of various ideological and political 
orientation are seen as the driving forces of the revolutionary wave of protests that became 
known as the Arab Spring and brought down a number of autocratic leaders across the 
Arab world in 2011-12. The initial success of these protests in overthrowing well-
entrenched autocratic regimes gave rise to hopes that new generations of horizontal and 
non-ideological movements were opening new windows for social and political reform in 
the Middle East (Durac, 2015; Durac, 2013).  
These divergent views regarding the role of social movements’ political stability in these 
contexts are most pronounced in the studies of Islamist movements. Two aspects of this 
debate are worth highlighting here. First, Olivier Roy, the French scholar of political 
Islam, famously argued that political Islam was failing by the 1990s. He argued that 
groups that sought to establish Islamic states had ‘social-democratized’, transformed ‘into 
a type of neofundamentalism, concerned solely with re-establishing Muslim law, the 
Sharia, without inventing new political forms’ (Roy, 1994, p. ix). In a similar way, 
describing the evolution of the Iranian Islamic Republic after the 1979 Islamic 
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Revolution, Bayat (1996) argued that as a result of critiques from within and without, the 
Islamists were metamorphosing into a post-Islamist phase.  
By “post-Islamism” I mean a condition where, following a phase of 
experimentation, the appeal, energy, symbols and sources of legitimacy of 
Islamism get exhausted, even among its once-ardent supporters. As such, post-
Islamism is not anti-Islamic, but rather reflects a tendency to resecularize religion. 
Predominantly, it is marked by a call to limit the political role of religion (Bayat, 
1996, p. 45). 
In contrast to Roy and Bayat, other observers have pointed to persistence, durability and 
even advantages of the Islamists over their rivals. As summed up in a review by Cammet 
and Luon (2014), these scholars point to ideological hegemony of the Islamists and their 
ability to provide social services and greater organisational capacity as sources of the 
Islamists’ advantage in mobilising the masses and winning elections. Without rejecting 
these presumed sources of the superiority of the Islamists, Cammet and Luong add that 
Islamists also enjoy greater advantages that result from their reputation as being 
competent and trustworthy.  
The presumption of an Islamist advantage is all the more surprising given their poor 
records in winning elections or maintaining power. The outcomes of the Arab uprisings 
in 2011-12 point to a more complex struggles for political power with uncertain 
outcomes. Instead of democratic transition, either the old guards re-established their 
political dominance, or the fall or weakening of authoritarian regimes was followed by 
chaos, uncertainty, civil wars and humanitarian emergencies. In most of the countries, 
instead of the young activists, the old and well-organised traditional movements such as 
the Islamists won the elections. In Syria, Libya and Yemen, the uprisings were followed 
by civil wars with disastrous humanitarian consequences. In Egypt, in July 2013, General 
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a former army general came to power after overthrowing 
Muhammad Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood politician who had been elected as president 
a year earlier. The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood to maintain power in Egypt, and 
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the rise of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in the course of the chaos 
and breakdown of state’s in Iraq and Syria, introduced ‘twin shocks’ to the dominant 
thinking students of Islamists movements as well as the mainstream Islamists themselves 
(Hamid & McCants, 2017, pp. 1-2) 
The complex and uncertain outcomes of the mass mobilisations in the Arab countries 
illustrate some of the dynamics of how state capacity or weakness interact with social 
mobilisation to produce divergent outcomes across the Muslim world. Strong states can 
resist challenging groups through repression or co-optation and weak states succumb to 
challenges of popular uprisings and disintegrate into civil wars. In these processes of 
movement emergence and state response, movements, including the Islamists 
movements, can evolve in a number of directions. By responding to national social, 
cultural and political environments, the Islamists also appropriate grievances and 
concerns that are at their core secular and political.  
Key Concepts and Research Approach  
Key Concepts  
At the outset, it is important to define concepts of state fragility and contentious politics 
as they are used in this thesis. While the notion of state fragility has been subject to intense 
debates in recent years (see chapter 3), for the purpose of this thesis, state fragility consists 
of weaknesses in extending its authority uniformly across its territory, in providing public 
services, and in developing effective and legitimate institutions. In this thesis, I ask how 
these dimensions of state weaknesses shape contentious politics as defined by McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly (2004, p. 5), 
Episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects 
when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the 
claims, and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests or values of at least 
one of the claimants (2004, p. 5) [Emphasis added].  
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However, this thesis also highlights the significance of symbolic and value-based forms 
of politics. Consequently, it is conceived that claim-making might be driven by a 
combination of interests and values. Social movements are a subset of a broader category 
of contentious politics. What constitutes a social movement has been defined in various 
ways. Goodwin and Jasper (2015, p. 4) define social movement as a ‘collective, 
organised, sustained, noninstitutional challenge to authorities, power holders, or cultural 
beliefs and practices’. Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 20) emphasise informal networks 
and collective identity as the defining features of social movements. In their view, social 
movements are distinct collective action processes in which actors:  
• are involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; 
• are linked by dense informal networks; 
• share a distinct collective identity. 
Snow, Soule and Kriesi (2004) also add that social movements may emerge in defence or 
challenge to an extant authority. As a result, unlike what is often assumed, in fact 
movement may emerge in defence of existing authorities. They define social movement 
as: 
Collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of 
institutional and organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or 
defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the 
group, organisation, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part (p. 
11).  
While each of these definitions emphasises some particular dimensions of social 
movements, in this thesis, the concept of a social movement is used in its broader sense 
to refer to extra-institutional and challenging protest against formal and informal 
authorities and power holders. As such, while firmly embedded in democratic orders, 
protest movements are distinctive from institutionalised forms of politics such as political 
parties and elections.  
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Multi-Institutional View of Politics and Society  
While this thesis is underpinned by the perspective that social science theories and 
concepts developed in western societies can fruitfully be applied to study fragile states 
and societies, it is informed by an understanding that uncritical application of these 
theories to these contexts can miss some of the complexities and nuances of these 
societies. To strengthen the applicability of the social movement theory to the context of 
Afghanistan, in this thesis I draw on a number of other literatures to account for the roles 
of state weakness in shaping the context for social movements. In its broad theoretical 
orientation, this thesis is informed by dynamic, processual and mechanism-based 
approaches advanced by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2004). To explore interactive 
relations between environmental changes and group-level responses, I focus on 
mechanisms of collective attribution of threats and opportunities, social appropriation, 
and boundary activation to explore how the four groups and events emerged in response 
to changes in the social and political environment of Afghanistan between 2001 and 2016. 
However, I complement this approach in two other ways. First, drawing on Schmidt’s 
(2008) distinction between three levels of ideas and discourses, I make a distinction 
between three levels of social change and conflict: policy, programme and foundations. 
Second, drawing on ‘the state-in-society’ approach of Migdal (2004) and building on 
Armstrong and Bernstein’s (2008) critique of the contentious politics approach, I take a 
multi-institutional views of politics and society in which power and domination is 
‘organized around multiple sources of power, each of which is simultaneously material 
and symbolic’ (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008, p. 75). Although the state as a creator and 
enforcer of the rules of the game is extremely important, the nature and extent of its power 
and influence are both historically and spatially variable and contingent. The 
simultaneous material and symbolic dimensions of institutions mean that successful 
challenges against institutions also combine material mobilisation of resources and people 
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with challenging the cultural hegemony of existing authorities and producing new 
meanings and messages that resonate with social groups. Consequently, culture and social 
and political narratives are constitutive of institutions and as such the objects of 
contestation between diverse social and political groups.  
An approach based on a multi-institutional view of politics and society and the state-in-
society perspective combined with the distinction between levels of changes and conflict 
has four major implications for the study of social movements. First, while it places the 
state at the centre of analysis, it recognises it as one of multiple actors involved in a 
broader struggle for change and domination in the society. Furthermore, the actual 
practices of the state and its constituent parts may vary significantly from the image it 
seeks to project of itself, domestically or internationally. Consequently, state institutions 
are not the only targets of protests as most scholars of contentious politics and social 
movements assume. In fact, state institutions may themselves be the site of contestation 
for political control by various social groups, and some parts of the state may join 
movements challenging other state institutions and actors.  
Second, assuming that society as ‘composed of multiple and often contradictory 
institutions’ (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008, p. 82) means that the state is not the only 
determinant of opening and closure of opportunities for the rise of movements. Change 
in the environment for the emergence, evolution and impact of movements occurs as a 
result of shifts in broader configurations of power relations that span formal state 
institutions and informal political alignments. In fact, some movements may choose not 
to engage directly with the state and instead focus on social and cultural activities which 
may only have long-term implications for politics and the state.  
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Third, movements do not respond to all types of social changes and conflicts equally. 
While some movements seek programmatic and policy-level changes, others reject the 
very foundation of the nation-state system.  
Fourth, institutions and opportunities for challenging the status quo are not static entities 
and conditions. Social and political outcomes and changes occur as a result of interactions 
and competition of states and other players over social control. As argued by McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly (2004, p. 22) as part of the critique of classical social movement 
theories, recent theorising see ‘social interaction, social ties, communication, and 
conversation not merely as expressions of structure, rationality, consciousness, or culture, 
but as active sites of creation and change’. This means that the goals and identities of 
actors, and the outcome of their actions may change and evolve in the course of 
contentious politics.  
Methods and Case Studies 
I examine the dynamics of contentious politics in Afghanistan through detailed study of 
four groups and three events. I follow a qualitative approach, using detailed interviews 
with organisers of protest movements, government officials, members of parliament, 
religious scholars, academics and journalists. In addition, I use formal statements and 
online and offline materials produced by organisers and leaders of movements to 
complement data collected during my interviews.  
The following are the main case study groups:  
 Hezb-e Hambastagi Afghanistan (Solidarity Party of Afghanistan), a political 
party registered in Afghanistan in 2004. What is distinctive about Hezb-e 
Hambastagi is that while it is formally recognised as a political party, in practice 
it functions as a social movement organisation. It does not compete in elections, 
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and focuses on organising regular protest activities against the political elites who 
dominated the political process and state institutions after 2001.  
 Afghanistan 1400, a civil and political movement that was launched in 2011 by 
a group of middle class professionals. It is not formally registered with the 
government but because of the social profile of many of its individual members, 
the movement has attracted significant domestic and international attention. 
 Jamiat-e Eslah wa enkeshaf-e ejtimai Afghanistan (Society for Reform and 
Social Development of Afghanistan), a flagship organisation that was registered 
as a social organisation with the Ministry of Justice in 2003. It includes a number 
of other educational, media, charity and cultural organisations. While Jamiat-e 
Eslah focuses on peaceful educational and cultural programmes and there is no 
evidence to link it to violent activities, many are concerned that the organisation 
is behind a wave of ‘soft radicalisation’, training a new generation of radical 
Islamists.  
 Hezb ut-Tahrir is the national branch of global Islamist movement that is active 
in many countries across the world. It has been active in Afghanistan since 2003 
and considers the country as one of the provinces for caliphate, or a global Islamic 
government, which it seeks to establish.  
In addition to these groups, the thesis examines the following three protest events.  
 Three separate protests events that followed the killing of Farkhunda 
Malikzadah on 20 March 2015.  
 The 11 November 2015 protest in response to the killing of the Zabul Seven by 
insurgent groups in the province of Zabul.  
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 The Roshanayee (Enlightenment) protest movement that was formed in protest 
against an April 2016 government decision to change the route of the TUTAP 
power transmission line from the province of Bamyan to the Salang Pass, and was 
subject of a suicide bombing during a peaceful demonstration on 23 July 2016.  
The Findings and Argument of the Thesis 
By using a mechanism-based approach to the study of these groups and events, and by 
identifying the particular types of social and political change to which they responded, I 
found that these groups are deeply shaped by the weaknesses of the Afghan state. First, 
the four groups are products of the statebuilding and social changes it triggered following 
the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. Each of these groups benefited from the 
relative political and social opening of the post-2001 period, and the broad social 
transformation that Afghanistan experienced during this period. Consequently, to varying 
degrees the rise and evolution of these groups also signifies an emerging generational 
break in Afghanistan’s politics. In this respect, as harbingers of broader social and 
political change, these groups reflect the discontent of a new generation of Afghanistan’s 
social and political activists with the patronage-based and divisive politics of the 
dominant elites between 2001 and 2016.  
Second, each of the four groups represents a particular response to the 2001 international 
intervention, subsequent practice of liberal statebuilding, and to the continued weakness 
of the state. Hezb ut-Tahrir represents a rejectionist position by clearly repudiating the 
foundational, programmatic and policy orientations of the Afghan state. It rejects both the 
idea of the nation-state system and the principles of electoral democracy on which the 
post-2001 statebuilding enterprise was based. Jamiat-e Eslah has taken a 
transformationist position by accepting the formal legitimacy of the state system but 
engaging in a transformationist strategy of bottom-up social and cultural change and 
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assuming some of the functions of the state such as delivering educational and health 
services and providing charity to the poor. In the meantime, it stops short of fully 
participating in the political process. Afghanistan 1400 has taken a reformist position that 
is premised on the acceptance of the principles of the post-2001 liberal democracy but is 
concerned with corruption, and elite division and inability of the state to perform its 
functions. Internally, the movement is divided over whether to participate in formal 
politics directly, or pursue strategies of a civic and social movement. Hezb-e Hambastagi 
underscores a partial rejectionist position, in that it accepts basic premises of the nation-
state system and electoral democracy but expresses deep programmatic opposition to the 
US’s political and military presence and the dominant role given to the former mujahedin 
groups in the state institutions. It is formally registered as a formally political party but 
does not compete in elections. Instead, it focuses on organising protest against the US-
led intervention and the elites who have dominated the state institutions and distribution 
of state and foreign patronage. The rise and evolution of these groups illustrate the 
dynamics of mutual interaction between statebuilding and group formation in 
Afghanistan. 
In contrast to the four groups, which represent more organised and strategic responses, 
the three protest events mark the ability of the new generation of activists to mobilise 
through loose and mostly informal social networks that bring together a wide range of 
grassroots activists, aspiring politicians, students, and leaders of civil society 
organisations and small businesses. Taken together, the three protest events, which 
became the largest and most dramatic events of their kind between 2001 and 2016, are 
responses to government failures to provide basic security and public services. 
Importantly, the protest events emerged at a time of particularly steep decline in 
government capacity and credibility following the 2014 fraudulent presidential elections 
and concurrent deterioration of security and economic conditions. As responses to the 
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state’s failures to perform its basic functions, these events also underscore the rise of a 
new generation of social and political elites for whom effective and credible state 
institutions have gained paramount significance. Consequently, these grassroots protest 
against state failures also underline the deepening of the roots of the post-2001 state 
among Afghanistan’s rising social and political elites.  
Third, each of the groups and events reflect a combination of interest-based and symbolic 
forms of politics. In other words, each group and event is simultaneously symbolic and 
material. In fact, despite significant differences, the organisers of these groups and events 
are united by underlying value-based and symbolic motivations. An important aspect of 
the state’s weakness is its poor capacity in discursive and symbolic fields which allows 
for highly competitive forms contention over legitimacy and credibility of state authority. 
Thesis Outline  
In the following chapters, I will proceed to examine the dynamics of social movements 
and contentious politics in Afghanistan in greater details. In chapter 2, I critically engage 
with various strands of social movement theory, asking how they might help explain 
social mobilisation in a fragile state. In chapter 3, I narrow down the focus of the thesis 
through a detailed examination of drivers and consequences of state fragility and 
disruption. In chapter 4 and 5, I set the context for the discussion in Afghanistan by 
providing an historical overview of Afghanistan’s social and political movements and the 
institutional and political context between 2001 and 2016. In chapters 6, 7 and 8 I use 
mechanisms of collective attributions of threats and opportunities, appropriation of 
resources and boundary activation to examine both the group-level dynamics of the four 
main case-study groups as well as their interaction with the state in Afghanistan. In 
chapter 9, I continue with the mechanism-based analysis to examine the three protest 
movements before drawing some general conclusions in the final chapter of the thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Social Movement Theory: From the Irrationality of Collective 
Behaviours to Rationality of Collective Actions and Ambition of Global 
Applicability 
Introduction 
It is not surprising that social movements have appeared in Afghanistan in recent years. 
Except under some extremely repressive regimes such as the Taliban in Afghanistan from 
1996 to 2001, protest movements are recognised as routine forms of politics and as major 
drivers of social and political change around the world (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). People 
organise collectively to protest against programmes and policies of states and 
international institutions, and the behaviour of non-state actors such as large multi-
national corporations. Some movements are defensive in the nature of claims they make. 
They protest against policies or social, cultural or political changes that they believe 
threaten the status quo and alter extant power relations. Others are offensive in their goals 
and strategies. They demand that the state institute new policies and promote or 
institutionalise social, political or cultural changes that involve some alterations in 
existing rules of the games which determines distribution of resources or symbolic and 
political representation. As a result, social movements are closely linked to dynamics of 
power relations as well as processes of social change.  
Social movements, however, were not always recognised as legitimate social and political 
actors. In fact, up to the 1960s, a number of influential scholars studied social movements 
as part of broader collective behaviours that included mobs, riots, and fads. Seen as the 
result of social breakdown and the strain it created at the individual level, these behaviours 
were regarded as disruptive and irrational tendencies that were harmful to the normal 
functioning of social and political processes (Smelser, 1962; Buechler, 2004). In this 
chapter, I discuss this shift of opinion about protest movements from their 
characterisation as irrational outbursts to their acceptance as rational, from being seen as 
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disruptive collective behaviour to being recognised as normal elements of a democratic 
process. I present and critically review the main theoretical traditions that have dominated 
research about collective actions and social movements since the 1960s. The overall 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a general context for the theoretical and empirical 
discussion that follow in the subsequent chapters.  
The first section of this chapter begins by asking the basic question of how a social 
movement might be defined. The second section discusses the main theoretical 
perspectives that emerged between the 1960s and 1990s. The third discusses efforts at 
reformulation and synthesisation of the classical theories since mid-1990.  
Changing Theory and Practice of Social Movements 
A social movement is a distinctive form of collective action which brings together a group 
of individuals in collective efforts in pursuit of some shared interests or values. Tilly 
(2004) argued that social movements as a form of public politics were a modern 
phenomenon that emerged during the eighteenth century Europe as a consequence of four 
broad social transformations: war, parliamentarisation, capitalisation and 
proletarianization. Simply put, Tilly argued that wars forced ruling elites to expand state 
structures, which then increased government expenditures. To cover the costs of 
increased expenditures, state elites needed to extract greater volumes of resources and 
mobilise people from the territories they controlled. The increased costs of war also 
increased the power of parliaments, which were becoming important loci of power 
struggles among various groups as well as targets of popular mobilisation as parliaments 
gained greater power in relations to monarchs and state elites. In the meantime, the 
expansion of agrarian, commercial and industrial capital weakened the power of the 
feudal aristocrats, and the dependence of increasing numbers of the population on wage 
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labour freed more people from dependence on landlords to engage in political action. 
These broad changes resulted in the invention of social movements as  
contingent alliances between dissident aristocrats and bourgeois (who lacked the 
numbers for independent action against the bulk of ruling classes) and dissatisfied 
workers (who lacked the legal and social protection supplied by patrons) (Tilly, 
2004, p. 27).  
Consequently, social movement are modern phenomena that came into being with 
processes of political and economic modernisation in Europe. However, movements can 
take diverse forms, depending on the social and political contexts in which they emerge. 
The diversity and complexity of movements have also meant that there are competing 
definitions of what social movements are. Two main sources of such disagreement are 
worth highlighting here. First, social movements, as a subtype of collective political 
struggle, may significantly vary in the collective claims they make, the targets against 
which they mobilise, and the strategies and tactics they use to achieve their goals. For 
example, the 2012 Occupy Movement in the United States differed significantly from the 
global environmental movement. The former targeted specific institutions, which were 
the large financial corporations in Wall Street, adopted a specific tactic sit-in and 
occupation public spaces, and lasted for a relatively short period of time. By contrast, the 
latter consists of a diverse range of groups which are active across countries, promote 
claims that affect governments, businesses and individuals, and are likely to be sustained 
over decades to come.  
Second, the conceptual definition of social movements is also influenced by scholars’ 
own broader assumptions that may not be made explicit in theorising about social 
movements. Scholars may assume particular models of society and politics and human 
motivations that affect the way in which social movements, their participants and 
outcomes are conceived (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008). As a diverse field, the theorising 
efforts have been influenced by both the broader trends in the social sciences and 
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changing nature of social activism as the object of its study. As Buechler (2004, p. 47) 
puts it,  
The story of social movement theory is not just a function of movements 
themselves, but also of the social and intellectual histories of the countries and 
disciplines in which the theories evolve.  
The impact of these two sources of disagreement over conceptual definitions and 
theoretical approaches can be usefully illustrated by the distinction that is often made 
between ‘collective behavior’ and ‘collective action’ traditions in the study of social 
movements. Prior to the 1960s, social movements were often studied as a subtype of 
‘collective behaviour’, which included a range of disruptive phenomena such as riots, 
crowds, panics and crazes. At the core of the collective behaviour tradition was an 
overriding concern about the impact of modernising changes such as the emergence of 
‘mass society’ (Buechler, 2013) on social bonds and integration. In its various versions, 
it viewed collective behaviour as a consequence of breakdown and disruption of social 
norms and routines and the strains they caused on individuals through creation of a sense 
of anomie and alienation. Consequently, collective behaviours were also usually viewed 
negatively and associated with irrational, emotional and thus dangerous and disruptive 
tendencies (Smelser, 1962; Marx & Wood, 1975; Buechler, 2004).  
During the 1960s, the literature underwent a paradigm shift with major qualitative and 
substantive implications. Henceforth, movements became a subtype of ‘collective action’ 
that gradually became accepted as a normal and routine aspect of democratic politics. The 
rise of mass protest movements led by middle class professionals and a generation of 
scholar/activists during the decade meant that the view that the protest movements were 
temporary and irrational social outbursts was no longer tenable. As a result, a new 
generation of scholars turned their attention to explaining how rational individuals 
engaged in collective actions and strategise and respond to their social and political 
environments.  
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Despite significant differences, a few shared characteristics can be found in most of these 
definitions. First, a social movement is a distinctive form of collective action that 
challenges existing political, economic and cultural authorities. A social movement 
challenges existing power relations, and is constituted by groups that have limited or no 
access to institutional politics. Consequently, social movements are different from interest 
groups, political parties and electoral politics that advance socio-political interests within 
extant institutional arrangements.  
Second, while the tendency of social movements to engage in protest activities tends to 
attract most of the headlines, it is important to recognise that public protests such as rallies 
represent but one of several courses of actions that are available to a challenging 
movement. Challenging groups employ a wide range of strategies and tactics in pursuit 
of their collective strategies, public protests and marches being just one, even if the most 
visible of them. In addition to protests, movements form organisations, build coalitions 
and explain their ideas and employ cultural symbols to justify and legitimate their causes. 
Having said that, it is important to remember that the tendency towards non-institutional 
tactics distinguishes social movements from political parties and interest groups.  
Third, social movements are sustained, and as such are different from single acts of 
protest. Movements may experience periods of decline and fragmentation but in general 
sustain the commitment of their members to their causes for extended periods of time.  
Fourth, any single movement operates in a broader strategic ‘field of social movements’ 
and their character, strategies and outcomes are shaped by their interaction with the 
dominant authority and one another. Consequently, as Calhoun (1993, pp. 386-387) 
argues, in any given historical era or situation, individual social movements are parts of 
broader ‘fields of social movements’ and as such are characterised by ‘inherent plurality 
of their forms, contents, social bases, and meanings’.  
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The Rise and Evolution of Social Movement Theories  
As an established field of social science inquiry, social movement studies are a products 
of the shift from the collective behaviour tradition to the collective action theories of the 
1960s. Over the past half century, the field has continued to evolve, producing a multi-
disciplinary body of scholarly literature that brings together political scientists, 
sociologists, anthropologists and social psychologists (Snow, Soule , & Kriesi, 2004; 
Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Klandermans & Roggeband, 2007). Central to understanding 
the post-1960s theorising is The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory 
of Groups, a 1965 book by Mancur Olson. The book represented a break from the 
collective behaviour tradition by placing a rational and calculating individual at the heart 
of any collective action. Olson began with the assumption that individuals who participate 
in any collective actions are rational actors who make decisions on the basis of an 
assessment of the costs and benefits of their participation. However, the assumed 
rationality of the actor in his approach resulted in an unexpected conclusion: Olson 
challenged the widely-held view at that time that individuals and groups would act 
collectively to further their common interests. On the contrary, he argued that 
Unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is 
coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common 
or group interests (1971, p. 2). 
What led Olson to such a conclusion was the assumption that the incentive of self-
interested individuals to participate in collective action declined as the size of the group 
that shared the interest grew larger. Larger groups such as groups of firms in a competitive 
industry might share an interest in lobbying a government for assistance but it would be 
irrational for an individual firm to contribute to the collective effort to attract government 
intervention. The individual firm lacks the incentive to contribute because, regardless of 
its own contribution, it will also benefit if efforts by other members of the groups secure 
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the collective interest. Furthermore, its individual contribution will be so marginal in 
larger groups that its withdrawal from the collective effort will be unnoticeable to other 
members of the group. In Olson’s view, this created the problem of ‘free riders’, that is, 
group members who benefit from the effort of others without making any contribution. 
In large groups, Olson argued, the problem could be overcome through coercion or 
provision of additional incentives to members in addition to the shared interest in 
achievement of the collective goal.  
The irony of Olson’s thesis was that it predicted that collective action was running into 
difficulties at a time when the US and many other countries were bursting with activism. 
As a result, while the ‘free rider problem’ became central to the analysis of group theories, 
scholars shifted their attention to broader social, economic and political environments that 
encouraged or hindered formation of social movements. In a broad overview, the field as 
it developed between the 1960s and the 1990s was dominated by three theoretical 
perspectives: the Resource Mobilisation Theory, which was inspired by insights from 
economics and rational choice theory; the Political Process Model, which was 
structuralist in its orientation; and finally, the social constructivist perspective which 
reflected a ‘cultural turn’ in the study of social movements.  
Rational Choice: The Resource Mobilisation Theory  
One of the most influential theories of the after 1960s was the Resource Mobilisation 
Theory, a perspective which drew heavily on concepts and insights from economics and 
rational choice theories. The economistic approach of the theory was most evident in the 
use of such concepts as ‘social movement sector’, ‘social movement industries’, ‘social 
movement organisations’ and ‘social movement entrepreneurs’. The conceptual lenses 
created by these concepts highlighted both the significance of material and social 
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resources to the emergence of movements, and the competitive nature of movement 
organisation and social mobilisation.  
Zald and McCarthy (1977), two of the main proponents of the Resource Mobilisation 
Theory, questioned what they regarded as the traditional literature’s emphasis on the 
existence of grievances and on generalised beliefs about the causes of those grievances 
as key to the emergence of social movements. They argued that ‘grievances and 
discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and 
organizations’ (p. 1215). Instead of grievances, they pointed to the significance of 
availability of resources for the rise of social movements. In particular, they emphasised 
the significance of availability of discretionary resources in a society as a precondition 
for the development of social movements. By discretionary resources, they meant time 
and money that individuals and groups could afford to reallocate to respond to different 
demands. In broad terms, the theory holds that social movements are products of 
preference structures towards particular social change in a given society. They argued 
that the ability of a group of people to turn their shared preferences into social action 
depends on the existence of organisational structures that can be utilised to form Social 
Movement Organisations s and mobilise resources. The individual Social Movement 
Organisations combine to form a social movement industry, in which, similar to the role 
of firms in an economics industry, they engage in competitive mobilisation of resources.  
During the 1970s, the Resource Mobilisation Theory was the dominant approach to the 
study of social movements in the United States. It offered an important corrective to the 
previous theories that saw social movements as simply products of grievances and 
ideologies. It drew attention to the crucial roles that availability or scarcity of resources 
played in making collective actions possible in pursuit of collective goals. However, by 
the early 1980s, some of the major weakness of Resource Mobilisation Theory were 
becoming apparent as other scholars began to scrutinise its key conceptions, in particular 
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the concept of ‘resources’ and its applicability across different situations: some described 
it as ‘one of the most primitive and unspecified terms in the theoretical vocabulary’ of 
social movement literature (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 125).  
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the importance of resources for initiation and 
continuation of collective action could hardly be underestimated. Consequently, in 
response to these criticisms, Resource Mobilisation Theory scholars began to specify 
various types of resources and their significance for social groups to form and engage in 
protest activities. Edwards and McCarthy (2004) formulated the most detailed typology 
of resources that they believed were critical to social movements, and the manner in which 
they could be aggregated and accumulated by various social groups for collective action. 
They broadened the concept beyond its original economistic conception by drawing on 
theories of social capital advanced by Bourdieu (1986) and Putnam (1995) to incorporate 
other forms of resources. They made a distinction between five types of resources: moral, 
cultural, social-organisational, human and material. Furthermore, they emphasised that 
not all resources are equally helpful for collective action. They emphasised that use-value 
of resources for social movements depend on their ‘fungibility’ and ‘proprietarity’. The 
former indicates the extent to which resources can be transferred from one group to 
another and the latter the extent to which groups have access to and control of their 
resources. In such broad formulations, distribution of resources was part of broader social 
stratification processes, which among other things, determined differential access to 
resources among various social groups.  
The Political Process Model  
Another influential approach explained social movements in terms of the political 
environment and institutional structures of a given society. Central to this approach was 
the idea that ‘exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for 
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particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of 
influence to be exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics 
and policy’ (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, pp. 1457-1458). Central to the approach is the 
concept of ‘political opportunity structures’, which is used to explain a relationship 
between political behaviour, including protest, and the political environment in which it 
takes place. The concept was first systematically developed by Eisinger (1973) who 
studied incidents of political protests in relation to institutional environments of 
municipal governance in 43 American cities. Viewing protest as a product of cost-benefit 
calculation about the signalling of impatience and frustration, Eisinger argued that there 
was a curvilinear relationship between opening of political opportunities and the 
prevalence of protests. This meant that protest was least likely in extremely open (mayor-
council systems) and extremely closed environments (council manager systems) but was 
most frequent in cities that were characterised by a mix of open and closed systems. One 
of the main points he made was that opening of political opportunities in mixed systems 
was creating expectations which they were unable to meet.  
Charles Tilly was the most influential proponent of the political process model. In From 
Mobilization to Revolution (1978), Tilly developed a theoretical model in which actors 
were constantly struggling for positions of influence in the polity. Depending on their 
interests and varying capacities for organisation, mobilisation and collective action and 
availabilities of opportunities, the contenders for government power are divided into two 
camps: members and challengers. Thus, whether a group becomes a member of the polity 
or remains outside it and thus becomes a challenger depends on its ability to mobilise 
resources in the process of interaction with other groups and the government. Challenging 
the government and polity members through mobilisation and collective action requires 
resources, and variation in the ability of groups to pool resources places them in different 
positions in relation to the polity. In Tilly’s own words: 
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They vary in the success with which they get back resources in return; the biggest 
division in that regard separates the high-return members of the polity from the 
low-return challengers. Among other things, all contenders (members and 
challengers alike) are struggling for power. In the model, an increase in power 
shows up as an increasing rate of return on expended resources. All challengers 
seek, among others things, to enter in the polity. All members seek, among other 
things, to remain in the polity. Changes in the resources controlled by each 
contender and by the government, changes in the rates at which the contenders 
and the government give and take resources, and changes in the coalition structure 
add up to produce entries into the polity, and exits from it. The model conveys a 
familiar image of interest-group politics (p. 54). 
In his treatment of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, McAdam (1999) 
specified the causal sequences of changes in opportunity structures and protest 
movements. McAdam synthesised the political structure model with existing literature on 
organisational structure and collective consciousness of groups to link broader 
environmental changes to group level processes. How do structures of political 
opportunities changes? First, McAdam pointed to broad processes and events such as 
‘wars, industrialisation, international political realignments, prolonged unemployment 
and widespread demographic changes’ (p. 41) as sources of periodic disruption of the 
status quo and changes in structures of power relations. In other words, these broad shifts 
were indirectly influencing social insurgency through disrupting prevailing power 
relations. But these structural shifts and their effects on power relations were not enough. 
Second, McAdam emphasised the importance of organisational resources for the ability 
of groups to exploit favourable opportunities and organise campaigns of social protest. 
Central to the ability of an aggrieved community to make use of opportunities is the 
existence of organisational networks and associational structures that can facilitate 
collective action through enabling communication and ‘block recruitment’ of activists, 
and serve as structures of ‘solidarity incentives’ and interpersonal rewards for 
participation in the movement. Thus, availability of favourable opportunities and 
organisational resources is necessary but not sufficient for the rise of social protests. The 
third necessary factor was the subjective meaning people attributed to their abilities and 
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external conditions, a process to which he referred as ‘cognitive liberation’. He argued 
that the Civil Rights Movement was the outcome of the confluence of three factors: 
political opportunities, indigenous organisational strength and cognitive liberation.  
The generation of insurgency is expected to reflect the favourable confluence of 
three sets of factors: expanding political opportunities combine with the 
indigenous organization of the minority community to afford the insurgents the 
‘structural potential’ for successful collective action. That potential is, in turn, 
transformed into actual insurgency by means of the crucial intervening process of 
cognitive liberation (p. 51).  
In subsequent decades, as Giugni (2009) argues, American and most European scholars 
focused on two different aspects of structures of political opportunity. The former tended 
to study changes in the structures of opportunities, and specifically the opening and 
closure of windows of opportunity, which could encourage or discourage the rise of a 
particular movement or cycles of protest movements. By contrast, most European 
scholars focused on the more stable and durable aspects of opportunity structures. By 
explicating such stable characteristics of political structures, they attempted to account 
for variations of movements across the continent.  
By the 1990s, the Political Process Model had become a dominant approach in the study 
of contentious politics. However, the divergent practices in the application of the theory 
overstretched its key concepts, most notably Political Opportunity Structure, and made it 
the object of a number of criticisms and critical reflections, including by original 
proponents of the theory. Perhaps the most serious critique of the Political Process Model 
came from Goodwin and Jasper (1999), who argued that overstretching of its key 
concepts and its structural bias made the approach ‘tautological, trivial, inadequate, or 
just plain wrong’ (p. 28). Gamson and Meyer (1996) complained that the concept of 
political opportunity was becoming a ‘sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the 
social movement environment – political institutions and culture, crises of various sorts, 
political alliances and shifts’. They warned that ‘used to explain so much, it may 
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ultimately explain nothing at all’ (p. 275). Depending on what the scholars sought to 
explain, they argued that the concept has been used as an independent, dependent or 
intervening variable. To overcome these problems of conceptual imprecision, they argued 
that distinctions should be made between cultural and institutional environment on the 
one hand, and the stable and volatile dimensions of those opportunities, on the other.  
Cultural Turn: The Social Constructionist Perspective  
Reflecting the broader ‘cultural turn’ in the social sciences, a number of scholars of social 
movements turned their attention to the role of meaning, emotion and identity in social 
movements. Rooted in a social constructionist ontology, cultural analysts highlight the 
significance of meaning, culture, identity and emotions in collective action (Jasper, 2007). 
They investigate how ideologies, belief systems or cultural communities shape 
contentious actions (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2004, pp. 21-22). As a result, they 
attribute causal powers to ideology, values, norms, beliefs and norms. Two aspects of the 
culturalist perspectives are worth highlighting here: New Social Movements Theory and 
Framing.  
New Social Movements Theory were formulated by a number of European scholars to 
analyse social and political movements that diverged from the logic of economic 
production and class relations, which were presumed to be the source of politically-
significant political actions in classical Marxism. These scholars departed from Marxism 
by identifying new logics of collective action and dynamics of social and political 
conflicts that were being excluded from the economistic lens of classical Marxist thinkers. 
The central premise of the various theories was that during the second half of the twentieth 
century, capitalist societies were transitioning to new forms of social formation, which 
they variously described as advanced or mature capitalism, programmed, post-industrial 
and post-modern societies. The transitions were creating new sources and sites of conflict, 
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engendering new relations of domination and resistance, and thus giving rise to new forms 
of movements such as feminism, ecology, peace and animal rights movements. In contrast 
to industrial society, where class relations and material distribution were the primary 
sources of social conflicts and struggles, and labour was the main force in social struggles, 
in the new post-industrial societies, quest for identity, autonomy and life-style were 
becoming the fulcrums of collective action (Buechler, 1995). In other words, the sites of 
social conflicts were moving from the arena of production to consumption. 
The New Social Movements theorists have been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. Two 
aspects of these criticisms are worth highlighting here. First, many scholars have taken 
issue with the notion of the ‘newness’ of these movements. For example, Calhoun (1993) 
argued that the quest for autonomy and identity and other defining features of new social 
movements can be traced even to some movements of the early nineteenth century. 
Consequently, these are features of movements at the early stages of their development. 
Furthermore, these theories may be limited in their applicability to developing and fragile 
societies that are lagging behind in capitalist development. For example, in Africa while 
identity issues have become more salient, struggles over distributive issues remain central 
to most social movements across the continent (Habib & Opoku-Mensah, 2009). Second, 
these theorists also excluded and marginalised other forms of social movement that did 
not fit with what they considered as new faultlines of post-industrialist societies. As 
Pichardo (1997, p.413) notes, ‘as the Marxist theories tended to marginalize protest that 
did not stem from the working class, so too have NSM theorists marginalized social 
movements that do not originate from the left’. Consequently, the new movement 
theorists assume a particular model of society, which privileges what they regard as 
progressive and emancipatory movements, excluding reactionary, conservative and right-
wing movements.  
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Besides the New Social Movements theory, another group of mainly American scholars 
used insights from linguistics and social psychology to develop their own conceptual 
repertoires to understand how social movements construct collective identities, formulate 
narratives, and interpret their social, cultural and political environments (Jasper, 2007). 
Central to this perspective is the concept of framing, which was drawn from the work of 
Goffman on how people make meaning of, and organise, their social environments. In his 
influential book, Frame Analysis (1986), Goffman argued that to understand everyday 
social occurrences people hark back to primary frameworks or schemata of interpretation 
to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete 
occurrences’ (p. 21). The concept was subsequently developed and applied to social 
movement analysis by Snow and his collaborators in a series of theoretical papers (1986; 
1988; 1992). At the core of their effort was a desire to understand the complex and 
transformative processes of social mobilisation and participation in social movements. 
These processes, which Snow identified in his ethnographic study of the Buddhist 
Nichiren Shoshu movement in the United States, often entailed a rebirth and thorough 
biographical transformation of individual participants. In Snow’s (2014) own words,  
I was intrigued by how individuals who initially had little to no understandings of 
the movement would come not only to embrace its beliefs and practices, but also 
to redefine who they were in terms of those very beliefs and practices. Time and 
again, apparent cultural strangers would come to a meeting, agree to experiment 
with the practice, and, several months later, not only avow previously foreign 
religious beliefs but use them and the practices in which they were embedded as 
the bases for constructing a new or revitalized sense of their biography and self 
(p. 24). 
These scholars argued that central to such transformation at the individual level was frame 
alignment, which they used to refer to a process of linking of an individual’s meaning 
construction to that of social movement, as a result of which ‘some set of individual 
interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and 
complementary’ (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 464). The congruence 
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of individual and collective interpretive processes occurs in four ways: (a) frame bridging, 
(b) frame amplification, (c) frame extension, and (d) frame transformation.  
Following the initial introduction of the concept, Snow and his colleagues further 
expanded the concept by making a distinction between three main forms of frames: 
diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational (1988). In other words, a successful frame 
should diagnose a particular problem, offer a solution and motivate supporters and the 
public to participate in collective action. By delineating various types of frames and the 
processes of their articulation, these scholars highlighted the active role and agency of 
social movements in production and diffusion of meanings.  
Over time, students of framing processes also shifted their attention towards interactive 
processes of articulation of meaning and the response they invoke from broader socio-
cultural environments. In a review of the literature, Snow and Benford (2000) identify the 
variable features of social movements that account for their differential impact on their 
target audiences. The variables that affect the degree of resonance of a frame include 
problem identification or locus of attribution, flexibility and rigidity, interpretive scopes 
and influences of those frames. To put it simply, the manner in which a problem is 
identified as a locus of action and the responsibility for the problem is attributed to certain 
actors, and the ways in which those problems are framed - rigidly or flexibly - and whether 
the frames are wide or narrow in their scopes, determine their impact on the target 
audience and the broader public. The wider, more flexible and inclusive frames that can 
resonate with broader social and cultural milieus are often referred to as ‘master 
narratives’. In addition to these generic frames, more specific frames are produced at the 
level of particular movements or individual organisations that constitute a movement.  
A useful way to capture the variability of framing processes and their differential impacts 
is to identify the sources of collective action frames and the levels at which they are 
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developed and contested. The existing literature converges on the idea that framing is a 
contested process and its impact on its audience is mediated by the material and 
institutional context in which it is formulated. Chong and Druckman (2013) highlight the 
significance of understanding the responses by adversaries in challenging and 
undermining the effects of frames in electoral mobilisation. The social movement 
literature also identifies two sources of frames: discursive and strategic. The former refers 
to meaning-making processes by individual movement members as they connect and 
align events and experiences through conversation and written communications about 
movement activities. In this process, ‘slices of observed, experienced, and/or recorded 
“reality” are assembled, collated and packaged’ (Benford & Snow , 2000, p. 623). At the 
strategic level, collective action frames become more goal-oriented, utilitarian and 
deliberative and are produced, contested, reinterpreted and transformed by social 
movement organisations and entrepreneurs as they respond to their adversaries, seek to 
mobilise supporters, and acquire resources.  
Table 1: Theories on Participation and Emergence of Social Movements, Van 
Stekenburg & Klandermans (2009, p. 20). 
 Classical 
approaches 
Contemporary approaches  
Mass Society 
Collective 
behaviour  
Resource 
mobilisation  
Political process 
approach  
Social constructivist 
approaches 
Why 
people 
protest 
Grievances, 
discontent, 
anomie, class 
conflict  
Resources, 
opportunities, 
social 
networks 
efficacy  
Political 
opportunities 
(cognitive 
liberation) 
Social construction 
of reality:  
- (meaning) 
construction 
- identity 
- emotions 
- motivations 
Who 
protests 
Alienated, 
frustrated, 
disintegrated, 
manipulated, 
marginalised 
people  
Well-
organized, 
professional, 
resourceful 
social 
networks; 
embeddedness  
Coalitions between 
challengers/political 
elites; 
embeddedness 
Countercultural 
groups, identity 
groups; 
embeddedness 
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Forms 
of 
protest 
Spontaneous, 
irrational, 
expressive, 
violent 
(panics, 
fashions, 
mobs, crime) 
Rational, 
planned, 
instrumental 
(institutional 
politics, 
lobbying, 
interest 
groups) 
Rational, 
instrumental, polity 
oriented (elite 
contention, 
lobbying, 
indigenous 
minorities, 
disruption i.e. sit-
ins, strikes)  
Ideological, 
expressive, identity-
oriented (cultural 
and religious 
organizations, self-
help groups, 
alternative lifestyles) 
 
The original formulation of the framing perspective gave rise to a prolific literature on 
various forms of collective action frames and the processes of their articulation and 
diffusion. As with other theoretical perspectives, the proliferation of the literature also 
exposed it to some important criticisms. Benford (1997), one of the original formulators 
of the perspective, pointed to a number of shortcomings of the literature towards the end 
of the 1990s. The shortcomings included lack of systematic empirical studies, a 
descriptive tendency that Benford thought trivialised the perspectives by producing a long 
list of collective action frames, a propensity to reify frames as things and static 
constructions rather than dynamic processes, a tendency to focus on frames that are 
articulated by movement elites at the expense of rank and file members, the broader public 
and the adversaries, and finally a reductionist ‘proclivity to reduce collective action and 
interaction to individual level explanation, to psychologise what is sociological’ (p. 420).  
Benford’s warning against reductionism and the danger of psychologising complex 
social, economic and political aspects of collective action also pointed to the limits of the 
framing perspective. As may have become clear so far, the framing scholars have invested 
considerable efforts to explain the conditions and mechanisms that increase or hinder the 
effects of collective action frames. The effects of frames are mediated, moderated and 
even neutralised by socio-cultural, economic and political environments in which 
collective action takes place. As Snow and Benford (2000, p. 626) put it, ‘one thing we 
do know, however, is that these framing contests occur within complex, 
P a g e  | 35 
 
multiorganizational – and sometimes multi-institutional arenas’. The question then is to 
what extent do frames matter? While stressing the significance of frames in highlighting 
collective action claims and focusing messages towards target constituencies, Ryan and 
Gamson (2006) warned against treating frames as ‘magic bullets’, a different version of 
the idea that ‘the truth will set you free’. They pointed out the significance of structural 
inequalities in power relations and uneven playing fields that often determine outcomes 
of collective action. They criticised a social marketing approach to framing that presumes 
its audience are individual citizens with individually-held views and voting rights. 
Instead, they proposed what they called a participatory communication approach, in 
which citizens are conceived as collective actors and framing is integrated to broader 
social movement building efforts, which among other things, include extensive social 
organisation and resource mobilisation. In this approach, they proposed a three-stage 
process towards successful framing: 
The first step is to map the power relations that shape structural inequalities in a given 
social and historical context. This strategic analysis informs the next phase, in which 
communities, directly affected by structural inequalities, cooperate to bring about change. 
This is empowerment through collective action. Finally, participatory communication 
models, including a third, recurring step – reflection. (p. 16).  
The importance of power relations and structural inequalities in mediating the effects of 
framing processes brings us back to the material institutions and conditions that are 
emphasised by the Political Process Model and the Resource Mobilisation perspectives. 
As Table 1 shows, the critique of the collective behaviour paradigm that began in the 
1960s paved the way for fruitful discussions of various dynamics of protest movements, 
including intra-movement dynamics as well as a movement’s interaction with its broader 
social, political and economic contexts. The upshot of these new conceptualisations was 
that social movements were no longer conceived as deviant and disruptive forms of 
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politics, and that movement participation was no longer viewed as driven by anomie and 
social alienation. To the contrary, what brings these various strands of theory together is 
the recognition that movement participants are rational and socially-integrated 
individuals who respond to opportunities, mobilise resources and tailor their messages to 
appeal to their target audiences. 
Synthesis and Extension of Empirical Foundation of Social Movement Theories  
As may have become apparent from the discussion of classical social movement theories, 
despite these major shifts since the 1960s, the field suffered from intellectual, 
geographical and disciplinary compartmentalisation. In the words of Edelman (2001, p. 
286) the debates ‘tended to occur along parallel and disconnected tracks, reflecting 
different disciplinary personal networks, and forms of socialization and inquiry and a 
major divide separating case study and grand theory practitioners’. In response to these 
criticisms, a number of scholars began to build on collaborative efforts between various 
strands of thought and critiques of each perspective to synthesise them into more coherent 
theoretical frameworks. In a review of the synthetic efforts and dialogue between various 
scholars, Oliver, Cadena-Roa and Strawn (2003) identified four emerging trends. First, 
the empirical base of the literature was being expanded from its traditional base of Europe 
and North America to cover more regions and cases of protest movements under different 
types of regimes, with important theoretical and methodological implications. Second, 
theoretically there was a shift from studies of cause and effect in particular protest 
movements as units of analysis to exploring broader processes and mechanisms that are 
at the core of complex interactions between collective action and their broader political 
contexts. Third, methodologically scholars were increasingly shifting from studies of 
particular groups to event analysis to capture the dynamic interactions and mutual 
adaptations by the movements and the states. Fourth, as a result of the above three, the 
literature was moving past the structuralist versus constructivist debates, and ‘false 
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dichotomies such as rational versus emotional, political versus psychological, material 
versus cultural and growing appreciation of the underlying unities’ (p. 215).  
To date, the most ambitious and influential such synthetic agenda is put forward by Tilly, 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2004) , the original proponents of the Political Process 
Model. In The Dynamics of Contention, the authors began by identifying and criticising 
four major intellectual traditions that underpinned classical social movement research 
since the 1960s. In their own words, these are: 
a. structuralists that ‘in their purest form, impute interests and capacities to whole 
collectivities – communities, classes, sometimes even those vague collectivities 
people call societies’ (p.21). 
b. rationalists that ‘impute direction to collectivities such as firms and states, but 
mostly focus on deliberate choices made by individuals in the light of previously 
defined interests, resources, and situational constraints’ (p.21). They sought to 
explain contention through studies of decisions and choices made by groups and 
individuals and their presumed interests, resources and constraints;  
c. phenomenologists that ‘concentrate on individuals (although sometimes 
individuals writ large), plumbing their states of awareness for explanations of 
involvement in contentious politics’ (p.21). 
d. and culturalists that ‘attribute causal power to norms, values, beliefs and symbols 
that individuals experience and absorb from outside themselves’ (p. 21).  
The authors propose a relational approach that depart from the classical approaches in 
three ways: First, it begins with a new ontological assumption that ‘treat social interaction, 
social ties, communication, and conversation not merely as expressions of structure, 
rationality, consciousness, or culture but as active sites of creation and change’ (McAdam, 
Tarrow, & Tilly, 2004, p. 22). Second, epistemologically, the relational approach moved 
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from the ambition of reaching covering-law explanations of previous approaches towards 
‘identification of causal chains consisting of mechanisms that reappear in a wide variety 
of settings but in different sequences and combinations, hence with different collective 
outcome’ (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2004, p. 23). Third, the relational approach 
incorporated elements of the social constructivist theories by recognising that actors 
engage in contentious politics in historically embedded social settings, in which 
accumulated historical experiences, past symbols and narratives make certain actions and 
outcomes appear more plausible than others.  
Table 2 Comparing Political Process and Multi-Institutional Politics Perspectives 
(Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008)  
 Political Process Multi-Institutional Politics  
Models of society 
and power  
a. Domination organized 
around the state  
b. Culture as secondary  
a. Domination organized 
around the state, other 
institutions and culture  
b. Culture as constitutive  
 
Definition of 
social movement  
a. State as target 
b. Seeks policy change, 
new benefits, or 
inclusion 
a. State, other institutions, 
and/or culture as targets 
b. Seeks policy change, new 
benefits, inclusion, 
cultural change, or 
changes in the rules of the 
game 
Definition of 
politics  
a. Related to governance, 
formal political arena 
a. Related to power, as it 
manifests itself in the 
state, other institutions, or 
culture 
Social movement 
actors  
a. Those excluded from 
the polity  
a. Those disadvantaged by 
rules organizing any 
institution 
b. Distinction between 
members and challenges 
breakdown 
c. Actors constituted in part 
by the institution(s) 
challenged 
Goals  a. Seeks policy change, 
new benefits, or 
inclusion 
b. Grievances taken-for-
granted 
a. Seeks material and 
symbolic change in 
institutions or culture; 
identity may be a goal 
b. Grievances in need of 
explanation  
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Strategy  a. Outside of 
conventional political 
channels 
b. Considered 
“instrumental” if 
seeking policy change, 
“expressive” if seeking 
cultural change  
a. Depends on logic of 
institutions: dominations 
reinforced by multiple 
institutions is difficult to 
challenge, and 
institutional 
contradictions can be 
exploited 
b. Instrumental/expressive 
distinction irrelevant  
Key research 
questions  
a. Under what conditions 
do challenges 
originate, survive and 
succeed? 
a. Why do challenges take 
the forms that they do? 
What does the interaction 
between challengers and 
target tell us about the 
nature of domination in 
society? Under what 
conditions do challenges 
originate, survive, and 
succeed?  
 
The contentious politics approach has come under new criticisms. Critics have argued 
that the approach has sought to do too much, that it suffers from a state-centric bias and 
that its emphasis on mechanisms and processes was leading to ‘mechanisms talk’, with 
the proliferation of too many mechanisms that lacked conceptual clarity and empirical 
foundation (Norkus, 2005; McAdam & Tarrow, 2011) One of the most significant 
criticisms came from Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) who also used the existing 
critiques to formulate an alternative approach which they called Multi-Institutional 
Politics. As Table 2 shows, Armstrong and Bernstein expose some of the underlying 
assumptions of these approaches more broadly by questioning the most basic assumptions 
held by their proponents about the models of society, nature of politics, and definition of 
social movements, and the implications they have for a movement strategy, tactics and 
goals.  
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Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the rise and gradual evolution of the 
scholarly literature on social movements. In its historical shift from the collective 
behaviour paradigm to collective action theories, research and analysis of collective 
action were guided by a set of factors. These include (a) the changing nature of social and 
political movements as subjects of scholarly research; (b) rise, decline and synthesis of 
broader social science theories and approaches; and (c) the personal experience of the 
scholars who studied social movements, including many who were themselves activists 
of protest movements in Western countries during the 1960s.  
The historical trajectory of the literature offers a few important lessons. First, the various 
theoretical traditions provide a wide range of theoretical tools, concepts and methods for 
understanding extremely complex and constantly-evolving social phenomena. Protest 
movements are often at the heart of more complex struggles for social control and change 
and as a result may take different forms depending on both the time and specific context 
in which they emerge.  
Second, at its core a social movement is a form of collective action. The ability of people 
to engage in collective endeavours is constrained or enhanced by their social and political 
contexts, the volume of resources they have at their disposal, and their ability to craft a 
unifying and persuasive message. To put it simply, politics, material resources and culture 
affect and shape prospects for such collective endeavours.  
Third, that collective actions are deeply influenced by their contexts raises a more 
fundamental question about the applicability of social movement theories to enormously 
different social, political and economic conditions outside the liberal democracies of 
Western Europe and North America. In other words, the question is whether theoretical 
tools and concepts developed on the basis of the experiences of movements in liberal 
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democracies can offer any lessons for understanding collective actions in undemocratic, 
illiberal contexts that may be characterised by low levels of socio-economic development, 
authoritarian political rule, or weak or non-existent authority.  
Fourth, social movement theories are also the products of experiences of Western scholar 
activists, many of whom were activists of the movements they studied and held strong 
political and cultural preferences. This gave rise to a strong isomorphic tendency in the 
literature, which lead to a disproportionate focus on what were regarded as progressive 
and liberal-democratic movements. Consequently, movements that demanded changes 
that were considered illiberal or unprogressive were sidelined and continue to be poorly 
represented in the literature.  
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Chapter 3: Research Scope, Approach and Methods 
Introduction  
The previous chapter provided a general overview of the historical trajectory and the main 
theoretical traditions of the literature on social movements and contentious politics. In 
this chapter, I narrow down the scope of the thesis by clarifying and delineating its main 
focus, identifying a gap in the literature and explaining my own theoretical and 
methodological approaches. The next section sets the broad context of the study by 
presenting a brief overview of existing perspectives on fragile states and deeply divided 
societies. It concludes that a state’s inability to enforce its authority over its population 
and territory uniformly, to provide basic services, and to develop effective and legitimate 
institutions provides important opportunities and constraints for social movements. The 
second section explains the main gaps in social movement theories as employed in the 
contexts of fragile and disrupted states. The third section provides a critical overview of 
the existing scholarly work on social movements and contentious politics in developing 
countries and fragile states. The fourth section specifies in more details the research 
question and methods of the thesis. The fifth section describes the overall explanatory 
and research approach of the thesis before offering some concluding remarks.  
Setting the Context: Contentious Politics in Fragile States  
To narrow down the focus of this thesis, it is useful to draw on the title of a book by 
Sidney Tarrow (2012), Strangers at the Gate, which he uses to describe the positions of 
contentious actors in relation to institutional politics. Tarrow argues that these challengers 
occupy a distinctive position on ‘the boundaries of constituted politics, culture, and 
institutions’ (p. 13) on the one hand, and extra-institutional, unconventional and thus 
challenging forms of politics, on the other. Despite their strange positions, these actors 
play important roles in processes of political change and stability. Towards the end of the 
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1990s, some scholars suggested that at the turn of the century these strangers were being 
integrated into routine politics. For example, Meyer and Tarrow (1998) argued that 
protests and social movements were ‘becoming largely institutionalized in advanced 
industrial democracies – so much so that classical social movement modes of action may 
be becoming part of the conventional repertoire of participation’ (p. 4). Hence, the 
strangers were being recognised as normal social and political actors.  
The institutionalisation and integration of protest movements were occurring in the liberal 
democratic countries of the West (Soule & Earl, 2005). Characterised by high levels of 
economic development, liberal-democratic political orders, and strong state institutions 
capable of providing security, rule of law and basic services to their citizens, these 
societies were also home to the intellectual resources that shaped social movement 
research and theorising. To use the key notions of Social Movement Theory, these 
societies offer structures of political opportunity, socio-economic resources and cultural 
environments that may be lacking or different in non-Western societies. Societies and 
states outside the liberal-democratic West cannot be placed in one camp. Depending on 
weaknesses and strengths of states, types of political regimes, levels of socio-economic 
development, nature of social conflicts, and cultural and historical experiences, these 
societies present different types of opportunities and constraints, socio-cultural 
environments, and different types and levels of resources (Boudreau, 1996). 
Consequently, it is important to ask whether and how social movement theory might be 
used to understand and explain similar collective actions in different contexts. 
In practice, while the scholarly literature on social movements tends to be informed by 
Western movements and societies, the idea and tactics of social movement as a form of 
social and political mobilisation are not. Yet research on non-Western social movements 
remains sporadic and limited. Outside Europe and North America, there is a strong 
tradition of research on Latin American protest movements established by scholars in 
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universities in the region as well as Western scholars (Oliver, Cadena-Roa, & Straw, 
2003). Studies of contentious politics in other regions tend to be sporadic and inconsistent, 
and where they are conducted, the research is often concerned particular protest 
movements that attract international significance such as the Islamist movements in the 
Islamic world or the 2011 Arab Spring protest movements in the Middle East and North 
Africa (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Beinin & Vairel, 2011). 
In this thesis, I focus on contentious politics in a particular non-Western context: 
Afghanistan, a fragile state, disrupted by external invasions and manipulation, and 
struggling to overcome nearly four decades of armed conflict, foreign intervention and 
massive social, economic and political dislocation. Afghanistan offers an illustrative 
example of states that are often described as weak, fragile or disrupted, and its society as 
violently divided along entrenched ethnic, religious or linguistic lines. In other words, 
these catchwords of the international relations, political science and development lexicon 
describe some of the poorest, least stable and most conflict-prone states. These states face 
some of the most difficult developmental challenges. The developmental challenges 
facing some of these states were most powerfully highlighted by Collier in his seminal 
book, The Bottom Billion (2007). Collier argued that about one billion people in 60 states 
have been falling behind the rest of the world on all development indicators since the 
1980s. He argued that these states are stuck in four development traps of conflict, 
dependence on natural resources, poor governance, and being landlocked with bad 
neighbours. According to the OECD, more than 1.6 billion, or 22 percent of the world’s 
population, live in fragile states. By 2050, the number of people living in fragile situations 
is expected to reach 3 billion, or 32 percent of the world population (OECD, 2016, p. 24).  
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State Fragility 
Although most fragile states are poor, state fragility does not necessarily correlate with 
the level of income of countries. The usual list of fragile states includes countries of 
different income groups. From among 56 fragile states in 2016, 27 are lower income, 25 
are lower middle income, and 4 are upper middle income countries (OECD, 2016, p. 24). 
Nevertheless, about half of the world’s poor are living in fragile states, and while the 
number of people living in extreme poverty elsewhere is decreasing, conflict and violence 
continue to keep large sections of these societies in extreme poverty. By 2035, it is 
expected that 80 percent of the world’s poorest population will live in fragile states 
(OECD, 2016, p. 79) 
To understand how contexts of political contention might differ in these societies in 
comparison to developed Western societies, it is useful to review briefly two major 
debates. First, a more dominant strand of thinking among Western scholars and policy 
makers has focused on the weakness and precariousness of state institutions in these 
countries. The exact nature, causes and consequences of state fragility are widely 
contested. Developmental economics often emphasises economic indicators such as the 
rate of economic growth and level of poverty. By contrast, international relations scholars, 
often concerned with regional and international security and security consequences of 
state weakness, tend to focus on the ability of states to secure their borders and territories. 
Still others have focused on internal socio-political dimensions of states as the primary 
drivers of crisis and state weakness (Rotberg, 2004; Hannan & Besada, 2007; Mcloughlin, 
2016).  
Emphasising the complexity and variation in forms of state disruption, Saikal (2003) 
make a distinction between five separate types of disrupted states: (1) states that 
experience open conflicts but remain recognised as distinct entities within the 
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international system; (2) states that have failed to achieve consolidated control over their 
territories and are contested by their neighbours; (3) embryonic states in which the ruling 
authorities are challenged by local populations; (4) states that have been isolated by the 
international system as a result of their violation of international laws and norms; and (5) 
states that do not experience open conflicts but are experiencing deep undercurrents of 
instability which are kept under control by powerful military institutions. 
The notion of fragile states has been criticised on a number of grounds. Critics have 
argued that it assumes a particular model of Weberian state and consequently focuses on 
the executive institutions of centralised states and as a result fails to capture the social and 
political complexity of these societies (Grimm, Lemay-Hébert, & Nay, 2014). Others 
have criticised it as a donor-serving notion that fails to take into consideration the role of 
donor countries in fragilities of many states around the world (Barakat & Larson, 2014). 
Still others, have argued against the terms of state failure and state collapse that result 
from the literature. Maley, Sampford and Thakur (2003, p.3), emphasising the 
international community’s role in and responsibility for disintegration of such states, 
argue that the ‘terminologies of failure or collapse sound rather too absolute and/or 
judgemental, and run the risk of detracting from the complexities of the problems with 
which it may be necessary to deal’. Instead, they suggest that these states be described as 
‘disrupted states’ to account for the role of the international community and other states 
in disintegration of these states through open military invasions or more subtle political 
meddling in their domestic affairs.  
Regardless of scholarly or policy focus on its particular dimension or causal factors, 
fragility has important implications for the capacity and legitimacy of the state and its 
role in shaping collective action. Stewart and Brown (2007) define fragile states by triple 
failures: (i) authority failure which results from inability of state institutions to protect 
and secure their citizens and territories; (ii) service failure: the state fails to provide basic 
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services to most of its citizens; (iii) legitimacy failure: because of its inability to defend 
and serve most or large sections of its population, the state enjoys little and limited 
legitimacy.  
Deep Social Divisions  
Another strand of scholarship since the 1970s focus on the nature and conflict-proneness 
of social divisions in these countries. In contrast to the literature on state fragility that 
emphasises an inability of state institutions to protect and provide services to their citizens 
and territories, this literature emphasises rigidity of social divisions and the implications 
they may have for the state and political order in these societies. The phrase ‘deeply 
divided societies’ gained widespread currency after it was used by Nordlinger in Conflict 
Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies (1972) to describe societies that are divided by 
communal rifts and vertical segmentations. Subsequently, Lustick (1979, p. 325) argued 
that in such societies,  
ascriptive ties generate antagonistic segmentation of society, based on terminal 
identities, with high political salience, sustained over a substantial period of time 
and a wide variety of issues. As a minimum condition, boundaries between rival 
groups must be sharp enough so that membership is clear and, with few 
exceptions, unchangeable.  
The literature on so-called deeply-divided societies began with the assumption that social 
divisions of various kinds are common in all societies, but in deeply-divided societies 
some, often primordial, divisions are deeply entrenched. The significance of ascriptive 
ties as sources of social antagonism and segmentation means that in these societies, group 
memberships are mostly involuntary, and ascriptive sources of identity such as ascribed 
ethnic identity, religion and language form the basis of vertical social differentiation 
among ethnic, religious, or linguistic communities. Guelke (2012, p. 30), who offers a 
recent survey of the literature, argues that in such societies, ‘conflict exists along a well-
entrenched fault line that is recurrent and endemic and that contains the potential for 
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violence between the segments’. Under such circumstances individuals have limited 
opportunities to define their identities on the basis of their acquired ties such as their 
occupation and socio-economic status. Consequently, group-based and ascriptive 
identities assume greater roles in shaping social and political relations. Nonetheless, the 
level of significance of ethnic identities in political conflicts varies over time and from 
country to country. In extreme examples of deeply-divided societies the predominance of 
ethnicity as a fault-line of conflict and division creates ‘ethnic seepage’, a tendency to 
view and assess all social and political changes through an ethnic lens. In other words, 
ethnicity becomes the main organising principle of social, political and economic life 
(Horowitz, 1985, pp. 7-8).  
At the extreme, ethnic identities become sources of competing or exclusionary 
conceptions of statehood and political legitimacy and lead to protracted conflicts and civil 
wars. Such situations result from a combination of historical processes and configurations 
of ethno-political power that can divide a society between a dominant ethnic group and 
dominated ethnic groups. Yiftachel and Ghanem (2004, p. 649) argue that such countries 
constitute ‘ethnocracy’, which they define as ‘a regime facilitating the expansion, 
ethnicization and control of contested territory and state by a dominant ethnic nation’. 
These regimes are the products of three political and historical processes: ‘settler 
colonialism’, either from one state to another or by members of the dominant ethnic group 
from within the country; ethno-nationalist ideologies which provides political legitimacy 
to the expansionist and territorial claims of the dominant ethnic group; and ‘a conspicuous 
“ethnic logic” of capital, which tends to stratify ethnic groups through uneven processes 
of capital mobility, immigration and economic globalization’ (2004, p. 650). These 
processes introduce a fundamental difference that distinguishes ethnocracies from other 
regimes: 
P a g e  | 49 
 
A central point is that in ethnocratic regimes, the notion of the ‘demos’ is crucially 
ruptured. That is, the community of equal resident-citizens (the demos) does not 
feature high in the country’s policies, agenda, imagination, symbols or resource 
distribution, and is therefore not nurtured or facilitated (Yiftachel & Ghanem, 
2004, p. 650). 
Consequently, an ethnocracy is, by definition, an ethnically-stratified society in which 
ethnicity rather than citizenship is used as a basis for distribution of resources and power. 
The distribution of power and resources on the basis of ethnic identities privileges group 
identities as the main source and driver of political conflicts. The type of ethnic and other 
forms of deep social divisions also matter. Guelke (2012, pp. 1,10) makes a distinction 
between vertical divisions that separates groups that are roughly equal in status and 
power, and horizontal divisions, in which members of one community are dominated by 
another. Both types of divisions tend to generate particular patterns of violence and 
instability. Vertically divided societies tend to generate ‘tit for tat’ violence, involving 
communities that are roughly equal in status and power. By contrast, in horizontally-
divided societies, the dominant groups can preside over long periods of stability but once 
their dominance is challenged, these societies are also likely to experience particularly 
intractable crises. In both contexts, the propensity towards violent conflicts remains high, 
making security the most perennial concern for all. 
The challenges of state fragility and social divisions become all the more obvious in 
societies such as Afghanistan that have gone through protracted violence and instability 
and struggle to manage complex transitions from war to peace. While it can be debated 
whether social divisions are responsible for weak political institutions or the other way 
around, it is evident that prolonged violent conflict has profound implications for the both 
the state and the society. At the societal level, while some social divisions may precede 
violent conflict, others follow or become more potent after it. Wood (2008) highlights the 
importance of understanding what she calls the ‘social processes of civil war’. In her 
study of civil wars in Peru, El Salvador, Sri Lanka and Sierra Leone, she argues that civil 
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wars polarise social identities, fragment political economies, and militarise state 
authorities. These changes, she argues, ‘reconfigure social networks in a variety of ways, 
creating new networks, dissolving some, and changing the structure of others’ (p. 539).  
War and violence can severely weaken or even destroy formal state authorities and 
produce long-term social consequences that are significant for the ability of movements 
to emerge and sustain challenges against state authority. As Maley (2006) argues, in 
Afghanistan decades of war and instability disrupted the Afghan state and left it with the 
dual problems of capacity and legitimacy. The state lacks the capacity to exercise 
effective authority over its people or its territories which then diminishes its ability to 
claim popular normative support. In societies so disrupted by war and state failure, trust 
in state institution, particularly in matters of security and survival, is a common casualty. 
In such situations, non-state social formations such as tribal or ethnic groups may gain 
more significance by taking on a role of ‘mutual-support association, bound together by 
strong norms of reciprocity based on shared lineage’ (p. 19). As Paris and Sisk (2009, p. 
1) have argued a post-war statebuilding usually ‘combines three separate yet 
simultaneous transitions, each posing its own tremendous challenges: a social transition 
from internecine fighting to peace; a political transition from wartime government (or the 
absence of government) to postwar government; and an economic transition from war-
warped accumulation and distribution to equitable, transparent postwar development that 
in turn reinforces peace.  
To recap the discussion here, state fragility and disruption in this thesis is defined in terms 
of triple weaknesses in enforcing its authority over its people and territory uniformly, in 
providing basic services, and in developing effective and legitimate state institutions. 
These weaknesses present highly complex situations that present social movements with 
important constraints and opportunities.  
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Stating the Problem: State Weakness and Contention 
As may have become clear so far, state fragility, deep social divisions or disruptions of 
states by exogenous forces have important implications for contentious politics. As Meyer 
and Tarrow have argued, modern social movements are closely linked to strong and 
capable nation-states.  
Movements became a viable way of making claims in national politics when the 
consolidated nation-state assured its citizens regular means of communication, 
created standard but fungible identities, provided challengers with uniform targets and 
fulcra for acting collectively (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998, pp. 4-5).  
In fragile states, state institutions that were conceived to be central in shaping political 
opportunities and discourses in Western societies may have weak and sporadic capacities 
to exercise their authority. Similarly, in deeply-divided societies, predetermined ethnic, 
religious and other forms of collective identities may subsume and overshadow the 
multiple, voluntary and overlapping social ties that are essential to the emergence and 
durability of cross-cleavage social movements in Western societies. When applied to 
fragile states, three particular shortcoming of the literature are worth highlighting here.  
Ideological and geographical limitations 
Despite the broadening of the conceptual and theoretical framework of social movement 
theories that were developed from the 1960s, empirically the literature is based on 
movements in western liberal democracies. The empirical base of theoretical efforts has 
created a strong normative and ideological preference: scholars studying western social 
movements have mostly focused on what are usually considered as liberal and progressive 
movements such as the New Left, civil rights, women rights, anti-war, environmental and 
more recently sexual minority rights movements. The normative preference partly results 
from the fact that scholars have tended to study movements with which they sympathised. 
In the words of della Porta (2014) ‘This has often brought about a normative urgency 
towards a knowledge oriented towards not only scientific theorisation, but also towards a 
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societal intervention’ (p. 3). Consequently, the theoretical efforts are also deeply 
embedded in the history of Western intellectual traditions and as such reflect normative 
and intellectual inclinations of their main proponents and shifting ideological trends of 
their societies. 
 In an analysis of geographical and topical focus of the two leading social movement 
journals, Social Movement Studies and Mobilization, Poulson, Caswell and Graya (2014) 
found that between 2001 and 2010, 77% and 72% of the contents of the two journals 
respectively concerned the study of Western societies and movements. While the authors 
noted that in comparison to similar other fields of inquiry, social movement research was 
worldlier and less West-Centric, they argued that a combination of isomorphic normative 
and parochial tendencies meant that most scholars often study societies with which they 
are familiar and movements in which they were themselves active. Consequently, many 
movements that appear awkward, including conservative movements in the West, remain 
understudied. The isomorphic and parochial tendencies are also evident in the relatively 
limited application of Social Movement Theories in developing and fragile states. Even 
when social movements of developing countries are studied, the focus tends to be on what 
are regarded as progressive movements such as women, youth, peace, and socio-
environmental movements (Earle, 2011). Such isomorphic tendencies lead to an implicit 
assumption that the processes and mechanisms of formation and evolution of progressive 
movements are different from the more awkward one that promote more conservative 
values or shifts towards violent strategies.  
Western-Style Conception of State-Society Relations  
What follows from the ideological preferences and Western-centric empirical foundation 
is a particular conception of state-society relations in the contentious politics literature 
(Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008). The role of the state, more specifically government 
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institutions, remains central to most conceptions of the political process and contentious 
politics theorists. The assumption of a territorially-bounded Weberian-style state, 
exercising ultimate authority over its people and territory, is particularly strong in the 
Political Process Model and the Contentious Politics approach that followed it. What 
follows from this basic assumption is that actors, including challengers and polity 
members, rise and decline primarily in response to the opening and closure of 
opportunities through institutional changes or shifts in power relations.  
While governments certainly remain a powerful actor, as discussed above, in many 
societies government institutions lack both the capacity and democratic legitimacy to 
exercise effective control over all their territories and populations. Furthermore, while the 
dominant theories of contentious politics tend to analyse contention in relation to 
Western-style strong states and highly diverse socio-economic differentiation, in practice 
all forms of contention, including social movements, occur in a diverse range of societies. 
In particular, the diffusion of social movement tactics and activities in fragile states such 
as Afghanistan raises a number of critical questions for the academic literature on 
contention. In contrast to Western liberal democracies, Afghanistan and many similar 
states around the world remain weak and fragile, presiding over fragmented and divided 
societies.  
The Puzzle of Political Islam 
The relationship between state weakness or failure and social movements is nowhere 
more evident than in the debates on the nature and evolution of Islamist movements. The 
rise and spread in recent decades of the movements that use Islam as an ideological 
framework for political change have been the object of intense debates among scholars 
and activists and their opponents alike. While the rise and spread of political Islam has 
been extensively debated (Rubin, 2010; Akbarzadeh, 2012), a particular dimension of the 
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debate needs to be highlighted here. The debate concerns the impact and internal 
evolution of the Islamist movements. As noted earlier, Olivier Roy (1994), famously 
argued that political Islam had failed by the 1990s. For Roy, the causes of the failure were 
intellectual as well as historical. Historically, he argued that the Islamists had proven 
unable to invent a new political order, including in countries where they had gained power 
such as Iran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The intellectual source of failure was even 
more important: 
The failure is primarily an intellectual one. Islamic thought rests on an initial premise 
that destroys its own innovative elements: on the one hand, as the logic goes, the 
existence of an Islamic political society is a necessary condition for the believer to 
achieve total virtue; but on the other hand, such as society functions only by virtue of 
its members, beginning with its leaders (Roy, 1994, pp. ix-x).  
In a similar way, encouraged by the reformist movements in Iran during the 1990s, Bayat 
(1996) advanced an argument that postulated that in the course of their experimentation 
with top-down Islamisation, Islamist movements were metamorphosing into a post-
Islamist phase.  
By “post-Islamism” I mean a condition where, following a phase of 
experimentation, the appeal, energy, symbols and sources of legitimacy of 
Islamism get exhausted, even among its once-ardent supporters. As such, post- 
Islamism is not anti-Islamic, but rather reflects a tendency to resecularize religion. 
Predominantly, it is marked by a call to limit the political role of religion (1996, 
p. 45). 
Despite these predictions, across the Muslim-majority countries, in recent decades secular 
nationalist, leftist and liberal forces have been in retreat and Islamists have remained as 
highly formidable forces. In 1979, several decades of Iranian modernist and 
constitutionalist movements culminated with the Islamic Revolution which replaced a 
modernising monarchy with an Islamic theocracy that has since effectively repressed and 
marginalised its secular competitors. In Afghanistan, as will be discussed in chapter 4, 
the Islamists moved from their marginal position in the 1960s to become dominant 
political forces. More recently, the initial euphoria of the Arab Spring that promised the 
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spread of liberal democracy to the Middle East quickly subsided as Islamist groups such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists proved to be more effective in appealing to 
the masses and winning elections than their liberal competitors. In short, political Islam 
which once appeared to have failed is on the rise, raising the longstanding question of 
whether Islam is compatible with liberal democracy (Hamid, 2014; Esposito, Sonn and 
Voll, 2016) 
Does the apparent victory of Islamists in Afghanistan prove that Islamists have a political 
advantage over their secular rivals? This seemingly straightforward question that 
Cammett and Luong (2014) ask in their review of the literature on Islamic movements is 
a central question of this research. If there is such a thing as an Islamist advantage, what 
are its sources? Cammett and Luong identify three major explanations for the alleged 
superiority of Islamic movements. First, Islamic movements are believed to gain an edge 
through provision of social services. The key premise behind this explanation is that 
Islamists win the hearts and minds of local Muslim communities through provision of 
important welfare services, particularly in areas where the state is weak and ineffective 
in offering such services. Second, Islamic movements enjoy greater organisational 
capacity since they are endowed with effective and easily-available mobilising structures 
such as mosques, charities, human capital in the form of devout followers, and 
independent sources of financing such as religious donations. Third, Islamists are thought 
to enjoy an ideological hegemony which they derive either from the particular 
characteristic of Islam as a total system of social organisation, or from the failure of 
competing modern ideologies such as nationalism, socialism and liberalism to take root 
in the Muslim world. Without disputing the importance of these factors, the authors add 
reputation of Islamists as ‘competent, trust worthy and pure’ as proximate cause of the 
Islamists’ superiority.  
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It is, however, important to acknowledge one major risk of this debate in general and this 
research in particular. As Roy (2007) has shown, the debate over secularism and Islamism 
can inadvertently contribute to an essentialising and generalising dichotomy between 
Islam, on the one hand, and a secular modernity as it developed in the Europe, on the 
other. Such an overly-simplified view that treats Islam as a timeless and unique system 
of thought and practice, and Western secularisation as one single process incompatible 
with religion and religiosity, can obscure the diverse historical pathways and significant 
variations between and within both Islamist movements and Western secularisation 
experiences.  
Theorising Contention in Fragile and Divided Societies 
The three main shortcomings of social movement theories, described above, raise the 
question: Does the theory need to be modified before it can be applied in the contexts of 
fragile states? Some scholars have attempted to do precisely this. Over the past two 
decades, a number of scholars have attempted to theorise how divergent contexts of weak 
or authoritarian states or deep social divisions shape the context for contentious politics.  
Asef Bayat and Life as Politics Approach  
In the course of many years of continuous research on movements in the Middle East, 
Bayat has critically engaged with the Western theories of social movements, asking 
whether scholars who applied social movement theories to non-Western contexts, 
‘‘borrow’ from rather than critically and productively engage with and thus contribute to 
social movement theories’ (Bayat, 2005, p. 892). For example, in emphasising the internal 
fluidity and dynamism of Islamist movements and thus their variation, Bayat (2005) 
argues that Islamist movements have been constructing ‘imagined solidarities’. This, he 
argued, was the key to the ability of Islamists to gain unity of action and purpose in spite 
of their significant internal differences.  
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Perhaps, the most significant outcome of Bayat’s years of critical engagement with the 
social movement theories is his book, Life as Politics, How Ordinary People Change the 
Middle East (2010). The book critically engages with social movement theories by 
questioning uncritical application of the theories beyond their Western and liberal-
democratic contexts. The main point of departure of the book is the assumption that 
Middle Eastern societies offer a particular context for collective action. Bayat begins by 
analysing the impact of neoliberal socioeconomic reforms such as the Structural 
Adjustment Programs of the 1980s. He argues that these reforms deregulated markets and 
cut spending on limited public welfare programmes that existed in the Third World 
countries and consequently led to erosion of a social contract between state elites and 
society. The effects of gradual removal of state welfare programmes were subsequently 
amplified by globalisation, with its double process of integration and social exclusion and 
marginalisation. These broad processes of political and socioeconomic change created 
new solidarities, reproducing social identities and creating new spaces for political 
struggle, for which existing theories cannot account. How the do the subaltern and the 
urban grassroots respond to the global processes of restructuring? Bayat argues that the 
urban poor respond through a policy of quiet and gradual encroachment. He defined quiet 
encroachment as  
…noncollective but prolonged direct actions of dispersed individuals and families 
to acquire the basic necessities of their lives (land for shelter, urban collective 
consumption or urban services, informal work, business opportunities, and public 
space) in a quiet and unassuming legal fashion (p. 45).  
While similar to James Scott’s (1985) notion of everyday resistance, the concept of 
everyday encroachment offers an innovative way of looking at forms of resistance against 
oppression in authoritarian states of the Middle East; it is more applicable to countries 
with strong and authoritarian states that effectively close opportunities for more organised 
and public forms of contention. Furthermore, as events of the Arab Spring in 2011-12 
showed, quiet encroachment is only one aspect of what the poor and subaltern groups do 
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in these societies. Thus organised and strategic forms of contention must be considered 
in any theoretical accounts of contention in the region.  
John Nagle’s Approach to Study of Social Movements in Divided Societies  
Nagle (2016) is among the few Western scholars who have attempted to theorise the role 
of social movements in divided societies. In his studies of protest movements in Lebanon 
and Northern Ireland, he found that the particular division of political power and 
resources between what are considered salient ethnic groups tends to exclude groups that 
do not identify with any particular ethnic identity. Furthermore, consociational 
arrangements also encourage top-down, elite-driven forms of politics that limit the space 
for non-ethnic forms of politics and reduce civil society groups to auxiliaries of ethnic 
parties. Despite these major structural impediments, Nagle (2016, pp. 9-41) finds that 
non-sectarian social movements play important roles in divided societies. He identifies 
four types of non-sectarian movements: Transformationist, pluralist, cosmopolitan and 
commonists. Transformationists seek to transform group identities by actively 
discouraging identity politics and presenting an alternative to the sectarian system. 
Pluralists seek to encourage recognition of more diverse forms of identities in addition to 
the main ethno-national identities. These include sexual minority groups and other group-
based identities that are excluded from the ethno-national configuration of power. 
Cosmopolitans are more concerned about global issues such as environmental 
degradation, war, and financial risks that they think are more important than the parochial 
questions of domestic ethno-national politics. Finally, commonist movements focus on 
issues and concerns that resonate across the social cleavages. Such mobilisations are often 
momentary and do not last long after the specific goals for which they had mobilised had 
been achieved.  
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Tilly, and Regimes and Repertoires of Contention  
What accounts for variations in forms and intensity of contention across time and space? 
Tilly, who was the leading and most influential proponent of the Political Process Model, 
dedicated a substantial amount of time in his later years to theorising the variation of 
contention across time and space (Tilly, 2006; Tilly, 2008). Tilly used the metaphors of 
performance and repertoire to analyse both the stability and variation of claim-making 
across time and space. Performances are collective actions that link ‘at least two actors, a 
claimant and an object of claims’ (Tilly, 2006, p. 35), and clumped together, they 
constitute repertoires, defined as ‘claim making routines that apply to the same claimant-
object pairs: bosses and workers, peasants and landlords, rival nationalist factions, and 
many more’ (Tilly, 2006, p. 35). The claim making performances and repertoires are 
loosely scripted theatres of collective action that are born out of historical experiences 
and learning and change and alter through internal improvisation or major environmental 
changes. 
Tilly sought to locate the source of change in repertoires in a dynamic causal relationship 
between political regimes and political contention. He believed that contention and 
political regimes interact and influence one another over a wide range of circumstances. 
He adopted a broad definition of political contention that ‘includes any individual’s or 
group’s making of consequential claims on another individual or group. 
“Consequential” means the claims, if realized, affect their object’s interests’ (Tilly, 2006, 
p. 20). Such broadly defined, contentious politics include a wide range of collective 
political struggles, including revolutions, insurgencies, strikes and social movements. It 
is evident that making of consequential claims can take highly diverse forms, ranging 
from submitting formal petitions to relevant authorities, through protesting peacefully in 
the streets, to violent confrontations as in coups, revolutions and armed insurgencies. 
Tilly argued that three factors interact to shape the prevailing repertoires of claim making 
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in any particular context: (1) structures and organisation of everyday social life, (2) 
cumulative experience and collective learning, and (3) types of the prevailing regime 
(Tilly, 2006, p. 42). From among the three, Tilly explains changes and variations in 
repertoires of contention in terms of political regimes, which he used to refer to broader 
political environment He defines the regime as ‘the set of relationships among a 
government and the major political actors within the government’s jurisdiction that 
interact routinely with each other and the government’ (Tilly, 2008, p. 148).  
Whether political struggle takes the form of violent conflicts or peaceful social 
movements depends on the types of regimes. Tilly developed a basic taxonomy of 
political regimes based on two dimensions of governmental capacity and democracy to 
account for a dynamic and mutual interaction between change in regime types and 
repertoires of contention. He defined capacity as ‘the extent to which rulers’ deliberate 
actions affect distributions of people, activities, and resources within the government’s 
territory’ (Tilly, 2006, p. 16). A regime can also fall on a democratic-undemocratic 
continuum depending on ‘the extent to which persons subject to the government’s 
authority have broad, equal rights to influence governmental affairs and to receive 
protection from arbitrary governmental action’ (Tilly, 2006, p. 16).  
How does the level of capacity and democracy in a regime influence the character of 
contentious political performances? Tilly argued that depending on their capacity and 
level of democracy, regimes influence the repertoires of contention through prescribing 
or tolerating some forms of political behaviours, and forbidding and punishing others. It 
is obvious that democratisation reduces the ranges of prescribed performances and 
increases the range of tolerated forms of political behaviour, and despotic and 
authoritarian regimes prescribe particular public performances and tolerate few forms of 
opposition and challenge to their rule. Regime capacity matters too for the simple reason 
that it is about the ability of a regime to enforce what it prescribes or proscribes on its 
P a g e  | 61 
 
citizens. Historically, high-capacity regimes were rare and high-capacity democratic 
regimes are even rarer. This leads Tilly to the following four-fold typology of regimes 
with different patterns of contention (Tilly, 2006, p. 81) 
Low-Capacity Nondemocratic: few prescribed performances; medium range of 
tolerated performances; much of contention via forbidden performances; low 
involvement of government agents in contention; high levels of violence in 
contentious interactions.  
High-Capacity Nondemocratic: many prescribed performances; narrow range of 
tolerated performances; almost all contention by means of forbidden 
performances; high involvement of government agents in contention (often as 
principals); medium levels of violence in contentious interactions.  
Low-Capacity Democratic: few prescribed performances; broad range of tolerated 
performances; extensive overlap of contention with both prescribed and tolerated 
performances; medium involvement of government agents in contention (often as 
principals); medium levels of violence in contentious interactions.  
High-Capacity Democratic: few prescribed performances; medium range of 
tolerated performances; contention overlapping somewhat with prescribed and 
tolerated performances; high involvement of government agents in contention 
(often as third parties); low levels of violence in contentious interactions.  
To put it simply, in high-capacity and undemocratic regimes, contention tends to the take 
the forms of clandestine opposition, brief direct confrontation which often ends with 
repression. In high-capacity, democratic regimes social movements become the 
predominant forms of contention. By contrast, low capacity undemocratic regimes tends 
to encourage civil wars and low-capacity democratic regimes are susceptible to coups and 
ethno-religious conflicts.  
Although Tilly uses the broader concept of regimes, when he specifies the causal links 
between regime type and forms of contention he focuses on governments’ capacity to 
enforce, encourage, or ban certain forms of contention. As he puts it:  
Schematically, every government distinguishes among claim-making 
performances that it prescribes (e.g., pledges of allegiance), those it tolerates (e.g., 
petitioning), and those it forbids (e.g., assassination of officials). The exact 
contours of the three categories vary from regime to regime as a result of 
accumulated bargains between rulers and their subject populations (Tilly, 2008, 
p. 149) 
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Government capacity indeed shapes the prevailing forms of contention in many societies. 
However, Tilly (Tilly, 2006) also notes, if not applied carefully, the analysis of the 
connection between regime types and forms of contention becomes almost tautological 
as in pointing to ‘prevalence of strikes under industrial capitalism or the concentration of 
peasant revolts in large-landlord systems’ (Tilly, 2006, p. 3). As the previous section on 
fragile states demonstrated, in many countries governments lack the capacity and 
legitimacy to exercise their authority uniformly across their territories. Although Tilly’s 
typology of regimes includes countries with weak governments, it still remains a 
government-centric analysis. Consequently, the model fails to capture the role of non-
state actors in prescribing, proscribing and as a result shaping forms of social and political 
struggles. Furthermore, the model also assumes a territorially-bounded state in which 
regime type and contention interact with one another independently of external 
influences. As the case of Afghanistan will demonstrate, in states disrupted by foreign 
interference, foreign actors, including other states, exercise heavy influence on the 
capacity of governments to exercise their authority and the ability of challenging groups 
to mount and maintain successful challenges to state authority. 
 Research Question and Method 
As mentioned in the Introduction, in its broad scholarly orientation, this thesis focuses on 
the intersection of literatures on fragile and disrupted states and contentious politics, and 
seeks to answer two primary questions: First, how might state fragility shape contentious 
politics? And second, do state fragility and disruption create conditions that favour 
particular groups or forms of contention?  
What methods are appropriate for answering these questions? Methodologically, the field 
of study of social movements and contentious politics is marked by a high degree of 
pluralism. As Donatella della Porta (2014) argues in her introduction to the 
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Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research, driven by a lack of reliable 
databases of contentious politics and scholars’ own theoretical and disciplinary 
backgrounds and normative preferences, students of contentious politics have been highly 
pragmatic and problem-oriented in their approach. As a result, the field is characterised 
by diverse practices in methodological approach and data collection and analysis.  
Notwithstanding this methodological pluralism, the existing literature tends to focus on 
one of three cores units of analysis. First, scholars who focus on individual participants 
in contentious politics tend to employ surveys and in-depth interviews as their main 
research methods. Surveys allows the possibility of generalising from a sample 
population. A quantitative survey of individual participants can be complemented by in-
depth interviews to capture more complex mechanisms and processes (Klandermans & 
Staggenborg, 2002, pp. xv-xvi). Scholars who seek to go beyond individual participants 
have focused either on groups, organisations that lead and organise protests, or particular 
events or networks of organisations and organisational fields. As Oliver, Cadena-Roa and 
Straw (2003, pp. 220-223) show, by the turn of the century many scholars were shifting 
their focus to protest events as the main units of analysis. There were several reasons for 
the shift from groups to events. First, events could demonstrate dynamics of mobilisation 
across movements. Second, events analysis has the advantage of showing mutual 
causality between challenging groups and political regimes as they interact with one 
another over time. Third, events analysis came to be recognised as more effective in 
understanding the rise and decline of particular protest movements and how one events 
shapes the outcome of subsequent events.  
Taking into account these advantages of studying of events and in view of its focus on 
the meso-level dynamics, this thesis focuses on groups and protest events to capture the 
interactive dynamics between state fragility and social mobilisation. I approach these 
groups and events, described in the Introduction, as case studies of broader patterns of 
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social and political contention in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2016. As Snow and 
Trom (2002) remark, groups as case studies are best conceived as ‘embedded within a 
“multi-organizational field” consisting of at least three sets of actors or subfields: 
supporters or protagonists, antagonists, and bystanders or an audience’ (p. 154). To locate 
the research questions and methods of this thesis, it is useful to draw on Tilly’s (2008, pp. 
8-10) distinction between three classes of political activities: (1) routine social life and 
the activities that take place at this level (e.g. employment, family structures, and daily 
economic activities); (2) contention-connected social interactions (e.g. organised activism 
such as awareness raising among women by feminist groups); and (3) public collective 
claim-makings (e.g. protests, strikes and rallies). As the previous chapter showed, much 
of the social movement theory and contentious politics literature conceives contention as 
part of the third of these classes of activity and then seek to explain its rise and decline, 
and evolution and variation in terms of changes and dynamics in level 2 and 3.  
Tilly (2008, pp. 8-9) also makes a distinction between thick and thin types of 
explanations. A thick explanation focuses on level (2) and (3) as objects of explanations 
and then includes variations in level (1) as part of the explanation. Tilly argues that a thick 
explanation of the feminist movement’s contentious politics in the United States during 
the second half of the twentieth century (a level 3 activity), may pinpoint to changes in 
the second level (e.g. consciousness-raising activist groups) but locate the causes in the 
first level (e.g. changes in routine social life such as women’s employment). By contrast, 
a thin explanation may analyse changes in level 3 in terms of changes in the levels 2 and 
3. Either way, the causal logic of explanation remains the same: public contention is 
interpreted as consequences of changes in the broader social, cultural, economic and 
political environments. 
For this thesis, the four groups represent dynamics of activism and consciousness-raising 
(i.e. level 2 activities) and the events offer insights into public claim-making (i.e. level 3 
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activities). The groups represent examples of a wide range of social and political activities 
that tend to occur in a large grey area between formal institutionalised politics and the 
extra-institutional and anti-state politics such as the armed insurgency against the 
internationally-sponsored statebuilding enterprise in Afghanistan between 2001 and 
2016. As a result, these groups, represent and are enmeshed in broader fields of social 
and political activism that demonstrate challenges and models of social and political 
strategising towards the internationally-sponsored statebuilding enterprise. The events 
can offer a unique opportunity for exploring actual process of social and political 
mobilisation in the country. While the group case studies demonstrate patterns of 
organisational, political and socio-cultural strategies of the more organised activist 
groups, the events demonstrate how formally-organised groups interact with broader 
processes of citizen mobilisation and the challenges that group formation and citizen 
mobilisation entail in the particular context of Afghanistan.  
Data Sources 
To examine these groups and events, I adopt a qualitative approach. I use a combination 
of in-depth qualitative interviews with analysis of online and offline materials and direct 
observation. Broadly speaking, the primary data used in this thesis have been collected 
through three sources. First, I have conducted a total of 51 in-depth interviews and 
informal conversations with organisers of these events and groups as well as independent 
observers such as journalists, academics, government officials and members of the 
Afghan Parliament. The bulk of these interviews were conducted during my field work 
in Kabul from August to December of 2015. The initial field work was complemented by 
subsequent interviews and conversations in 2016 and 2017. These interviews form the 
backbone of the empirical chapters of the thesis and are cited according the numbers in 
chronological order (See the full list attached at the end of the thesis). Second, I have 
observed the rise and evolution of these groups and the social networks that organised the 
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protest events first as a researcher in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2013, and second and 
more directly, during my field work in Kabul in 2015. During my field work, I attended 
public events organised by the groups, and the protest against the killing of Zabul Seven 
on 11 November of that year. Third, I use books, brochures and formal statements issued 
by the organisers of the groups and events to complement the data I have gathered through 
interviews and direct observation. The latter includes articles and statements published 
online.  
Research and Explanatory Approach  
In my overall explanatory and analytical approach, I follow the mechanism-based and 
relational approach as formulated by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2004). However, I seek 
to complement the approach by taking a multi-institutional approach and highlighting the 
nature and type of social and conflict. In this section, I will explain the three elements of 
my approach briefly.  
Relational and Mechanism-based Analysis 
The relational approach as formulated in Dynamics of Contention by McAdam, Tarrow 
and Tilly (2004) was discussed in chapter 2. For the purpose of this thesis, it is important 
to restate here that the proponents of the approach sought to draw on the previous 
traditions of social movement research and theory to construct a more synthetic, dynamic 
and broader approach to account for a wide range of contentious politics. Central to the 
new approach was the concept of social mechanism and process, which they used to 
account for rise and evolution of contentious politics and environmental changes. They 
defined the terms as follows: 
 Mechanisms are a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified 
sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations. 
 Processes are regular sequences of such mechanisms that produce similar 
(generally more complex and contingent) transformations of those elements 
(McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2004, p. 24). 
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In this thesis, I focus on the following three sets of mechanisms: collective attribution of 
threats and opportunities, social appropriation and boundary activation.  
Multi-Institutional View of Politics and Society  
As stated above, in this thesis, while I emphasise the role of the state, I seek to go beyond 
the state-centric view of the political process model and the contentious politics approach. 
Following Migdal’s (2004, pp. 249-261) concept of ‘limited state’ and building on 
Armstrong and Bernstein’s (2008) critique of the contentious politics approach, this thesis 
begins with a multi-institutional view of politics and society in which power and 
domination are ‘organized around multiple sources of power, each of which is 
simultaneously material and symbolic’ (Armstrong & Bernstein, p. 75). Conceiving the 
state as ‘limited state’ means that although the state as the source and enforcer of the rules 
of the game is highly important, the nature and extent of its power and influence is both 
historically and spatially variable and contingent. The simultaneous material and 
symbolic dimensions of institutions mean that successful challenges against institutions 
also combine material mobilisation of resources and people with challenging the cultural 
hegemony of existing authorities and producing new meanings and messages that 
resonate with social groups. Consequently, culture and social and political narratives are 
constitutive of institutions and as such the objects of contestation between diverse social 
and political groups. 
I draw on the pioneering work of Migdal (2004) to view the state as part of a broader 
social ‘melange in which multiple sets of rules struggle for predominance and the state is 
seen both as an idea and as diverse practices that maybe at loggerheads’ (p. 57). In this 
approach, the state is one among many actors, although a more powerful actor that is in 
constant interaction and competition with other social formations and institutions for 
setting and enforcing rules of social control. Consequently, neither the state nor the 
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society which it seeks to control are fixed entities; they constantly change and evolve as 
a result of ongoing interaction between multiple actors and their competition for social 
control. 
The Type and Levels of Change and Conflict 
Groups and individuals might respond to different types of social and political changes 
differently, and their responses might be shaped by underlying dynamics of social 
conflict. In formulating a new institutionalist approach, which emphasises the role of 
ideas and discourses as drivers of change, Schmidt (2008) makes a distinction between 
three levels of ideas:  
The first level encompasses the specific policies or “policy solutions” proposed 
by policy makers. The second level encompasses the more general programs that 
underpin the policy ideas. These may be cast as paradigms that reflect the 
underlying assumptions or organizing principles orienting policy (p. 306).  
The policy and programme-level ideas are nested even in deeper structures that have been 
described as ‘public philosophies’, ‘deep core’ or ‘worldviews’ (p. 306). In this thesis, I 
draw on Schmidt’s formulation to make a distinction between three levels of social and 
political change and conflict. The first level concerns the formulation and implementation 
of policies. Second, policies are part of broader programmes of states that might underpin 
a range of policy solutions to a series of interconnected problems. Third, both state 
policies and programmes are founded on the system of nation-states as the basic 
foundation of the international order.  
Relational and mechanism-based approaches combined with a multi-institutionalist view 
of politics and society and the distinction I make between three levels and types of change 
have four specific implications for the purpose of this thesis. First, institutions and 
opportunities for challenging the status quo are not static entities and conditions. Social 
and political outcomes and changes occur as a result of interactions and competition of 
states and other players over social control. As argued by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 
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(2004, p. 22), as part of the critique of the classical social movements theories, recent 
theorising sees ‘social interaction, social ties, communication, and conversation not 
merely as expressions of structure, rationality, consciousness, or culture, but as active 
sites of creation and change’.  
Second, while the state as the ‘field of power’ occupies the centre of analysis it is 
recognised as one of multiple actors involved in a broader struggle for change and 
domination in the society. Consequently, state institutions are not the only targets of 
contention as most scholars of contentious politics and social movements assume. In fact, 
state institutions may themselves become the main sites of contestation between various 
social groups and some parts of the state may join challenging groups against other state 
institutions and actors. The change in environment for the emergence, evolution and 
impact of movements occurs as a result of shifts in broader configurations of power 
relations that span formal state institutions and informal political alignments. In fact, 
some groups may choose not to engage directly with the state and instead focus on social 
and cultural activities which may only have long-term and indirect implications for the 
politics and the state.  
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Figure 1 Levels and Types of Change and Conflict 
Third, the manner in which actors respond to the type and level of social and political 
change shapes their overall position and strategies towards a national political order. 
Groups that organise around policies and programmes are more likely to adopt reformist 
stance and choose methods of claim-making that are prescribed by the state. In contrast, 
groups that reject the basic foundation of a nation-state might have greater propensity to 
engage in subversive and anti-systemic strategies.  
Fourth, the distinction also helps to illuminate the role of state weakness in shaping social 
movements and contentious politics. In strong states with deep solid foundations and 
strong capacity to formulate and implement policies, movements are more likely to 
respond to state policies and suggest their own policies for change. By contrast, as shown 
in figure 1, in weak states that suffer from weak authority and capacity, policy-level 
contention might intensify deeper programamtic and foundational conflicts or even create 
new ones.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter sets out to advance two goals. First, it serves to narrow down the focus of 
the thesis by elaborating its primary research questions and the research gaps and 
problems it intended to address. It defines state fragility as characterised by triple 
weakness in extending its authority, providing basic public services, and developing 
effective and legitimate institutions, and argued that these weaknesses shape contentious 
politics by creating a specific set of constrains and opportunities. Second, it sets out the 
overall theoretical approach and research methods of the thesis. In the following chapters, 
I will further contextualise the argument of the thesis by engaging in in-depth analysis of 
the broader political and historical context of Afghanistan before turning to detailed 
examination of the four groups and three events.  
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Chapter 4: State Formation and Contentions Politics in Afghanistan, 
1901-2001 
Introduction 
In comparison to most post-colonial states that emerged during the twentieth century, 
Afghanistan has had a relatively longer history of statehood. It emerged as a country with 
delineated boundaries and a relatively centralised system of government towards the end 
of the nineteenth century. However, the existence of a centralised authority did not lead 
to a process of political or socio-economic modernisation. State institutions remained 
weak, presiding over a largely agrarian economy and fragmented society and political 
elites, experiencing recurrent crises and cycles of contention. In its attempt to impose and 
maintain a centralised system of government, the Afghan state faced two types of 
challengers: (1) rural and agrarian-based traditional revolts led by traditional landed elites 
and the religious establishment, and (2) urban-based and usually educated groups that 
were exposed to external modernising influences. The two groups represented different 
approaches towards political authority and social change: the former sought to limit the 
administrative and extractive power of the state, whereas the latter sought to influence 
state policies and gain power to implement broader socio-economic and political changes.  
These two forms of challenges also focused on different sets of issues and showed 
different dynamics and models of social and political mobilisation. The traditional 
rebellions were mostly reactive in character, and were often launched in response to 
policies of centralisation of power and/or extraction of resources by the central 
authorities. These revolts were organised mostly around local solidarity networks or a 
coalition of such networks, and as a result were poorly equipped for sustained social and 
political action on a national scale. By contrast, the urban-based challenges tended to be 
proactive, driven by broader ideas and images of modernisation and progress, and sought 
to employ and invent modern forms of social and political organisation.  
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The combination of traditional and modernist challenges posed a conundrum for state-
society relations and policies of modernisation and social and political change: state 
policies of political and socio-economic modernisation were encouraging the rise of 
urban-based challenging groups, and provoking revolts by the traditionalist segments of 
the society. The former demanded often quite radical changes, which required even more 
activist state intervention in the society, and sharing of political power with activist 
groups. The April 1978 coup by the pro-Soviet People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
represented a turning point in the political development of the country as it represented 
the triumph as well as polarisation and radicalisation of the urban and modernist groups. 
The communists who came into power were confronted by traditional revolts from the 
countryside, and by Islamists who assumed leadership of the opposition from bases in 
neighbouring countries, most importantly Pakistan (Roy, 1990).  
In this chapter, I aim to explicate the historical dynamics of state formation and social 
mobilisation in the country. The first section provides a broad overview of the trajectory 
of political regimes during the twentieth century. The second section offers a broad 
typology of challenging groups. The third describes the transformation of Afghanistan’s 
social and political movements as a result of war, foreign invasion and mass violence 
after 1978. The final section draws some general conclusions.  
State Formation and Contention in Afghanistan 
Afghanistan is often recognised for its fierce resistance to foreign domination. Official 
histories of the country and the language of its political elites are often replete with the 
rhetoric of independence and struggles against foreign domination. There is a certain 
element of truth in this collective pride for independence. The country was never directly 
colonised by any major colonial power, and during the nineteenth century two major 
British attempts to occupy the country, known as the first and second Anglo-Afghan 
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Wars, were defeated by popular revolts and uprisings. In the first Anglo-Afghan War 
(1839-1842), the British invaded and occupied much of Afghanistan, and overthrew Amir 
Dost Muhammad Khan. However, the occupation ended with mass revolts and the 
military defeat of the British, which was forced allow the eventual return of Dost 
Muhammad Khan to the throne (Noelle, 1997).  
Beneath the history and myth of resistance to foreign colonialism generated by the Anglo-
Afghan Wars, however, the ruling elites were profoundly contradictory and ambivalent 
towards external influences, particularly socio-economic modernisation that would 
change the balance of power in the country. The contradictions have meant that despite a 
long history of statehood, the country failed to achieve any significant levels of socio-
economic differentiation that are hallmarks of modern societies. Until the outbreak of the 
conflict in 1978, the country was largely agrarian, dominated by small family-owned and 
subsistence farming, and with 80 percent of its population depending on the rural 
economy. The failure of any major capitalist development meant that the country did not 
experience socio-economic differentiation along the lines of individual citizens’ socio-
economic status, and hence labour as a socio-economic and political constituency did not 
emerge. Prior to 1978, the number of industrial workers remained below 40,000 
(Dorronsoro, 2005, p. 64). 
The modern Afghan state emerged from the remnant of the traditional Durrani Empire 
established by Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747. During the so-called Great Game in the 
nineteenth century, the territories of the Durrani Empire became the centre of rivalries 
between Tsarist Russia and Great Britain, which had colonised the Central and South 
Asian regions respectively. In their expansion northwards, the British took control of 
important territories that used to be part of the Durrani Empire. Similarly, Russian 
expansion limited the influence of the Afghan rulers to the Oxus River, which now 
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separates Afghanistan from the Central Asian Republics. What was left in between 
became modern Afghanistan, a buffer state between the two world powers.  
State Disruption and Contention in Afghanistan 
As a country with clearly-delineated boundaries, and controlled by a centralised 
government, Afghanistan was formed after the end of the second Anglo-Afghan War 
(1878-1880). The creation of the first centralised state by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan 
(1880-1901) was made possible by a combination of British assistance and the Amir’s 
own tactics of manipulation, as well as heavy-handed repression (Gregorian, 1969). To 
impose his authority over the country that became Afghanistan, the Amir fought a series 
of wars against dynastic rivals and local elites as well as popular revolts and mass 
uprisings. The Amir entered into an alliance with British India at the end of the Second 
Anglo-Afghan War, which brought him generous British aid in the forms of annual 
financial assistance and military weapons and ammunitions. These included 2 million 
rupees paid to him as he was enthroned in 1880 (Griffin, 1888), and beginning from 1882, 
an annual subsidy of 1.2 million rupees, which was increased to 1.85 million in 1893 
(Rubin, 2002, p. 49), and thousands of guns and tens of thousands of rifles with their 
ammunitions (Ghani, 1982, p. 391). In return, the Amir gave control of Afghanistan’s 
foreign policy to the British and accepted the international boundaries that were largely 
drawn by the British and Russian officials, including the now contested 2,640 kilometre 
Durand Line, now separating the country from Pakistan.  
The centralised and repressive state built by Abdur Rahman Khan contained the seeds of 
future rebellions and opposition against the state (Kakar, 1979). Ever since its creation, 
recurrent instability has been a constant feature of the politics and society in Afghanistan. 
Endemic instability and periodic ruptures in the political history of the country have 
involved tensions between centralising elites seeking to impose a centralised system of 
P a g e  | 76 
 
control, and various social forces that have mounted resistance against the centralising 
tendencies. The pattern has often been analysed as a symptom of strong centrifugal 
tendencies on the part of social formations such as tribes, and weak centripetal forces on 
the part of the central elites. However, as will be shown below, the dynamics of political 
stability have been much more complex, and some of the most disruptive periods of 
instability were spawned by contradictions and power struggles within the political 
regimes.  
Between 1901 and 2001 Afghanistan experienced the following main political regimes: 
 Monarchy (1901-1973) 
 Authoritarian one-party republic of Daoud Khan (1973-1978) 
 Socialist style one-party regimes of the PDPA (1978-1992)  
 The Islamic State of the mujahedin (1992-1996) 
 The Islamic Emirate of the Taliban (1996-2001).  
Afghanistan was a monarchy until 1973, although from 1963 of a ‘constitutional’ variety. 
Consequently, an important part of Afghanistan’s political history can be analysed by the 
internal dynamics of the institution of monarchy. The character and role of the monarchy 
was shaped by the intra-dynastic rivalries as well as the governing approaches and 
policies of individual rulers (Saikal, 2006).  
However, some of the most significant threats against the stability of the system came 
from competition for power within the ruling dynasty. In 1901, when Amir Abdur 
Rahman Khan died, he was succeeded by his son, Habibullah Khan who ruled the country 
until he was assassinated during a hunting expedition in the Eastern province of Laghman 
in February 1919. Habibullah Khan was succeeded briefly by his brother Nasrullah Khan 
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(21-28 February 1919) who was ousted and imprisoned by Amanullah Khan, 
Habibullah’s younger son who ruled the country until 1929.  
As a system of rule, the monarchy required a difficult balancing act between domestic 
forces and the influence of foreign powers. The most significant vulnerability of the 
monarchies and subsequent regimes in Afghanistan resulted from the political economy 
of dependence on foreign aid, which limited their ability to initiate any major programme 
of socio-economic transformation. This became most obvious during the reign of 
Amanullah Khan, who secured the country’s independence from the British in the Third 
Anglo-Afghan War of 1919, but then saw the loss of British subsidies weaken the state’s 
capacity to withstand rising challenges against his modernisation policies. In 1929, mass 
rebellions forced Amanullah Khan to abdicate and flee first to India and then Europe 
(Poullada, 1973). 
The rebellion against Amanullah Khan initiated a highly tumultuous and contentious 
politics in the history of modern Afghanistan. The revolt brought to power Habibullah 
Kalakani, a Tajik from a humble social background from the Shamali Plains north of 
Kabul. Kalakani ruled the country from January to October 1929. In October 1929, 
Kalakani’s short reign came to an abrupt end as a result of tribal mobilisation led by Nader 
Khan who forced him out of Kabul and hanged him on 1 November 1929.1 Nader Khan 
had served as Minister of War and Ambassador to France under Amanullah but was not 
a descendent of the family of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. Instead, he came from the 
Musaheban branch of the Muhammadzai ruling dynasty that had the ruled the country 
since 1826. The family had been forced into exile in India by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan 
                                                          
1 Kalakani’s remains were re-interned in Kabul 1 September 2016 on a day of high drama 
marked by the presence of hundreds of armed Shamali residents.  
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and only allowed to return by Habibullah Khan. As a result, Nader Khan’s rise to power 
represented a transfer of power from one branch of the dynasty to another.  
On 8 November 1933, Nader Khan was assassinated during a visit to a school by Abdul 
Khaleq, a Hazara student. Nader Khan was succeeded by his 19-year old son Zaher Shah 
who reigned the country for a period of nearly 40 years, the longest period of political 
stability in the country’s modern history. The Musaheban dynasty did not pursue 
Amanullah’s social transformation agenda, which had entailed rapid Westernisation in 
the style pursued by Ataturk in Turkey. Instead, they restricted the modernising agenda 
to Kabul and a few urban centres, thereby creating what has been described as ‘enclave 
state’, which exercised its authority over the periphery through traditional intermediaries 
(Rubin, 1988; Sedra, 2016, pp. 160-161). As it will become clear, over time the monarchy 
faced greater pressure for modernisation from below. 
The young Zaher Shah was only a symbolic ruler for the bulk of his reign. Until the early 
1960s, real power was exercised by two of his uncles whose personal approaches to 
government also shaped the degree of government openness to social and political 
liberalisation. Between 1933 and 1946, the government was in fact ran by Sardar 
Muhammad Hashim Khan, Nader Khan’s younger brother. Hashim Khan ruled the 
country with a firm hand. In 1946, Hashim Khan was replaced by Shah Mahmud Khan 
who pursued a relatively more liberal policy until 1953. In 1953, Daoud Khan was 
appointed as Prime Minister. Daoud Khan was the son of Muhammd Azim Khan, a half-
brother of Nader Khan. He attempted to break the peace of the ‘enclave state’ by pushing 
for modernising policies and state intervention in the society and the economy.  
It was only in 1963 that Zaher Shah took actual control of the government by initiating a 
period of political liberalisation and the adoption of a new constitution in 1964 that 
declared the country a constitutional monarchy. The liberalisation of the 1960s backfired 
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in the form of a backlash from members of the royal family who were marginalised by 
the new reform. On 17 July 1973, Daoud Khan seized power in a coup while King Zaher 
Shah was in Italy. Daoud Khan reversed the political reforms of the 1960s and declared 
the country a republic with himself as president.  
Daoud Khan’s republic was short-lived. On 28 April 1978, another coup, by members of 
the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, killed him along with most members of 
his family. The new coup leaders declared the country a ‘Democratic Republic’ with 
commitment to social, economic and political reforms. The PDPA coup began a process 
of gradual unravelling of the state through several episodes of contention that involved 
foreign actors more directly in the politics of the country. Its socialist-style social and 
economic reform agendas unleashed a series of uprisings across the country in 1979. In 
December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded the country, which further galvanised 
opposition to the PDPA regime. Leaders of the initial uprisings fled to Pakistan and Iran 
where they formed several Tanzeems, or organisations, and received financial and 
military assistance from the West and Muslim countries. Henceforth, the country became 
a major battlefield of Cold War rivalries between the West and East, with the Soviet and 
regime forces challenged by the so-called ‘mujahedin’ (Bradsher, 1983; Hyman, 1984; 
Braithwaite, 2011). 
The Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan in February 1989, and hence left 
the pro-Soviet regime exposed to a myriad of armed mujahedin organisations that were 
bent on toppling it militarily (Saikal & Maley, 1989). On 28 April 1992, the government 
of Dr. Najibullah collapsed in Kabul and the mujahedin entered the city without any 
resistance from the government security forces. The mujahedin takeover of Kabul was 
the beginning of a vicious cycle of armed conflict among several mujahedin organisations 
who were unable to form a new government and fought one another as they jockeyed for 
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power and control of territory (Fotini, 2013, pp. 57-100). In the environment of 
generalised insecurity and anarchy that characterised the mujahedin rule, the Taliban 
emerged in 1994 from the Southern province of Kandahar. The Taliban claimed to be 
pursuing a temporary mission of restoring peace and facilitating the formation of a 
national government, but in seeking to impose their control over territories they became 
another warring faction. The Taliban also hosted a number of foreign jihadist groups, 
including Al-Qaeda, which aided it in its relentless war against the former mujahedin 
whilst pursuing their own agendas elsewhere. The danger of the Taliban alliance with 
extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda became clear when the latter planned the 11 
September attacks on the United States in 2001.  
Institutional Underdevelopment and Contention in Afghanistan 
As this brief overview of the political history of the country during the twentieth century 
shows, the state in Afghanistan underwent recurrent cycles of contention which disrupted 
the political development of the country. Having said that, in comparison to many 
countries that gained their independence after the First or Second World Wars, 
Afghanistan had a relatively longer history of statehood. However, from the outset, 
foreign patronage had contradictory effects on the nature of the state-society relations. 
British subsidies enabled Abdur Rahman Khan to build the coercive capacity of the state, 
which he used to expand central authority across the country. In the long-run, however, 
foreign patronage had a detrimental effect on the nature of the state and its relations with 
society: a highly authoritarian state built on patronage of a foreign power lacked the 
structures and incentives to negotiate a durable social contract with its society. 
Furthermore, British aid ironically did not lead to the integration of Afghanistan with 
broader processes of socio-economic and political modernisation. On the contrary, it 
enabled the Amir to isolate Afghanistan from the rest of the world. He refused to connect 
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Afghanistan to international telegraph and railway networks and described British efforts 
to extend the railway into southern Afghanistan as ‘just like a knife pushing into my 
vitals’ (Khan, 1900, p. 159). This meant that while the state was inserted into the 
international state system and its elite benefited from it, it was determined to prevent the 
society from developing direct links to outside forces. As will be shown below, the drive 
towards modernisation remained strong and some of Abdur Rahman Khan’s successors 
embarked on radical projects of modernisation, but only to face violent opposition.  
The tension between domestic and international postures of states is not unique to 
Afghanistan. As the political scientist Joel Migdal (2004, pp. 58-94) argues, states operate 
in two intersecting arenas: the first is the international arena in which the state interacts 
with the international state system and myriad non-state actors. The second is the 
domestic arena where the state aims to exercise its authority. As Migdal argues, both 
arenas present the state with multiple constraints and opportunities. The international 
arena, characterised by alliance and conflict between states, constrains state behaviour 
through threats of conflict and shifting power alignments, and presents opportunities 
through alliances and international recognition. However, Afghanistan suffered from a 
more fundamental disjuncture between its international recognition as a modern state and 
its underlying socio-economic weakness. The fears and anxiety of the ruling elites about 
joining the international rail and telegraph networks were symptoms of a broader 
determination at that time to isolate the country from external modernising influences. 
Hence, there were simultaneous processes of inclusion in, and exclusion from, the 
international system; this meant the country embarked on the path of political 
centralisation, funded by foreign patronage, without the accompanying processes of 
capitalist and industrial development.  
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The simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion created a complex social and 
political environment that continues to puzzle students of the country. Many scholars 
have attempted to identify the faultlines that explain the complex politics of the country. 
As Dorronsoro (2005) argues, the tendency leads to reductionist and essentialist 
explanations that see the country in terms of fixed and rigid dichotomies: the state versus 
tribe, the urban elite versus the rural countryside and the modernisers versus the 
conservatives. Such accounts cannot do justice to the complexity of dynamic struggles 
between the modern state and rival social forces in the country. In the context of 
Afghanistan, the key task then is to identify the range of institutions and organisations 
that co-exist and compete with the state. In a review of the Western scholarship on 
Afghanistan, Dorronsoro (2005) also makes an important distinction between two forms 
of analysis: one that sees Afghanistan’s politics in the light of international geopolitical 
rivalries and another that focuses on domestic drivers of political violence and conflict. 
By focusing on international geostrategic factors such as the so-called Great Game in the 
nineteenth century and the Cold War rivalries during the 1980s Soviet occupation of the 
country, the former refuses to acknowledge domestic dynamics, and hence fails to take 
into account the agency and role of domestic actors in sustaining and perpetuating 
conflicts. By contrast, the latter group of scholars who analyse domestic politics of the 
country risk essentialising the politics of the country along three major lines of 
explanation: tribe, ethnicity and Islam. 
The Evolution of Contention in Afghanistan 
Assuming a two-tiered social and political environment, in this chapter I make a 
distinction between two ideal-type forms of political contestation that were historically 
prevalent in Afghanistan. On one hand, there were traditional forms of political 
mobilisation that emerged in response to local issues and were underpinned by traditional 
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social networks of solidarity and identity. On the other, there were urban political groups 
that were the product of Afghanistan’s exposure to external modernising influences. At 
the core of contestation between the state elites and their challengers is a struggle over 
social control. In these struggles for control, the actors, both the challengers and the state 
elites, drew on a number of mobilising frameworks that ranged from family and kinship 
networks, through tribes and local solidarity networks, to ethnic and religious identities 
at the national and international scales. The main difference between traditional and 
modernist forms of mobilisation lay in the capacity of the latter for sustained and 
proactive mobilisation on a national scale. This distinction remains pertinent to this day. 
In an important respect, the political history of Afghanistan has been shaped by 
contestation between traditional, mostly local and kinship-based networks of solidarity, 
and modern, usually-urban principles of social divisions that are created as a result of the 
rise of, and are articulated by, educated urban elites.  
The Traditional Rebellions  
Afghanistan’s history is replete with recurring rebellions against state authority. In the 
process of centralisation of power in the last decades of the nineteenth century some 
regions became known as Yaghistan, or the land of rebels. These included the 
Southwestern region of Hazarajat, consisting of the present-day Uruzgan province and 
districts in Zabul and Qandahar provinces (Ibrahimi, 2017, pp. 53-85), and the tribal areas 
now in the Northwest of Pakistan (Younus, 2015). Although such labels given to 
particular regions often came with negative connotations that associated their inhabitants 
with xenophobia and resistance to modern civilisation, rebellion was an historically-
prevalent form of protest against excesses by the ruling authorities.  
These rebellions were typically organised around the networks of qawm, local solidarity 
relationships that can range from kinship ties, through tribes, to larger geographical, tribal 
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and ethnic identities. These mobilisations also tended to be reactive in nature as they 
occurred in response to intrusion of state authorities in local affairs. As a framework for 
political mobilisation, these solidarity networks have major limitations, as such networks 
are by definition local in nature and as a result their mobilisational capacities remain 
limited in scope. This meant that even large scale mobilisation against foreign powers as 
in the Anglo-Afghan Wars did not result in the emergence of national political 
movements, As Rubin (2002, p. 20) argues,  
The Anglo-Afghan Wars, fought by tribal coalitions, left no organizational legacy. 
Rather than incorporating the various sector of the population into a common 
national political system, the political elite acted as an ethnically stratified 
hierarchy of intermediaries between the foreign powers providing the resources 
and the groups receiving the largess of patronage. 
Furthermore, given the fragmented nature of Afghanistan’s economy, such networks were 
also formed around local socio-economic issues and as a result were poorly equipped to 
offer ideological and programmatic basis that are necessary for sustained mobilisation. 
Rubin (2002, p. 20) adds further that the monarchies pursued a deliberate policy of 
promoting social fragmentation through promoting the solidarity networks at the lowest 
level,  
Most of the population related to the government by using kinship to obtain 
patronage. Each solidarity group (qawm) remained isolated, linked to the nation-
state only through personal ties to individuals in the government; the qawm did 
not need to form nationwide alliances to capture and exercise power. Indeed, the 
government had for decades pursued a policy of breaking larger tribes into smaller 
groups and recognizing only the village-level qawm (p. 20). 
In the course of his twenty-one year campaign of brutal centralisation, Amir Abdur 
Rahman Khan faced a series of rebellions across the country. In his own biography, the 
Amir recounts that during his rule he was faced with forty revolts, including four major 
wars that he describes as civil wars (Khan, 1900, p. 249). In the twentieth century, 
rebellion as a form of protest continued to be employed across the country. Amir 
Habibullah faced rebellions from the Loya Paktya region in 1912-13 and in Qandahar in 
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1912. These rebellions were put down by a combination of negotiation and repression 
(Ghubar, 1997, pp. 1125-1131). However, rebellions against his successor, Amanullah, 
took more serious dimensions. Amanullah’s radical modernisation agenda, which turned 
the state into a vehicle of social and economic transformation, was opposed by traditional 
and conservative sections of the society (Nawid, 1999). The first major revolt broke out 
in 1924, one year after the adoption of a modernist constitution, but his poorly-paid army 
failed to withstand a more widespread mobilisation which began in November 1928.  
The mobilisational capacity of localised rebellions increased if they aligned themselves 
with networks of the ulema (religious scholars) who were spread across different regions 
of the country and hence could offer platforms for coordinated action on a larger scale. 
However, as a social group the ulema were dependent on the patronage of the state or the 
traditional landed elites. Consequently, the ulema were seldom able to initiate mass 
mobilisation without the patronage of rural elites or Afghan rulers. The success of the 
anti-Amanullah rebellion in coordinating a large scale revolt that involved several 
provinces and forced abdication of the king came from an alliance of several localised 
rebellions with leaders of religious networks that spanned across provinces and districts. 
In this alliance, the mobilisational capacity and passion of tribes was combined with a 
national discourse for defense of religion and traditional values. However, as Shahrani 
(2005) argues, the rebellion failed to mobilise supporters on a national scale. In fact, both 
the mobilisation against Amanullah and the counter-mobilisation against Habibullah 
Kalakani were limited to the almost exclusively or predominantly Pashtun provinces of 
Eastern and South-eastern Afghanistan. Habibullah Kalakani, who came to power as a 
result of the initial rebellion, reduced the role of the state in society by discarding the 
modernist constitution of 1923, banning the wearing of European clothes, and making it 
mandatory for women to travel with a male companion (Dorronsoro, 2005, p. 284).  
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The success of the rebellion convinced Nader Khan and his successors to abandon the 
agenda of social transformation and opt for creating an ‘enclave state’ that sought to 
promote limited modernisation in the urban centres, and rule the country through 
traditional intermediaries known as khans and maliks. In the words of Rubin (2002, p. 
20), ‘rather than try to penetrate the countryside and govern it, the Afghan state continued 
to pursue a strategy of encapsulating traditional local institutions’.  
The consolidation of state authority from 1933 to 1973 did not put an end to rebellion as 
a form of protest. Local resistance against excessive state extraction, and centralisation 
by the state, continued, albeit on relatively smaller scales. Among the Hazaras, who were 
subjected to extremely exploitative socio-economic relations to the advantage of Pashtun 
nomads, popular discontent gave rise to yaghi individuals (literally meaning rebels) who 
after having troubles with government officials fled to the mountains and championed the 
rights of the exploited against repressive governments. The best-known examples were 
Yosuf Beg in the 1930s, and Ibrahim Khan Gawsawar in the late 1940s. Yosuf Beg 
escaped government attempts to arrest him but was eventually captured and executed. 
Gawsawar, who even overthrew the government administration in the district of 
Shahristan (formerly Uruzgan province and now Day Kundi) was pardoned by King 
Zaher Shah after a delegation of Hazaras convinced him to give up resistance (Edwards, 
1986, pp. 208-211; Yazdani, 2007). Another major tribal revolts of the Zaher Shah period 
include the rebellions by Safi tribes in Kunar province in 1945-1946 and the Durrani 
tribes in Qandahar in 1959. While some of these such as the Safi rebellion posed 
significant challenges to state authority at the local level for several months, in general 
the state had acquired the military capability to put down localised rebellions 
(Dorronsoro, 2005, p. 42) 
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The localised rebellions shared important features. As Edwards (1986) argues, the yaghi 
Hazaras were representatives of a broader social phenomenon, described by Eric 
Hobsbawm as ‘social banditry’ (Hobsbawm, 1971) that can emerge in processes of social 
change where small communities are absorbed into larger socio-economic systems. 
Despite significant differences, the localised Hazara rebellions shared important 
characteristics with the dynamics of the anti-Amanullah rebellions. In fact, Habibullah 
Kalakani represents another example of ‘social bandit’, an outlaw who became the voice 
of expression of protest against exploitation. As Olesen argues ‘it seems plausible to 
assume that he [Kalakani] and his short-term reign represented yet another case of ‘social 
banditry in the Hobsbawm-ian sense’ (Olesen, 1995, p. 149).  
The Modernist Movements 
In stark contrast, Afghanistan’s urban-based modernist groups were products of exposure 
of the country to modernising influences from the outside world. These groups 
nonetheless followed a historical trajectory in parallel to the localised rebellions. Broadly 
speaking, these groups were pursuing a different mobilisational strategy, and drew on 
broader discourses of modernisation, progress and universal ideas for social and political 
changes. Prior to the outbreak of armed conflict in 1978, three distinct phases can be 
identified in the historical trajectory of these movements.  
Afghanistan’s first modernist political movement emerged during the first decade of the 
twentieth century. The movement was based on a network of three groups of people: (1) 
the teachers and students of Habibiah High School, the first modern school of the country 
established in 1903; (2) Madrasah Shahi-e Kabul (Kabul Royal Madrasah); and (3) a 
particular category of servants at the rulers’ courts who were known Ghulam bachaha 
(literally meaning servant boys) (Habibi, 1985). The Ghulam bachahas, usually young 
men from traditional elite families of various parts of Afghanistan, were either sent to the 
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court by their families as gifts to the rulers or were demanded from the families by rulers 
who sought to maintain an instrument of pressure against rebellious rural elites and saw 
an opportunity to socialise new generations of elites into the political culture of the ruling 
elites.  
The Kabul Royal Madrasah originated from Jamiat ul-Ulema, an institution of ulema 
established by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan that included selected pro-government ulema 
from across the country and was tasked to translate texts from Arabic and other foreign 
languages into Dari and Pashto, and draft and disseminate financial, judicial and 
administrative documents. During the mid-1900s, the centre was named the Kabul Royal 
Madrasah and included 50 prominent ulema who also laid the foundation of the country’s 
first printing press and library (Rasouli, 2012, pp. 246-248).  
In 1905, the group coalesced around an association that published the country’s second 
print paper, Seraj ul-Akhbar Afghanistan (Torch of News of Afghanistan), a biweekly 
newspaper in Kabul.2 They received an official license for the biweekly through an 
official request from Amir Habibullah in 1905 before publishing its first and only issue 
on 11 January 1906. Afghan historians mostly attribute the closure of the paper to 
pressures exerted by British India but Sims-Williams (1980, p.118) believes ‘it seems 
more likely that internal pressure was responsible for its closure’.  
In 1909, the reformist circles faced severe repression after the group presented their 
demands through a formal petition to Amir Habibullah Khan (Arizah). The petition 
written collectively in Kabul was presented by a delegation of the constitutionalists to the 
Amir in Jalalabad. It read in part: 
In some countries, people use compulsion and overwhelming power to force their 
governments to make the administration according to the wishes of the nation and 
                                                          
2 Afghanistan’s first newspaper was Shams Al-Nahar which was published in 1872.  
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make it constitutional and law-based. In others, enlightened kings take their own 
decisions and initiative to enforce laws and principles of constitutionalism in their 
countries. Since Seraj Al-Mellat wal-Din is a progressive and informed king – as 
the formation of Habibiah High School and Military College, publication of Seraj 
Al-Akhbar, printing of books, importation of modern printing press, construction 
of roads and buildings and etcetra are signs of kindness and kingly attention and 
in the direction of greatness and exaltation of the homeland – it is expected that 
[His Highness] base the conduct of affairs of the government on laws of 
constitution (Habibi, 1985, p. 17) [My translation].  
According to Habibi (1985), the petition infuriated Habibullah Khan who ordered four 
members of the delegation to be executed in Jalalabad. By contrast, Ghubar (1997, p. 
1134) argues that repression began after a government informant reported to Amir 
Habibullah that the movement leaders had decided that each member carry a pistol. 
Regardless of what triggered the repression, it is clear that during 1909 the movement 
was dissipated as a group. Seven of its members were executed in Jalalabad and Kabul 
and about 35 others received long-term prison sentences (Ghubar, 1997, pp. 1134-1137).  
The repression of the first constitutionalist movement was followed by a decade of 
abeyance. The execution and long-term imprisonment of leaders of the movement 
destroyed the organisational structure of the movement. However, although the 
movement was supressed, the modernist tendency continued to survive in the court. A 
second phase came from 1911 when Seraj ul-Akhbar Afghaniya was launched by 
Mahmud Tarzi a member of a family of the Muhammadzai clan who were exiled by 
Abdur Rahman Khan in the 1880s. In exile, in Damascus and Istanbul, Tarzi was exposed 
to ideologies of nationalism and Islamic revival. After returning to Afghanistan, Tarzi 
became a key figure of what became known as ‘Young Afghans’, a modernist and pro-
independence faction in the royal court. His daughter, Soraya, was married to Amanullah 
Khan and thus his connection to the royal court provided him a greater degree of 
protection against government repression. He used the biweekly paper to introduce new 
ideas to the country, formulate basic tenets of Afghan nationalism, and call for complete 
independence of Afghanistan from Britain (Gregorian, 1967). In September 1918, the 
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biweekly was shut down, and two of its key editors were jailed. When Habibullah was 
assassinated in February 1919, some blamed the modernist faction of the monarchy for 
his murder. Although the exact details of the death of Habibullah never became known, 
it was clear that repression and the authoritarian approach of the last decade of his rule 
had radicalised the opposition to his rule Consequently, the first modernising effort was 
undone by a tribal and conservative rebellion decades before groups such as the Taliban 
posed similar challenges (Stewart, 1973).  
When Amanullah came to power, he appropriated the demands and aspirations of the 
modernist circles of Kabul, initiating the third phase. In his coronation speech on 1 March 
1919, he announced three major goals: independence of Afghanistan; punishing those 
who murdered his father; and the abolishing of begari, forced labor practised by landlords 
and possibly government authorities (Fletcher, 1965, p. 57). By asserting Afghanistan’s 
independence in foreign affairs from Britain and by embarking on a path of radical 
modernisation, he became the first ruler to champion modernisation of the country. 
Achieving Afghanistan’s independence was surprisingly easy. After a series of 
skirmishes in May 1919, known as the Third Anglo-Afghan War, the British accepted 
Afghanistan’s independence in a peace treaty signed on 8 August 1919 in Rawalpindi, a 
city now in Pakistan. The independence of Afghanistan significantly increased the power 
and popularity of Amanullah. In 1921, he signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet 
Union and entered into diplomatic relations with many other countries (Adamec, 1974; 
Adamec, 1967). 
The rise to power of modernist and nationalist forces under Amanullah changed the 
dynamics of contention in the country. As discussed above, whereas previously modernist 
elites were agitating for modernising changes against a conservative monarchy, under 
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Amanullah conservative elites felt threatened by his reform programmes and thus 
revolted against his programmes of modernisation.  
The Emergence of Proto-Political Parties during the Liberal Period of 1946-1953 
 Following the defeat of Amanullah’s modernisation programme, the constitutionalist 
movement went into a prolonged period of abeyance. The killing of Nader Khan at the 
hands of a high school student in 1933 increased the suspicion of the Musaheban rulers 
towards the intelligentsia. As Mobarez (1996, p. 115), who grew up during this period, 
remarks, the relatively small education sector in the urban centres was tightly controlled 
by the government: 
After the assassination of Nader Shah by Abdul Khaleq, student of Nejat (Amani) 
High School, the education sector was turned into centres of spying and petty 
despotism; students were taught under very strict conditions; sincerity among 
students had totally disappeared as one feared the other would be a spy [My 
translation]. 
The Musaheban could not entirely eliminate the intelligentsia or close the modern 
education system. The state needed to provide modern education to train educated cadres 
for the state bureaucracies. As Shahrani (1984, p. 39) argues, the non-interventionist 
Musaheban rule gradually gave rise to a small and yet assertive educated class that began 
to agitate for change besides two other major social and political groups, 
During much of the Musahiban rule there had been only two major political 
forces: foremost the royal household and new ruling elite, and second the 
nonofficial, community based traditional leaders who for the most part avoided 
contact with the authorities and were concerned with the welfare of their own 
communities above all else. Relations between the two were not confrontational; 
they involved keeping at a distance and maintaining a degree of mutual 
suspicions. A third element was added when the educated youth became alienated 
and began to call for radical social, economic and political changes. Beginning in 
the mid-1960s, they increasingly formed the primary political opposition in Kabul 
and other urban centres.  
 After more than 17 years of repressive and authoritarian rule by Hashim Khan, who had 
first become Prime Minister in 1929, Shah Mahmud (1946-1953), another uncle of King 
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Zaher Shah, was appointed as Prime minister in 1946. Shah Mahmud opened the political 
space to broader political participation. Although Afghanistan had had a form of 
parliament from 1933, it was never free from government interference. Shah Mahmud 
changed this in the 1949 parliamentary elections. The liberal and reformist circles 
enthusiastically participated in the elections, electing 50 of the 120-member assembly. In 
1951, the liberal parliament passed new legislation, permitting freedom of the press, 
which opened the opportunity for launch of new newspapers and proto-political parties. 
During the reign of Shah Mahmud the intelligentsia coalesced around the following 
groups: 
 In 1947, a group of mainly Pashtun intellectual and cultural figures formed 
Wishzalmayan, or Awakened Youth (Bezhan, 2014). Most of its members came 
from the Southern province of Qandahar and the Eastern province of Nangarhar. 
As its name indicates, at the core of the group’s objective was the notion of 
awakening of youth, which implied active social and political engagement. The 
extent and form of youth engagement as envisaged by the group is not very clear. 
Whilst mostly noted as a forerunner of modern political movements in the 
country, the group is also noted for its close ties with the establishment and 
Pashtun-nationalist tendencies. Emadi (2001, p. 430) argues that Wishzalmayan 
was dominated by Pashtun intellectuals and its ‘main objective was to introduce 
some cosmetic changes in the system without provoking the incumbents’. 
Mobarez (1996, pp. 116-119) has pointed to rivalries between a pro-establishment 
and a more independent faction within the group as the cause of its changing and 
sometimes contradictory approach towards the government 
 Hezb-e Neday-e Khalq (Party of the Voice of People) was founded by Abdur 
Rahman Mahmudi, one of the first graduates of Kabul University’s Medical 
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Faculty. Mahmudi edited an independent publication also called Neday-e Khalq, 
which adopted a critical approach towards the government. Mahmdudi was 
certainly the most radical of the activists, writers and politicians of this period. He 
was so critical and vocal in his ‘people’s politics’ approach that some have seen 
him as precursor of the Marxist groups that emerged in Afghanistan during the 
1960s (Shafaye, 2015, pp. 130-133). Pointing to his religiosity and knowledge of 
the Quran, Mobarez (1996, p. 133) rejects the proposition that Mahmudi was a 
Marxist but described him as a ‘parliamentary leftist’ for his radical pro-poor 
politics.  
 In 1951, Ghulam Muhammad Ghobar established Hezb-e Watan, a party of the 
relatively moderate urban intelligentsia and also edited Watan, an associated 
publication.  
 An important and yet often overlooked social and political movement in this 
period was orchestrated by Sayed Ismail Balkhi, a Shi’a scholar activist who 
launched a protest movement outside the institutional structure of the state. Balkhi 
was one of the first Islamist activist ulema to have championed the cause of the 
poor and demanded radical social and political transformation in the state level 
(Edwards, 1986). In March 1949, Balkhi and a number of members of his circle 
were arrested after their plan to launch a coup was leaked to the government; and 
they were given long-term prison sentences.  
The liberalisation of political space and formation of radical opposition groups created a 
backlash among some members of the ruling dynasty. In 1950, Daoud Khan also 
established a group which became known as Klup-e Milli (National Club), a pro-
establishment party with strong Pashtun-nationalist ideology. Daoud Khan became the 
main champion of Pashtunistan, a claim by Pashtun nationalist groups on Pashtun 
territories that became part of British India and subsequently Pakistan after the Durand 
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Line was drawn in 1893. Pashtun nationalists led by Daoud Khan demanded that these 
territories be either annexed to Afghanistan or declared as a separate Pashtunistan state. 
In 1947, Afghanistan became the only country to vote against admission of Pakistan to 
the UN. In Kabul, the government announced 14th of August, the day of independence of 
Pakistan, as Pashtunistan day and named a major square in the centre of Kabul as 
Pashtunistan Square.  
The Pashtunistan issue had significant impacts on the emerging political and cultural 
groups in the country. As Bezhan (2014) shows, Wishzalmayan adopted Pashtunistan as 
its core platform, a move which limited its appeal among non-Pashtun communities. By 
contrast, the idea of Pashtunistan was viewed with suspicion among non-Pashtuns, many 
of whom saw the ethno-national expansionist claim as an instrument of supremacy of 
Pashtuns. As a result, Bezhan (2014) argues that most of these other groups were 
primarily concerned with domestic socio-economic and political reforms and viewed 
Pashtunistan as a distraction from domestic struggles.  
In 1953, Shah Mahmud was asked to resign by the King. He was replaced by Daoud Khan 
who ruled the country with an iron fist for the next ten years. Most of the key leaders of 
the reformist circles were put in prison, and the independent press was closed as Daoud 
Khan initiated another cycle of centralisation of power and state-led development 
programs.  
In many respects, Daoud Khan disrupted the domestic and international foundation of the 
stability of the Musaheban dynasty. The Pashtunistan issue became a source of recurrent 
friction with neighboring Pakistan, and the need to finance ambitious five-year 
development programs broke the policy of neutrality in the context of Cold War rivalries. 
Daoud Khan became dependent on Soviet developmental and military aid. Ironically, 
Daoud Khan’s modernising and state-led development played a major role in the upsurge 
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of radical protest groups during the 1960s. He contribute to radicalisation of the 
intelligentsia in at least two ways. First, he entered into a series of developmental 
relationships with a number of other countries, which included the Soviet Union, the US, 
and a number of Islamic countries. These agreements included scholarships for Afghan 
students to study in the Soviet Union, Egypt and elsewhere, and provided for large 
number of foreign advisors to be deployed in various sectors of government bureaucracy. 
Second, as the Table 1 (Samady, 2001, p. 29) shows, the national development plans 
quickly expanded the education sector across the country, from 121,090 students in 1955 
to 664,270 in 1972. 
Table 3 Student Enrolment, 1955-1972 Source: Samadi (2001) 
Year 1955 1960 1967 1972 
Primary  111,650 213,100 444,240 540,700 
Secondary 5,730 14,100 54,400 107,600 
Vocational 1,950 2,500 5,700 5,200 
Teacher Ed. 1,000 3,900 5,600 4,170 
Higher Ed. 760 1,700 4,320 6,600 
Total 121,090 235,300 514,260 664,270 
 
Democratisation and Contentious Politics during the 1960s.  
In March 1963, Daoud Khan was forced to resign. In 1964, King Zaher Shah promulgated 
a new constitution which declared the country a constitutional democracy and barred 
members of the royal family from holding executive offices. Widely described as a Dahe 
Demokrasi, or Decade of Democracy (Koshkaki, 1986), the decade witnessed the 
emergence of a significant number of political and ideological currents that engaged in 
competitive social mobilisation and recruitment among the country’s educated class. 
Thus, the adoption of the new constitution ushered in a period of highly contentious 
politics in the history of the country. Ruttig (2006) classifies these groups into three major 
currents: the Marxists, the Islamists and the ethno-nationalists.  
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The Marxist groups evolved from radical activist circles of the previous decades. The 
movement was dominated by two major rival political and ideological groups that 
espoused separate versions of Soviet and Chinese approaches to socialist revolutions, 
reflecting in turn the intense rivalries in the communist world following the 1960 Sino-
Soviet split. In January 1965, supporters of Soviet-style Marxism formed the Hezb-e 
Demokratik-e Khalq-e Afghanistan (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, PDPA). 
Towards the end of the same year, supporters of the Chinese-style communism 
announced Sazman-e Jawanan-e Motaraqqi (Progressive Youth Organisation, PYO), a 
separate organisation that became a fierce rival of the PDPA and followed an entirely 
different strategy for realisation of their own version of socialist social and political 
changes.  
Although transnational political Islamism has a longer history in the country dating back 
to the work of the Sayed Jamaluddin Al-Afghani (1838-1897), it never developed deep 
roots in the society. As a social and political force with significant mobilisational 
capacity, Islamism emerged towards the end of the 1950s, when as part of a program of 
cultural exchange with Egypt a number of Afghan students went to study at the Al-Azhar 
University in Cairo. The founding figures of the movement were all Al-Azhar graduates. 
These included Ghulam Muhamamd Niyazi, who subsequently became the dean of the 
faculty of theology at Kabul University, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Musa Tawana and 
Minhajuddin Gahiz (Roy, 1990, pp. 69-83).  
In an attempt to reformulate Islam as a political ideology, the Islamists translated the 
works of Islamists such as Sayed Qotb and Mawlana Maududi and focused on recruiting 
among students in Kabul. Consequently, in comparison to traditional Islam which was 
based in mosques and traditional madrassahs, this generation of Islamists was the product 
of state institutions, and was inspired by broader ideological struggles that raged across 
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the Muslim world. These activists criticised the government and presented themselves as 
bulwarks against the spread of communist ideologies and other western influences.  
Besides these largely ideological groups that were, at least in theory, non-sectarian in 
their recruitment and social mobilisation strategies, a number of other groups emerged 
that were chiefly concerned with more particularlist ethno-linguistic issues. These ethno-
nationalist groups included the Hezb-e Social Demokrat (Party of Social Democrats), 
popularly known as Afghan Millat after a newspaper it published of the same name during 
the second half of the 1960s. The second major group with clear ethnic tendencies was 
Mahfel-e Entezar (Awaiting Circle), more popularly known as Setam-e Milli or National 
Oppression. It was led by Tahir Badakhshi, a Tajik from the north-eastern province of 
Badakhshan who was a founding member of the PDPA but split from it arguing that in 
Afghanistan ‘national oppression’ was more important than class struggle. Consequently, 
Badakhshi and his followers focused on what they regarded to be the primary national 
issue, which it defined as the oppression of the other ethnic minorities by the Pashtuns. 
While there was no equivalent of Afghan Millat or Setam-e Milli among the Hazaras, 
there were various activist Hazaras groups, both in and out of Afghanistan, which actively 
debated the historical persecution and marginalisation of the Hazaras (Ibrahimi, 2012b; 
Ibrahimi, 2017). Ethnicity as a framework for social and political organisation owed its 
emergence very much to the rise of the educated class.  
The emerging Marxist, Islamist and other groups organised rallies in the streets of Kabul, 
and engaged in intense ideological battles against one another. The protests and rallies 
disrupted the normal functioning of state institutions, including schools, universities and 
the national assembly. Protests quickly shifted from street demonstrations to activities 
directly challenging and disrupting state institutions. The new parliament became a major 
target of such disruptive tactics. Since its opening, the new national assembly had allowed 
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members of the public – mostly activist students – to sit in the general meetings of the 
assembly and listen to speeches of members of the parliament. On 24 October 1965, when 
the Prime Minister Dr. Muhammad Yosuf was due to introduce members of his cabinet 
to seek a vote of confidence from the assembly, the number of spectators was so large 
that even members of the parliament and candidate ministers could not find seats. 
Consequently, the vote of confidence was postponed to 25 October and the assembly also 
decided to convene a secret meeting to vote on members of the new government. The 
following morning, when the assembly convened some 2000 demonstrators gathered 
outside the parliament building, protesting the decision to hold a secret ballot on the new 
government. While the parliament was in session, government forces were trying to keep 
the protestors away from the parliament. Towards the end of the day, the confrontation 
between the security forces and the demonstrators turned bloody: members of the 
National Army who were also deployed to support the police opened fire and killed three 
protestors. The incident had a huge effect on the subsequent course of development of the 
experiment with constitutional democracy. It frightened King Zaher Shah, who asked Dr. 
Yosuf to resign and nominated Hashim Maiwandwal as a new Prime Minister on 29 
October. Hence, the first government under the new constitution survived less than a 
week.  
According to Farhang (1988, p. 508), the 25 October rally was like a ‘funeral service in 
which large number of people participated but everybody was mourning their own 
losses’. These included members of the PDPA, and supporters of Daoud Khan (who was 
sidelined by the new constitution), and of Hashim Maiwandal. In addition, Farhang (1988, 
p. 508) refers to other opportunists and ethnic supremacists who also saw the failure of 
the first government under the new constitution as in their interest.  
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The 25 October rally was symptomatic of contentious politics that raged throughout the 
decade. Koshkaki (1986, pp. 121-140) identifies three different stages of student 
demonstrations: (1) 25 October 1965, which led to the resignation of the Prime Minister; 
(2) 1968-69 strikes and demonstrations against education laws and regulations which 
forced the government to revoke those laws and ask the Minister of Education to resign; 
and (3) 1972 strikes and demonstrations against the Minister of Education and Chancellor 
of Kabul University that also resulted in the resignation of the minister, the chancellor 
and heads of faculties of Kabul University. In 1968, students went on strike against 
policies at schools and universities in Kabul and other urban centres. Workers also used 
strikes to protest against managers of light industries that had emerged in Kabul and a 
few other urban centres (Emadi, 2001, pp. 434-435). In 1971, students of Kabul 
University formed a formal Students Union, which came to be dominated by members of 
the Maoist PYO. A year later, during a clash between members of the PYO and the 
Muslim Youth Organisation, Saidal Sukhandan, a prominent PYO activist was murdered 
inside Kabul University. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was a student of the engineering 
faculty that time, was accused of the murder.  
In July 1973, Daoud Khan, who had been sidelined by the new constitutional democracy, 
staged a coup and seized power while Zaher Shah was traveling in Europe. The coup was 
conducted by a section of the PDPA, which had chosen to infiltrate the armed forces of 
the government. Daoud Khan abrogated the 1964 constitution, and declared the country 
a republic. The renewed drive for centralisation enraged other activists groups, notably 
the Islamists and Maoists. In July 1975, the Islamists sought to incite a revolt against 
Daoud Khan in several provinces. The attempt was a massive failure, as except for a few 
pockets in the north of Kabul most people refused to join the revolt. In response, the 
government launched a campaign of crackdown against the Islamists, capturing and 
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executing or imprisoning hundreds of their members. Those who survived fled to 
Pakistan.  
The April 1978 Coup and External Influence on Domestic Contention 
In the second coup in the political history of the country, on 27 April 1978 members of 
the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan killed Daoud Khan and most members of 
his family and overthrew his government. The coup took the politics and strategies of 
contention to whole new levels. The new regime initiated a series of radical programmes 
that, in ways similar to Amanullah Khan’s modernisation agenda, sought to transform the 
country. Unlike Amanullah, the PDPA reform programmes were inspired by Soviet-
inspired Marxist top-down transformation. The opposition against the government of the 
PDPA began with popular and spontaneously-organised revolts at the community level. 
In other words, the initial revolts against the PDPA reform agendas were led by traditional 
community and religious elites and were consequently disjointed from one another. In 
their scope, these initial revolts were restricted to local settings such as districts and sub-
districts. The PDPA regime responded to these revolts with terror and violence, launching 
campaigns of mass arrest and executions of local notable, religious elites, Islamists, 
Maoists and all forces that were not aligned to the party (Maley, 1991).  
Repression and crackdown in the cities drove most of Islamists and non-conforming 
intelligentsia to the countryside, or to exile in neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. In the 
countryside, the traditional organisers of revolts were joined by educated cadres who 
brought with them the ideological framework and organisational tactics for more long-
term and nation-wide resistance. Consequently, the two different forms of historical 
forces were conjoined in their opposition to the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.  
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The April 1978 coup and mass rebellions that it provoked unleashed a number of major 
social and political changes. First, the two coups in 1973 and 1978, and the violent 
opposition against the PDPA regime began a processes of rapid unravelling of the state. 
Two aspects of the effects on the state of the war are worth noting here. First, the manner 
in which both Daoud Khaan and the PDPA gained power reversed the limited 
institutionalisation of politics that was achieved during the Musaheban rule from 1933. 
The PDPA regime enjoyed little popular legitimacy to defend itself against popular 
revolts that it incited through its policies of social and political change (Maley, 1987). As 
it lost control of territories its domestic revenues also declined quite rapidly. In 1978, 53 
percent of the government expenditure was on development. In 1988, 84 percent of its 
expenditure was on routine operation of the state rather than development, and more than 
three quarters of its revenues came from foreign aid, sale of natural gas and domestic 
borrowing (Maley, 2009, pp. 130-131). Second, the unsuccessful agrarian reform 
launched by the PDPA and the violence that followed corroded the social foundations of 
the state in the country. The traditional elites who served as intermediaries between the 
Musaheban governments and society were first persecuted and estranged by the PDPA 
functionaries before being sidelined by the more organised and ideologically-oriented 
mujahedin factions. Instead of the traditional elites, the war gave rise to a new generation 
of elites that achieved their power through violence, greater organisational skills and an 
ability to obtain and distribute foreign assistance that came from an anti-Soviet coalition 
of Islamic and western countries. Consequently, the traditional patterns of power relations 
at the societal level were profoundly disrupted. 
Second, Islam became the overarching ideological framework for mobilisation, first 
against the PDPA and subsequently against the Soviet invasion of the country in 
December 1979 (Roy, 1990). The armed resistance against the Soviet occupation of the 
country was framed as a jihad, a just struggle within an Islamic framework, and the 
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participants in the war became known as mujahedin. The jihad also drew thousands of 
foreign jihadists to the conflict in the country (Maley, 2009, pp. 49-50). However, in the 
shift from the spontaneous phase of mobilisation in 1978-9 towards more organised forms 
of guerrilla warfare, there emerged diverse groups that were motivated by a wide range 
of interpretations of Islam, including popular religion, traditional Sufi brotherhoods, and 
modern Islamist ideologies inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood. As the conflict 
intensified and following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the 
locally-organised popular uprisings were gradually transformed or co-opted into formal 
political and military organisations that became known as Tanzeem. Throughout the 
1980s, there were seven major Sunni Tanzeems based in Pakistan and another eight 
similar organisations of the mainly Shia and Hazara mujahedin formed in Iran.  
Consequently, the mujahedin groups exhibited diverse political and military strategies 
and pursued different models of social and political organisations. Dorronsoro (2005, pp. 
137-172) draws a distinction between three models of organisation among the mujahedin: 
bureaucratic, clerical, and patrimonial forms of organisations that were inspired by 
Islamist, fundamentalist and conservative ideologies respectively. The bureaucratic 
organisations tended to be led by members of the educated class, the clerical organisations 
were formed by the ulema, and the patrimonial organisations were dominated by the 
traditional landed elites known as khans. In a similar manner Roy (1990) identifies three 
organisational patterns that followed from the existing networks of Islamists, the ulema, 
the Sufi brotherhoods, and tribal networks. According to Roy (1990, p. 120) 
So three different patterns emerged, which have characterised the history of resistance 
parties throughout: 
(1) A number of loosely structured parties, made up of local fronts, corresponding 
to the segmentation of the Afghan society and indicative of the rivalries of 
potential leaders and their followers; these multiple groups joined in a loose 
coalition. They are the so-called “moderate parties”.  
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(2) A dominant party which had renounced its quintessential character to absorb 
people who were not ideologically committed from the very beginning: this is 
Jamiat.  
(3) A very homogenous party, of the Leninist type: this is the Hizb of Hekmatyar. 
On the one hand, there were groups that pursued a Leninist form of political organisation 
with highly centralised hierarchies. The most significant example of this group was the 
Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. On the other, there were groups that replicated 
traditional patron-client relationships in highly personalised networks of mutual exchange 
and solidarity. In short, some groups reproduced traditional social segmentation and 
religious identities, and others attempted to override social segmentation and invent new 
organisational identities.  
Third, the armed resistance against the PDPA and Soviet occupation precipitated a period 
of intense competition as well as mutation among Afghanistan’s various social and 
political movements. Backed by financial and military support from Western and Muslim 
countries, the Islamists emerged as victorious from the conflict first among the 
mujahedin, and then against the PDPA regime backed by the Soviet military. The victory 
of Islamists, however, came at a price for the Islamist’ rhetoric of universalism. In the 
course of their rivalries with other groups, including the PDPA, the Maoists and ethno-
nationalists, they were also transformed as they competed to garner domestic support and 
national legitimacy. In this process of gradual mutation, the Islamist factions also shifted 
towards ethno-nationalist identities by appropriating causes that were articulated by 
leftists and ethno-nationalist groups (Roy, 1990). 
Among the Hazaras, the Shi’a Islamists first fought against local leaders of anti-PDPA 
rebellions and then among themselves throughout the 1980s. In 1989, the process of 
conflict and rivalry resulted to the formation of Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Afghanistan, a 
nation-wide political party that combined Islamist rhetoric with strong elements of Hazara 
nationalism. Two of the largest Sunni mujahedin groups clearly show ethnic tendencies. 
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Jamiat-e Islami, the Islamist party that had its roots in Islamist activist networks of the 
1960s in Kabul University gradually gravitated towards the narrative of Tajik nationalism 
that was articulated by the organisers of the Settam-e Milli since the 1960s. Among the 
Pashtuns, the Hezb-e Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, also originated from the pre-
war Islamist activism in Kabul. Undoubtedly the most radical and most organised of the 
mujahedin tanzeems, the Hezb-e Islami was also overwhelming dominated by Pashtuns. 
According to Rubin (1992, p. 89), in Hezb-e Islami two-third of the leadership came from 
Pashtuns. By contrast, Jamiat-e Islami, the only one among the seven Sunni parties in 
Pakistan led by a non-Pashtun, had nearly three quarters of leadership roles given to 
Tajiks. To be sure, both Jamiat and Hezb-e Islami maintained strong national and Islamist 
rhetoric and included significant members from other ethnic groups. The main point, 
however, is that the two parties were overwhelmingly dominated by Tajiks and Pashtuns 
respectively and the process of ethnicisation continued further as they competed with one 
another during the civil in Kabul from 1992 and 1996. But that said, the ethnicisation 
process had it limits, as all parties remained committed to the idea of a united Afghanistan, 
and thus the discourses of national unity and Islamic fraternity continued to be employed 
by all factions.  
Conclusion: Recurrent Contention, Institutional (Under)development and Social 
Change 
In the previous sections, I have attempted to provide a historical overview of the parallel 
two forms of social mobilisation and contentious politics in Afghanistan. As Giustozzi 
and Ibrahimi (2012, p. 62) argue at the end of their review of existing literature on drivers 
of anti-government mobilisation in Afghanistan, ‘Afghanistan is afflicted by the weight 
of its own history more than anything else. Structural factors, therefore, are not always 
given once and for all, but have their own dynamics’. The war and violence and the 
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profound disruption of state and society in Afghanistan after 1978 greatly influenced the 
trajectory of all social and political movements of the country. With the Soviet invasion 
of the country in 1979, Afghanistan’s conflict gained highly important regional and 
international dimensions. Thenceforth, the success of a movement largely depended on 
the degree to which it could successfully position itself in relation to powerful external 
players, namely the US and Soviet Union until 1992 and countries in the region from 
1992 to 2001. However, as the previous section showed, domestic political regimes and 
social conditions also greatly shaped the character of groups that were formed and 
conditions under which they competed against one another. For the longer haul, two 
aspects of domestic contexts deserve some further elaboration: modernising social change 
and institutional development of the state.  
Institutional closure and (under)development 
The combination of formal statehood and underlying socio-economic underdevelopment 
and fragmentation has had important implications for state-society relations in the 
country. First, in the domestic arena, the state never developed the institutional capacity 
and autonomy from the society that are the hallmarks of modern states in developed 
societies. To borrow from Migdal (2004, p. 63), the Afghan state was ‘a sprawling 
organization within society that coexists with many other formal and informal 
organizations, from families to tribes to large industrial enterprises’. Lacking sufficient 
domestic revenues and depending on foreign aid for its major programmes of socio-
economic or institutional modernisation, successful statecraft has historically required a 
careful strategy of balancing between shifts and drifts of domestic politics as well as the 
interests and alignments of regional and world powers (Bizhan, 2017).  
Second, the formal state institutions, and the informal structures of power relations based 
on various forms of solidarity networks, provided specific sets of opportunities and 
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constraints for socio-political mobilisation in the country. Some scholars have argued that 
the institutional underdevelopment of the Afghan state has held back the political 
development of the country more broadly. In recent years, this argument has emerged 
among students of political movements of the country. These scholars have been puzzled 
by the fact that the country has not experienced the rise of any ethnic secessionist 
movements despite its high level of ethno-linguistic diversity and numerous opportunities 
presented by the conflict and weakness of central state control since 1978. Barfield 
(Barfield, 2005) has attributed this to a combination of pragmatism on the part of political 
elites and a long historical process in the region that de-links ethnicity from nationalism 
and views multi-ethnic states as a norm rather than an exception. More recently, Gopal 
(2016) has argued that the underdevelopment of political movements such as the Taliban 
is due to institutional poverty and backward socio-economic conditions of the country, 
which accounts for ‘prevalence of strong sub-ethnic identities, of ever-shifting networks 
of solidarity defining hyper-local collectivities’ (Gopal, 2016). In short, these scholars 
argue that underdeveloped socio-economic and political conditions produce 
‘underdeveloped’ political movements.  
The argument advanced in this chapter is based on a conception of the Afghan social and 
political life as layered, contested and continuously evolving. The implication of this 
argument is that traditional social segmentation along traditional tribal identities and 
localised solidarity networks provides particular sets of opportunities and constraints for 
collective action. However, the formal institutional structures of the state, the attitude of 
the ruling elites, and external factors provide additional layers of constraints and 
opportunities for collective mobilisation.  
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Modernising changes 
Contrary to the wishes of Abdur Rahman Khan, as it proved to be the case that 
Afghanistan’s rulers could not isolate the country from the modernising influences from 
the outside world. Some elements of modern education and training were essential to the 
functioning of the state. The state bureaucracy needed to train new cadres of bureaucrats, 
giving rise to the need for a modern education sector. Furthermore, within the old regimes, 
there were powerful modernising tendencies that saw the strength of the state in 
modernising the society and economy of the country. From the formation of Habibiah 
High School in 1905 to the founding of Kabul University in 1947, it becomes clear that 
the most important conduit for dissemination of modernisation influences has historically 
been the modern state-run education sector. And the intelligentsia that emerged from the 
state education sector agitated for changes that were often beyond the expectations of the 
ruling elites.  
The most significant pattern that emerges, however, is that throughout the twentieth 
century, and despite their strong modernist tendencies, the Afghan rulers were reluctant 
to provide institutional avenues for social and political forces that were the products of 
modernising policies, and consequently their most likely allies in long-term social and 
political modernisation. This tendency came to the fore during the 1963-73 experiment 
with constitutional democracy. Although the new constitution provided for general 
elections and freedom of press, the King hesitated to sign into effect a law on political 
parties (Weinbaum, 1972). Consequently, most of the new groups that were formed 
during this period became known after the names of their newspapers, and had limited 
access to the commanding heights of the state power. As the subsequent chapters will 
demonstrate, this pattern repeated itself in the design of the post-2001 state institutions in 
the country. 
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Chapter 5: Liberal Statebuilding and its Discontent in Afghanistan, 2001-
2016 
Introduction 
The 2001 US-led military intervention profoundly altered the underlying dynamics of 
political contestation and armed conflict in Afghanistan by changing the incumbent-
challenger relations in the country. The intervention overthrow the Taliban regime, which 
controlled most of the territories of the country, and empowered two other groups that 
dominated the politics of the country: the former mujahedin who had lost nearly all of the 
country’s territory to the Taliban by 2001, and influential sections of Afghan diaspora 
who rose to prominence in the West. 
The statebuilding enterprise that followed the intervention provides the critical context in 
which the argument of this thesis develops. Consequently, this chapter aims to provide 
the socio-cultural and political context in which the main case studies of this thesis 
develops. The chapter aims to explore how the intervention and the subsequent courses 
of statebuilding were shaped by a set of international and domestic ideas and practices 
that proposed different programmatic and policy solutions to the myriads of problems of 
post-war reconstruction and stabilisation.  
The first section provides an overview of the key tenets of liberal peacebuilding and 
statebuilding, discussing how implementation of the principles and institutions of liberal 
democracy were shaped by competing international and domestic interests and agendas. 
The second section discusses the establishment and evolution of a highly centralised 
presidential system as an outcome of the compromise between competing domestic and 
international agendas. The third discusses the rise of patronage-based politics, the Taliban 
insurgency and continued dependence on foreign aid as major sources of continued state 
weakness in in extending its authority over its people and territories uniformly, in 
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providing basic public services, and in developing effective and legitimate institutions. 
The section ends with a discussion of profound social changes that the country 
experienced during this period as a result of globalisation. The fourth discusses the formal 
institutional avenues that were made available by the institutional structures of the state 
during this period. It discusses the context for organised political parties, social 
associations and non-governmental organisations as the three main institutionally-
recognised avenues for collective social and political organisation.  
The Ideas of Statebuilding in Afghanistan 
Since the 1990s, international efforts to end violence and build long-term peace in 
societies disrupted by war and state fragility have coalesced around an agenda that are 
often described as ‘liberal peacebuilding’. In the words of Mac Ginty and Richmond 
(2007, p. 493), ‘the liberal peace has become the new ideology, upon which life, culture, 
society, prosperity and politics are assumed to rest’. The liberal peacebuilding agenda is 
premised on a theoretical hypothesis that in liberal democracies institutional constraints 
and democratic norms and mechanisms of accountability such as periodic elections 
constrain political leaders from engaging in war with other democracies. The idea has its 
roots in the thoughts of Immanuel Kant and other eighteenth century Enlightenment 
thinkers (Doyle, 1983a; Doyle, 1983b).The hypothesis is supported by an empirical 
pattern that show historically liberal democracies have been reluctant to go to war against 
one another to resolve their conflicts. However, liberal democracies have gone to war 
with illiberal and authoritarian states. 
The countries that adhere to basic principles and institutions of liberal democracy also 
form a zone of peace. Despite their significant internal differences, as argued by Doyle 
(2012, pp. 4-5), liberal democracies can be characterised by three sets of rights and four 
institutions. The first set of rights, describe as ‘negative freedoms’, emphasises on 
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freedoms from arbitrary use of power. It is complemented by a second set of positive 
freedoms that are aimed to ensure equal opportunities such as in education and 
employment. The fourth set of rights guarantees participation and representation in 
democratic processes. These rights underpin four essential institutions that are found in 
all liberal democracies. The first is ‘juridical equality and other fundamental civic rights’. 
Second is the principle state sovereignty resides with representative legislatures’. Third, 
the economy is based on the institution of private property. Fourth, economic system and 
policies are based on free dynamics of supply and demand.  
In practical terms, as applied to reconstruct and stabilise societies ravaged by war and 
instability, the liberal peace entails wide-ranging political and economic liberalisation. In 
this respect, peacebuilding has entailed reconstruction of basic state institutions, 
promotion of human right and rule of law, and a market economy. The record of 
peacebuilding have been subjected to extensive debates and controversies. These efforts 
have been criticised for both its failure to achieve its intended outcomes of promoting 
stable liberal democracies and for its underlying Western assumptions and values (Mac 
Ginty & Richmond, 2007; Suhrke, 2007; Newman, Paris, & Richmond, 2009).  
In Afghanistan, the core ideas of the liberal peacebuilding were first reflected in the initial 
framework for Afghanistan’s political transition that was formulated in the December 
2001 UN-sponsored conference in the German city of Bonn. The Bonn Agreement, as it 
became known, included a tight timeline for the transition from war to peace, beginning 
with a six-month Interim Administration, which would then hand over power to an a 
Transitional Administration for another 18 months. During this 24-month period, the 
country was planned to conclude a series of other highly complex processes for creating 
the conditions for a national, pluralistic and representative state institutions. These 
included: 
P a g e  | 111 
 
 The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR); 
 The drafting and adoption of a new constitution through nation-wide consultation; 
 The organisation of two Loya Jirgas, a traditional assembly of elders and 
politicians from across the country: First an Emergency Loya Jirga to elect 
members of the Transitional Authority and second a Constitutional Loya Jirga to 
approve the new constitution; 
 Prepare for a nation-wide popular vote for election of the President and members 
of the National Assembly at the end of the transition period.  
However, as Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009, pp. 8-9) argue a liberal peacebuilding 
operation may involve a wide range of actors with different priorities and objectives. 
These include security, development, humanitarian assistance, and promotion of 
governance and rule of law. In Afghanistan, the statebuilding process in Afghanistan was 
influenced by a number of competing and sometimes overlapping sets of domestic and 
international discourses and agendas, including promotion of human rights, technocratic 
institution building, and stabalisation and security agendas. To begin with, the 
multiplicity of international actors that participated in the post-2001 statebuilding and 
reconstruction efforts were following a series of contradictory short-term and long-term 
goals that can be characterised by the imperatives of stabilisation and counter-terrorism, 
promotion of human rights, and technocratic and developmental institution building. The 
primary factor that led to the US-led international military intervention in 2001 was 
counter-terrorism, the chief reason being the overthrow of the Taliban regime that 
harboured Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaedah terrorist network. In this context, nation-
building or state-building was a consequence of the military intervention and hence only 
a secondary agenda. However, once the Taliban and other militant groups began to 
militarily challenge the authority of the new government in Kabul, the US and NATO 
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waged a counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaign that profoundly influenced 
the course of statebuilding, particularly in efforts to extend state authority beyond Kabul.  
Besides these international agendas, the course of statebuilding in Afghanistan was also 
shaped by domestic groups as they sought to advanced their own interests or particular 
models and concepts of statehood in the country. As Goodhand and Sedra (2013, p. 240) 
argue  
In Afghanistan, there has been a constant divergence between proclaimed 
commitments to liberal principles and actual practices on the ground. This started 
with the Bonn agreement of December 2001, which, far from being a transmission 
mechanism for the liberal peace template, was the result of messy compromises 
between internal and external players and contained distinctly illiberal and non-
democratic dimensions. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, beginning from the 1960s the Afghan educated and political 
elites were coalescing around three major ideological currents: the ethno-nationalists, the 
Islamists and the leftists. The fall of the pro-Soviet government in Kabul in 1992 marked 
the defeat of the leftists as an organised ideological and political movement in the country. 
Consequently, after 2001, besides the principles of liberal democracy ethnicity and Islam 
remained as the dominant frameworks for national-level social and political contestation, 
including distribution of power in the centre. These mutual interactions can be usefully 
captured by the main distinctions I make in this thesis between a foundational, 
programmatic and policy levels. In their extreme forms, Islamism and ethnicist 
movements clash with the core tenets of liberal democracy. By definition, ethnicist 
movements make collectivist claims on the state, and similarly extremist or violent 
interpretation of Islam can clash with core tenets of liberalism that emphasise individual 
freedom, including freedom of conscience and of expression.  
Despite widespread agreement over the role of Islam in the legitimation process, there 
was significant differences over the manner in which Islam could be reflected in the 
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political legal frameworks of the state. Similarly, ethnicity became a major a source of 
division and a framework for social mobilisation. The 2004 constitution, and the political 
groups that dominated state institutions reflected some major faultlines that reflected the 
outcome of the mutual interaction between international ideas and agendas and domestic 
responses. As a result, it became a compromise between the competing domestic and 
international agendas. In its Chapter Two, the constitution includes 38 specific articles, 
outlining a wide range of civil and political rights and freedoms for individual citizens of 
the country. However, beyond these mostly uncontroversial provisions, the constitution 
reflected some critical tensions on three core sets of issues. First, there was an important 
debate concerning the role of Islam in the state and politics of the country (Rubin, 2004). 
As an almost entirely Muslim country, Islam was widely expected to assume an important 
place in the public life of the country. However, the exact modality of the relationship 
between religion and politics, or the specific interpretation of Islam was already quite 
contentious. As a compromise, the country was declared an Islamic republic, and the 
article two of the constitution declared Islam the official religion of the country, and 
article three emphasised that no law could contravene the tenets and provisions of Islam. 
At the same time, article seven of the constitution reiterated the commitment of the 
country to its international obligations, including the Universal Human Rights 
Declarations and other treaties to which the country had acceded.  
Second, another major contention concerned the way in which the country’s diverse 
ethno-cultural groups be included in the new state structures (Simosen, 2004). During the 
debate over the constitution, the tension over ethnic issues surfaced in debates over 
symbolic dimensions of the state-building process, including the status of Dari and 
Pashto, the two main languages of the country, and other minority languages. The article 
four of the constitution named fourteen ethno-linguistic groups of the country as 
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comprising the nation of Afghanistan.3However, an underlying tension remained over the 
status of the two main languages of the country. Some of the most protracted 
controversies over the status of the language have resulted from a clause in article sixteen 
of the constitution that demand the ‘current national and scientific terminologies be 
preserved’. The clause was subsequently interpreted by Pashtun nationalists to refer to 
Pashto military terms for military, educational and administrative terms and ranks. 
Consequently, they opposed the use of Dari equivalents for the same ranks and terms. 
Other participants of the Loya Jirga that approved the constitution claimed that the clause 
was not included in the document as it was approved by the assembly. Regardless of how 
the clause was included in the document, it has since become a source of heated debate 
between Pashtun nationalists who attempt to promote Pashto as the public and 
administrative language of the country, and Dari speakers who have resisted such 
attempts (Arbabzadah, 2008). 
Third, there was some heated debate over the forms of political system, primarily along 
centralised and de-centralised forms of system, with Pashtuns mostly advocating for a 
strong centralised state, and many non-Pashtuns demanding systems with greater vertical 
or horizontal distribution of power (Rubin, 2004, pp. 11-13; Thier, 2006, p. 576). The call 
for creation of a federal or parliamentary system with the office of a prime minister was 
muted as some powerful international actors also found it in their interest to work with 
one person leading a centralised system, rather than multiple institutions balancing one 
another and providing institutional avenues for political participation. 
 
                                                          
3 These Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkman, Baluch, Pachaie, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, 
Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujur, and Brahwui.  
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The Practice of Statebuilding 
The constitution created a highly centralised presidential system by giving the presidency 
the responsibility for both the executive and political leadership of the state (Maley, 
2013). According to the article 64 of the constitution, in addition to a range of 
coordinative and symbolic leadership roles, the President has the power to appoint and 
dismiss ministers, the attorney general, judges, officers of the armed forces, heads of 
independent commissions and agencies, and heads of the country’s diplomatic missions. 
The president, who has been a Pashtun, assume these responsibilities with two vice-
presidents who are also directly elected in joint electoral tickets, and usually come from 
among members of Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek ethnic groups. The distribution of power at 
the presidential palace underlined a broader pattern of distribution of power which was 
based on an informal hierarchy among the country’s major political networks that claim 
to represent the country’s major ethnic groups. In the absence of clearly defined terms of 
references, the power of the vice-presidents also depended on their informal networks and 
ability to project power nationally. Karzai who was elected for the first two terms in the 
2004 and 2009 elections, and Ghani who succeeded him in 2014 were both Pashtuns, 
although from two different tribal groups. The two vice-presidential roles were assumed 
by Tajik and Hazara politicians during the two terms of President Karzai respectively. 
Muhammad Qasim Fahim, who served as Vice-President and Minister of Defence in the 
Interim (December 2001-June 2002) and Transitional Administrations (June 2002-
December 2004) and the second term of Karzai (2009-2014) was highly influential as he 
commanded an expensive networks of armed militias. By contrast, Ahmad Zia Massoud, 
another Tajik politician from the province of Panjshir, who became the first Vice-
President from 2004 to 2009 was unable to exercise the same degree of influence as 
Fahim. Similarly, Karim Khalili, a Hazara, who served as second Vice-President from 
2002 to 2014 was widely perceived as lacking much influence over government policies 
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or distribution of state resources. In 2014, instead of a Tajik, Ghani chose General Abdur 
Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek, and Sarwar Danish, a Hazara, as the first and second vice-
presidents respectively. General Dostum, a former militia commander, was sidelined soon 
after the formation of the National Unity Government September 2014. As a commander 
of Uzbek militias in the 1980s and 1990s and accused of committing human rights 
atrocities Dostum lacked the leadership qualities and credibility’s for the job.  
Outside Kabul, the list of officials directly or indirectly appointed (either through the 
Ministry of Interior or the Independent Directorate of Local Governance after 2007) 
through the President’s office include governors and police commanders of the country’s 
34 provinces. With poorly defined terms of reference, the ability of a provincial governor 
to exercise any influence depended on what van Bijlert (2009, p. 3) calls ‘relationship 
politics’, informal networks of power and resources, as opposed to rule-based and 
meritocratic appoints. In other words, their power depended on the resources they 
controlled and the power of their networks of allies locally or nationally. To exert 
influence beyond Kabul, Karzai regularly appointed, dismissed or reshuffled governors 
from one province to the other. Between 2002 and 2004 alone, he appointed nearly two 
hundred governors for the country’s 34 provinces (Mukhopadhyay, 2016, p. 3).  
Unsurprisingly, the concentration of powers in the president’s office has also led to 
concentration of competition for state resources and distribution of power in the office of 
presidency, making it highly-prized in an extremely fluid and unstable political situation. 
The effects of increased competition for the office became clear during the 2009 and 2014 
presidential elections when mass frauds were orchestrated by electoral camps to ensure 
their candidate’s victory. In 2014, after a relatively credible first round of the vote on 5 
April failed to produce a clear winner with more than fifty percent of the vote, the country 
was highly polarised between the two leading candidates, Dr. Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani. 
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The second round on 14 June was so extensively tainted by fraud and irregularities that 
even months of audit by an UN-led team of international experts could not produce an 
acceptable outcome. After months of intense political crisis that pushed the country to the 
brink of a civil war between supporters of the two candidates, a political agreement was 
brokered by the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, which brought the two candidates 
together in a highly-fractured government of national unity.  
Weak and Fragmented Legislature  
Following the model of the 1964 constitutional monarchy, the 2004 constitution created 
a bicameral legislature. The 249 members of the Wolesi Jirga (House of People), the 
Lower House of the Parliament, is elected through direct popular votes. By contrast, the 
Mishrano Jirga (House of Elders), the Upper House, consists of one third appointed by 
the president for a period of five years, another one third elected from among the 
country’s provincial councils for a period of four years, and the remaining third through 
district councils for a period of three years (Article 84). Since the district-level elections 
were never held, the president has appointed two thirds of the members of the Meshrano 
Jirga in 2005 and 2010, giving him immense influence in the make-up of the assembly.  
Although the Parliament has been given the power to approve many presidential decisions 
such as members of the cabinet, in practice it has limited capacity and power to provide 
the necessary checks and balances. Two factors appear to have been particularly 
detrimental to the ability of the National Assembly to perform necessary balancing 
functions. First, members of the assembly are elected through the Single Non-
Transferable Voting System (SNTV), according to which MPs are elected through direct 
votes in multi-member constituencies, based on the country’s 34 provinces. Based on an 
estimated size of their population, each province was allocated a fixed number of seats 
that would go to the candidates with the highest number of votes. Consequently, the 
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system pushed political contestation between the candidates to the local level. A multi-
year research by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) found that 
members of the Wolesi Jirga, lacking the organisational capacity and resources for 
effective and long-term representation of their constituencies, were focusing on building 
close ties with the government and the president’s office to access patronage and 
resources (Lough, 2011). The same report state that, 
the paramount importance of solidarity groups (often referred to as qawms or 
khels) and reciprocal patronage networks in Afghan society means that elections 
revolve around competing local interests rather than cross-cutting issues or 
ideologies’ (Lough, 2011).  
Second, the SNTV discouraged formation of nation-wide and programmatic political 
parties, by making parties essentially irrelevant to fielding candidates in elections and 
voter mobilisation. The SNTV system encouraged localised and person-centred forms of 
electoral mobilisation, leaving little incentives for candidates to align themselves with 
national parties. The system was particularly detrimental to small parties with relatively 
smaller support bases spread across several provinces (Reynolds, 2006; Reynolds & 
Carey, 2012). The National Assembly, which was elected through the system, was 
dominated by members who took pride in being ‘independent’ and even deployed 
‘political ambiguity’ as a strategy to keep their options open amid changing political 
alignments (Larson, 2016).  
As might have become clear so far, the combination of centralised presidential system 
and weak legislature spawned two parallel and contradictory processes of centralisation 
and localisation. While the power of dispensing state patronage was concentrated in the 
presidency, politics, as evidenced by the parliament, underwent a process of 
fragmentation, driven by person-centred politics and local dynamics of interest 
representation.  
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Neopatrimonialism and its Discontent 
Although the conclusion of the Bonn process with the adoption of the new constitution 
and election of Karzai as President in 2004, technically Afghanistan became a sovereign 
state. However, the state institutions acquired neither the bureaucratic capacity nor the 
coercive power to exercise its sovereign authority uniformly over its territory. As 
conceived in for this thesis, the state continued to remain weak in extending its authority 
over its people and territories uniformly, in providing basic public services, and in 
developing effective and legitimate institutions. Three major sources of continued state 
weakness worth highlighting here: 1) patronage-based politics and corruption, 2) violent 
insurgency, and 3) dependency on foreign financial and military aid.  
Informal Patronage, Corruption and State Capture 
The idea of building a highly centralised presidential system ran into difficulties. The 
outcome of the confluence of domestic and international interests and conceptions of 
statehood was neopatrimonialism, a complex and instable order in which the formal rules 
and institutions of the state are permeated by informal and patron-client relationships. 
Since its introduction to the academic debate by Eisenstadt (1973), the notion of 
neopatrimonialism has been widely debated (Erdmann & Engel, 2007). Clampham (2004, 
p. 48) defined it as  
a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type 
pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on 
rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organisations with 
powers which are formally defined, but exercise those powers, so far as they can, 
as a form not of public service but of private property. 
In Afghanistan, neopatrimonialism translated into what was described by Schmeidl 
(2016, p. 576) as ‘negative hybridity’, and by Maley as a ‘particularly dysfunctional form 
of hybridity’ (Maley, 2013, p. 260). The formal institutions of the state were captured by 
a wide range of groups, including non-state armed groups that had flourished during the 
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previous decades of conflict and instability. These non-state armed groups commanded 
coercive power of their own, enjoyed some level of local popular support and controlled 
local economies (Mac Ginty, 2010). Lacking the coercive power and bureaucratic 
capacity to project power across the country, the government of Hamid Karzai chose to 
extend state authorities at the provincial level through dispensation of patronage and co-
optation of local and provincial strongmen into the folds of state structures. Local 
strongmen and power networks also responded to the centralisation agenda by taking 
control of state institutions as governors, police commanders and judges, and hence 
appropriating both the official legitimacy which came with formal positions and the 
material patronage resources.  
The co-optation by the state and appropriation by the non-state networks, compounded 
by weak to non-existent state bureaucratic capacity, created the conditions for extreme 
forms of corruption, loot of meagre domestic revenues, and foreign aid. Afghanistan was 
consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world by the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index. According to a survey by the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, in 2012 half of Afghanistan’s population paid a bribe to 
access a public service, and the total amount of bribes paid to state officials in the same 
year was estimated to amount to US$ 3.9 billion (United Nations Office on Drug and 
Crime, 2012). As the US Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction noted, 
although corruption had highly corrosive effect on the statebuilding process as it 
undermined the legitimacy of state institutions and created widespread grievances and 
even diverted funds to the insurgency, the US and other international actors were slow to 
recognise it as problem. The report also highlighted how the US even contributed to 
corruption through its ‘flawed oversight and contracting practices’, and partnership with 
‘malign powerbrokers’ (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 
2016).  
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Insurgency and Terrorist Violence 
After a hiatus of few years after their overthrow from power in 2001, the Taliban 
regrouped in sanctuaries in neighbouring Pakistan and launched an insurgency to 
challenge the central government control in many provinces. Beginning with sporadic 
and small-scale attacks in 2003, the insurgency developed a resilient fighting force by 
2006, challenging government control over districts and highways in the south of the 
country. Overtime, the insurgency gradually spread to seriously affect large areas in the 
south-east, east, west and north of the country. In response, the US and NATO forces 
launched a counter-insurgency campaign to clear areas from the insurgents whilst 
simultaneously training and helping build up the Afghan Security Forces. The counter-
insurgency campaign was intensified by President Obama’s December 2009 military and 
civilian ‘surge’ which included deployment of an additional 30,000 US forces in the 
country. The surge escalated the military campaign against the insurgents, and 
subordinated the statebuilding and developmental programmes to the logic of winning 
hearts and minds. 
As of November 2016, according to the United States Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR), only 57.2 percent of Afghanistan’s 407 districts was under the 
control or influence of the government of Afghanistan; the remaining districts, which 
accounts for a third of Afghanistan’s population, were either contested, or controlled, or 
influenced by the insurgents (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 
2017). In the process, the human rights agenda and the process of extension of creation 
and gradual expansion of rule-based institutions became subservient to the logic of 
counter-insurgency that demanded quick reconstruction efforts, and ill-thought alliances 
with malign local actors.  
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Aid Dependency 
The Afghan state’s ability to exercise its sovereignty is limited by its extensive 
dependence on foreign aid. As a historically resource-poor state, Afghanistan has always 
relied on external support for funding its large-scale socio-economic developmental 
programs. Following the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, financially the state 
institutions were in extremely debilitated conditions. Consequently, the country relied on 
foreign aid to fund its socio-economic development programmes, security and 
reconstruction efforts. According to the World Bank (2012), beginning with a high rise 
in 2005, in 2010/11, foreign civilian and security aid rose to amount to $15.7 billion, 
equalling the total gross domestic product of the country in the same year. Excluding 
security aid, civilian aid has remained around $6 billion per year, or about 40 percent of 
the GDP of the country, creating a level of ‘aid dependency [that] is almost unique (only 
a few smaller entities, such as Liberia and the West Bank and Gaza, have on occasion 
received more aid per capita) (p. 1). The same World Bank report states, 
The large aid inflows that have benefited Afghanistan have also brought problems. 
Aid has underpinned much of the progress since 2001—including that in key 
services, infrastructure, and government administration—but it has also been 
linked to corruption, fragmented and parallel delivery systems, poor aid 
effectiveness, and weakened governance (p. 1). 
Suhrke (2009; 2013) argues that the heavy international role and the presence of tens of 
thousands of US and NATO forces in the fight against insurgency by the Taliban created 
a number of inherent contradictions which undermine the long-term prospect of the 
enterprise. Three such contradictions, raised by Suhrke (2013), are worth mentioning 
here. First, massive aid created a rentier state and as a result contradicted the stated goals 
of democratisation by undercutting the prospect of a negotiated bargain between the elite 
and the people. Second, there was an inherent contradiction between the stated goal of 
‘Afghan ownership’ and the donors’ actual concerns with controlling programmes and 
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policies, including important reform agendas. Third, following the intensification of the 
Taliban insurgency in 2006 there emerged a contradiction between fighting a war in the 
form of a counter-insurgency campaign and building peace at the same time. For Bizhan 
(2017), foreign aid was not destined to produce a weak state. Rather, the weakness of the 
state was the outcome of more complex interactions between external donors and 
domestic actors and conditions, including important policy choices made during this 
period.  
Although some of the problems that emerged in the post-2001 state-building 
process were predictable, the types of intervention that occurred – including aid 
architecture, the subordination of state building to the war on terror, and donors 
and domestic policy choices – decreased the effectiveness of the use of aid and 
contributed to maintaining a weak state (Bizhan, 2017 p.2) 
What is clear is that the high level of dependence on foreign aid have multiple effects on 
the nature of the state and its relations with the society it governs. While foreign aid, 
arguably funded the revival of the state institutions and enabled the state to fight the 
insurgency that violently contest its sovereign claims, it also contributes towards the 
fragmentation and weakening of state’s claim to exercise sovereignty over its people and 
territories. 
Globalisation and Social Chang 
Despite the key challenges that emerging in the statebuilding process, foreign aid, and 
reconstruction efforts radically transformed the country, reviving critical public 
institutions, rehabilitating the national infrastructure, and expanding basic public services 
such as health and education. The Afghan society is deeply connected to the outside world 
in ways that they closely follow transnational and global socio-cultural and political 
changes through television, radio and the most recently the internet. Domestically, these 
changes have the effects of created a nation-wide audiences, with profound implications 
for social mobilisation in a country historically shaped by its traditional social 
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segmentation. The expansion of the education sector has dramatically expanded the 
educated class with their specific modernist tendencies and social outlooks, and the 
internet and mass media have created the opportunities for activists and politicians to 
deliver and communicate their messages to national or transnational audiences.  
Between 2001 and 2010, Afghanistan’s urban population grew by about 4.5 percent per 
year (The World Bank, 2016, p. 54), and Kabul became the fifth fastest growing cities in 
the world (Rasmussen, 2014). In 2001, the Taliban’s restrictive educational policy and 
general deterioration of the state capacity had left fewer than one million students at 
schools, and only 7,800 students at the country’s universities; the girls were almost 
entirely excluded from the education sector. By contrast, in 2015-16 the expansion and 
reconstruction of the education sector had increased the number of school students to 
about 9.18 million (including 3.6 million girls) who were studying in 15,384 schools. In 
the same year, there were 171,609 students at around 145 public and private universities 
(Central Statistics Organisation, 2016). 
Similarly, the number of active health facilities has increased, from 496 in 2002 to more 
than 2200 in 2015. The expansion of health services has reduced maternal mortality from 
1,600 per 100,000 live births in 2002 to 327 in 2013, and child mortality under the age of 
five has fallen from 257 per 1,000 to 97 per 1,000 during the same period. Life expectancy 
has increased from 55.1 years in 2000 to 60.4 in 2014 (The World Bank, 2015; Central 
Statistics Organisation, Ministry of Public Health and ICF, 2015). 
In addition, by 2014, more than 9,200 kilometres of national highways, provincial and 
local roads were rehabilitated, laying the foundations of the first nationally integrated 
domestic market in Afghanistan’s history. These included the national ring road which 
connects Kabul to major urban centres and links Afghanistan with neighbouring 
countries. 
P a g e  | 125 
 
The most dramatic, and perhaps also the most durable, effects of the international 
intervention and statebuilding enterprise is connectivity of the Afghan society to global 
mass media and the internet. In 2001, Afghanistan was an extremely isolated country. 
Since 2002, a fast growing telecommunication sector has connected the country’s 
population to the wider world. According to The Asia Foundation’s 2015 Survey of the 
Afghan People (2015), 82.3 per cent of the population has access to at least one mobile 
phone in households, 62.1 per cent own a television and 21 per cent has at least one family 
member with access to the internet (The Asia Foundation, 2015). 
Institutional Contexts for Organised Participation 
In important respects, the evolution and trajectory of the post-2001 statebuilding exercise 
in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2017 can be illustrated by how social and political 
groups responded to the opportunities provided by the institutional structure of the post-
2001 Afghans state. Broadly speaking, the post-2001 institutional arrangement 
recognised three main institutional avenues for official recognition for social and political 
groups: political parties, social organisations and non-governmental organisations. First 
and most obvious are the political parties. Since20002, the Ministry of Justice was tasked 
with assessing applications for registration of political parties. Although in 2001 there 
were several military-political organisations that had emerged during the years of 
resistance against the Soviet occupation and dominated the Interim Administration and 
Transitional Authority, there were no formally-recognised parties in legal sense of the 
term. As explained in Chapter IV of this thesis, many of the political groups had their 
roots in peaceful and student activism of the 1960s but the years of war had transformed 
them into mainly military organisations. Consequently, after 2001 Afghanistan’s political 
and socio-economic transformation also required that these groups demobilise their 
military wings and transition to peaceful and institutionalised political parties.  
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The efforts to create new political parties or reform and reconstitute the old ones began 
with a high level of enthusiasm. Afghanistan’s Political Parties Law was promulgated 
through a presidential decree in October 2003. According to the law, groups that could 
present a list of 700 members with a basic organisational documents would be registered 
as political parties. According to article 6 of the law, parties were required to demonstrate 
that they did not have any links to armed groups, their goals were not contrary to 
principles of Islam, and that they were not using or promoting violence on racial, ethnic 
or sectarian basis. The relatively low bar set for registration of parties opened the way for 
an unprecedented rise in the number of parties. By 2009, there were 110 formally 
registered political parties.  
To curb the political fragmentation and encourage the rise of fewer and more national 
political parties, in 2009 the Political Parties Law were revised with adding more stringent 
requirements for registration. The new law raised minimum membership from 700 to 
10,000 and required all parties to re-register under the new conditions. Furthermore, in 
2012 a new regulation required each party to maintain an office in at least 20 of 
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Taken together, these measures were aimed at encouraging 
the rise of more representative and inclusive parties (Bose & Ibrahimi, 2017). The 
tightening of institutional requirement for party registration reduced the number of 
registered political parties but not end the political fragmentation of the country. As of 
May 2017, there were 63 parties registered with the Ministry of Justice (Ministry of 
Justice).  
The tightening of regulations for party registration did not lead to institutionalisation of 
political parties. Instead, most of the parties that have emerged after 2001 lack clear 
ideological and political platforms (National Democratic Institute, 2011), and operated as 
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loose networks led by strongmen competing for patronage and political power (Sharan, 
2011).  
Second, the same department of the Ministry of Justice also issues licenses for what are 
called interchangeably jamiat, association, sazman-e ejtema’i, social organisations. 
According to a report by the ministry (Ministry of Justice, 2014), between September 
2002 and September 2014, the ministry had registered a total of 4,969 separate social 
organisations. The same report also notes that during this period the ministry had 
extended the registration of 1400 other social organisations. According to the country’s 
2013 (Ministry of Justice, 2013), Qanun-e Jama’iyytha, these organisations are also 
registered as non-political and not-for-profit (Articles II and III). Article II of the law 
further stipulates that this category of organisations consists of associations (anjoman), 
unions (ittehadiya), councils (shura), and forums (majm’a). The article distinguished 
these categories by specifying the aims according to which they can be formed. According 
to article II of the law, an association can be formed in pursuit of ‘scientific, literary and 
professional goals’; a union is formed to follow ‘shared and legitimate occupational, and 
specialists’ of its members; a council can be formed to pursue ‘community (qawmi), 
occupational and regional’ aims; and finally forum brings together people for ‘shared and 
specific goals’.  
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Table 4: Trends in Political Party and Social Organisations Registration, 2002-2014 
Source: Ministry of Justice, 2014 
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Third, the Ministry of Economy has a specialised department for registering and 
overseeing the work of domestic and international non-governmental organisations. The 
NGOs constitute an amorphous and highly diverse field in Afghanistan. The first major 
NGOs began operation for Afghans began in 1980s, when many Western NGOs began 
delivering aid for Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Baitenmann, 1990). After the fall of the 
pro-Soviet regime in Kabul 1992, some NGOs began operating in Afghanistan but their 
operations were interrupted by the civil war among the mujahedin. The role of NGOs 
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became particularly significant for the Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001 which, lacking 
the financial resources and bureaucratic capacity, relied on the NGOs to provide basic 
social services. However, in 1998 the Taliban became increasingly suspicious of the 
NGOs and the UN. In 1998, the Taliban ordered many NGOs and the UN to leave the 
country (Dorronsoro, 2005, pp. 282-283).  
The number of NGOs rose dramatically after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. The 
opportunities created by flow of foreign aid and weak government capacity created a huge 
demand for the rise of highly diverse range of NGOs, ranging from specialised 
international NGOs and development agencies to inexperienced local groups. These 
groups worked in all areas where the fund was available, including agriculture, 
reconstruction, human rights and delivery of basic health and educational services. By 
early 2004, there were 2,365 NGOs registered with the Ministry of Planning. 
Unsurprisingly, such sudden spike in the number and influence of NGOs created a major 
political backlash. Ramazan Bashardost, a Western-educated technocrat who was 
appointed as Minister of Planning in March 2004, waged a major campaign against 
NGOs, accusing them of profiteering and siphoning off aid projects that was intended to 
reach the poor. Bashardost demanded that 1,935 of the NGOs be dissolved and that must 
tougher regulations be imposed on them (Rahmani, 2012). The reality of distribution of 
aid was much more complicated than what was suggested in the Bashardost’s campaign 
but it was clear that from early on for many Afghan groups the NGOs was an important 
vehicle for accessing foreign resources. In December 2004, Bashardost resigned from his 
post as minister. The public perception of waste and mismanagement in the distribution 
of aid created a popular electoral constituency in Afghanistan. In the 2009 presidential 
elections, Bashardost, who had continued to campaign for reform of the aid sector, 
finished as the third leading candidates at the national level (Mayr, 2010). Consequently, 
the domestic demand for regulation of NGOs remained strong. In January 2005, the 
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Ministry of Planning was reconstituted as a Ministry of National Economy and in June of 
that year a new law required all NGOs to re-register with the new ministry. Nonetheless, 
despite the enforcement of tougher regulations and the requirement of re-registration the 
number of NGOs rebounded. In 2013, some 2,320 NGOs were registered with the 
Ministry of Economy, were employing an estimated 90,000 people, including 3,337 
foreign nationals (Nordland, 2013). 
These separate institutional status for the three categories of organisations have a certain 
logic. The political parties are obviously formed to contest for political power and 
participate in elections. Social organisations can be formed to pursue social and cultural 
objectives. Finally, the NGOs work in the humanitarian sector. However, these 
institutional logics are poor guides to how these organisations work in practise. To begin 
with, the vast majority of Afghanistan’s political parties do not function as political 
parties as in Western democracies. The line separating the humanitarian sphere from the 
political and social spheres are also often fuzzy, with NGOs often finding it difficult to 
maintain their avowed neutrality in rapidly social and political environments. In the post-
2001 period, as Goodhand argues, although NGOs tried push back against a trend of 
‘politicisation’ and ‘securitisation’ of aid, in reality the boundaries between military 
strategies, political stabilisation efforts and NGO activities were highly blurred 
(Goodhand, 2013).  
The blurring of boundaries is most clearly demonstrated by the pattern in the growth of 
social organisations. While the number of political parties declined or remained stable, 
the number of social organisations have progressively increased over the years. The 
reason for the enormous growth of the sector has partly to do with the easier process and 
requirements for registrations of a social organisation. However, the trend in the growth 
of social organisations might illustrate some broader trends in the social and political 
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landscape of the country. As figure 3 shows, over the period of twelve years between 
2002 and 2014, the sector witnesses some steep rises in years that overlap with election 
calendars. During this period, the country witnessed two parliamentary (2005 and 2010) 
and three presidential elections (2004, 2009 and 2014). The 2004 and 2005 presidential 
and parliamentary elections respectively saw the sudden spikes in the number of 
registered political parties. However, while over the following years the number of parties 
decline or remain stagnant, the number of social organisations rise dramatically. In the 
year 1387 (March 2008-March 2009), the Ministry of Justice registered a total of 453 
separate social organisations; in the previous year, the ministry had registered 269. The 
association between the rise in the number of social organisations and election campaigns 
became starker in preparation for the 2014 presidential elections. During the year 1392 
(March 2013 – March 2014), the Ministry of Justice registered a staggering number of 
1,090 social organisations, nearly a quarter of all registrations over a period of 12 years.  
Conclusion 
This chapter provided the critical institutional and socio-economic context for the detailed 
case studies of this thesis. It began with a distinction between ideas and practices of 
statebuilding between 2001 and 2016 in Afghanistan, before dissecting the institutional 
and socio-economic conditions in which collective social and political mobilisation takes 
places. The main conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that although the 
international intervention and reconstruction efforts made important successes in reviving 
the state institutions, the state faced serious challenges in enforcing its authority, 
developing effective and legitimate institutions and providing basic services. These 
challenges were patronage-based politics, dependency and Taliban insurgency. For the 
purpose of this thesis, two dimensions of the dynamics and challenges of statebuilding in 
Afghanistan after 2001 are worth highlighting here. First, the post-2001 Afghanistan is 
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characterised by intense contestation and contention over the nature of state-society 
relations. In this respect, the principles and institutions of liberal democracy are the 
central objects of contention. The liberal state took its particular form in the country 
through bargaining between various national and international actors. While the Taliban 
insurgency presents the most significant challenge to idea of a liberal state, as the case 
study groups of thesis will demonstrate, the overall domestic response to the idea and 
principles of liberal democracy is far more complex. While some groups are motivated 
ideologically to transform or reject the institutions of liberal democracy, many others have 
taken adopted a reformist stance and are more concerned with the patronage-based 
politics and elite division and corruption that permeate the state.  
Second, the highly centralised presidential system coupled by a hostile attitudes towards 
organised political parties drive actors towards contentious forms of collective action. 
Consequently, the formally centralised presidential system simultaneously co-habit with, 
and tries to integrate, a number of competing or overlapping structures of authority. The 
formal trapping of a centralised state and the informal reality of elite fragmentation and 
state weakness have led to two emerging trends: on the one hand, the centralised 
presidential system has led to concentration of contestation for political power and 
resources at the centre, and consequently high demands and expectations from the office 
of the presidency. Lacking the bureaucratic capacity and coercive power, the presidency 
has focused on dispensation of state patronage for extension and maintenance of the 
authority of the centre over the rest of the country. The patronage-based politics has 
discouraged the formation of nation-wide programmatic parties, favouring person-
centred electoral mobilisation through networks of patronage. The neopatrimonial 
political order breeds widespread discontent - particularly among the youth and those 
excluded from the main patronage networks - through regular and unpredictable shifts of 
power and resources. In this context, the non-state structures of authority, including 
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informal networks of solidarity and survival, offers alternatives for failure and inadequacy 
of state institutions but at the same time hinders national and programmatic forms of 
collective action.  
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Chapter 6: Group Strategies and Environmental Responses: Between 
Facilitation, Rejection and Cohabitation 
Introduction  
]\This chapter examines the mechanisms and processes of group formation and 
contentious politics in Afghanistan. It follows from chapter 5, which provided the 
institutional and socio-economic context for the emergence of the four case group case 
studies of this thesis. It follows a process-based approach to explore how the four case 
study groups emerged and then responded to the opportunities and constraints created by 
the post-2001 US-led military intervention and the subsequent statebuilding process. This 
chapter aims to identify patterns of group formation and contention through studying the 
interactive process of international intervention, state formation, and agency by social and 
political actors. It aims to do so by focusing on two sets of mechanisms: collective 
attributions of threats and opportunities, and facilitation or rejection. The former focuses 
on how groups attribute threats and opportunities to the environment in which they 
emerge, and the latter aims to explain how the environmental conditions facilitate or reject 
particular courses of group formation and engagement with the environment. 
Collectively, these mechanisms link macro-level political and social changes to meso-
level strategies and behaviours at the level of groups. The four groups represent four 
distinct responses to the post-2001 international intervention and statebuilding processes: 
reformist, transformationist, partial rejectionist and full rejectionist. 
The first section of this chapter introduces the four main groups, their main goals and 
ideological and political orientations and distinctive trajectories. The second section 
explores the effects of engagement, or lack thereof, in the political process on these 
groups, examining the changing strategy of these groups towards formal political 
processes. One of the major goals of the section is to explore the conditions under which 
these groups engage in protest activities. The third analyses the rise and evolution of these 
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groups with respect to the formal institutional context as well as informal, non-state and 
anti-state environments in the country, before highlighting some main patterns in the 
conclusion.  
Responding to the Constraints and Opportunities of the Post-2001 International 
Intervention and Statebuilding 
The 2001 US-led military intervention and the statebuilding process that followed have 
elicited a wide range of responses from social and political groups in Afghanistan. Two 
of these responses are widely known and relatively well-studied: first, a violent 
rejectionist strategy pursued by the Taliban, and a militant faction of Hezb-e Islami that, 
after a few years of relative calm between 2001 and 2003, launched an armed insurgency 
to overthrow the new government and evict US and NATO forces from the country 
(Giustozzi, 2007; Giustozzi, 2009); and second a strategy of embracing the socio-
economic and political opportunities created by the intervention pursued by most of the 
former mujahedin organisations and many Afghan diaspora groups (Mukhopadhyay, 
2014; Coburn & Larson, 2013).  
However, between these two poles of violent rejection and acceptance there emerged a 
broad socio-cultural and political space that was characterised by uncertainty, ambiguity 
and struggle for survival, and constant adjustment to the uncertain and rapidly-changing 
social and political environment. The position of these groups demonstrates a wide range 
of posturing, ranging from total rejection, through partial acceptance of the relatively free 
social and political space created by the intervention in the midst of continuing 
ambivalence, to acceptance of the ideals and goals set by the new process amidst rising 
disillusionment with the corruption and poor performances of the state. Drawing on 
McAdam and Tarrow and Tilly (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2004, p. 41), in this chapter, 
I focus on ‘attribution of threats and opportunities’, as a mechanism that links these broad 
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level institutional change and group-level responses. However, groups respond to 
different sets of opportunities and threats that emerge at different levels of a socio-
political environment. Drawing on Schmidt (2008), I make a distinction between three 
levels of institutional change and instability. First, changes can occur in the level of 
policies as ‘solutions’ to specific set of problems and issue areas. Second, policies are 
informed and underpinned by more general programmes that operates as organising 
principles of a range of policy solutions. Third, the programme and policy-level 
configurations are informed by ‘deep structures’, the foundational structures of 
opportunities and constraints that shape programmes and policies. 
Table 5. Level of Conflict with the International Intervention and Statebuilding in 
Afghanistan 
Level of 
Conflict 
Afghanistan 
1400 
Hezb-e 
Hambastagi 
Afghanistan 
Jamiat-e Eslah Hezb ut-Tahrir 
Foundational 
(The Basic 
Idea of Nation-
State System) 
No No No Yes  
Programmatic 
(Elections) 
No Yes (e.g. 
presidential 
elections) 
No (e.g. 
elections4) 
Yes (e.g. 
electoral 
democracy) 
Policy Yes Yes (e.g. US 
and NATO 
military 
presence) 
Yes (e.g. 
foreign 
military 
presence) 
Yes 
 
The four groups represent four types of responses, depending on their alignment or 
conflict with the foundational, programmatic and policy orientations of the state: (1) total 
rejectionist Hezb ut-Tahrir rejects the post-2001 statebuilding process at the foundational, 
programmatic and policy levels; (2) partial rejectionist Hezb-e Hambastagi Afghanistan 
accepts the basic foundational structures of the nation-state system but opposes the 
                                                          
4 As of 2014, Jamiat-e Eslah did not participate in elections, although it did not directly oppose 
it, fearing its divisive impact on its reputation. 
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particular programme of statebuilding that followed it, and the specific groups that were 
empowered in the process; (3) transformationist Jamiat-e Eslah accepts the basic idea of 
the nation-state but seeks to transform it through a bottom-up strategy of Islamisation; 
and (4) reformist Afghanistan 1400 supports the post-2001 statebuilding processes but is 
concerned with the actual practices of the state at the level of policies. Taken together, 
the four group case studies of this thesis exhibit how groups in this social and political 
space of uncertainty and ambivalence strategised and evolved as they interacted with one 
another and the state in the context of fragmented and fuzzy sovereignty (Monsutti, 2012).  
Reformist: Afghanistan 1400 
Afghanistan 1400 began with the motto ‘Our Country, Our Responsibility’, with the 
vision of becoming ‘a credible and nation-wide movement of the new generation of 
Afghanistan, [that is] responsible, believer in national obligation and pride, and has 
influence and impact on political, social, cultural and economic processes of the country’ 
(Afghanistan 1400, n.d.). The launch of the movement on 6 December 2012, in Kabul’s 
four-star Safi Landmark Hotel, came after more than a year of intense discussions among 
its approximately 80 founding members. The founders of the movement included senior 
government officials, prominent civil society activists, leaders of non-governmental 
organisations, and private companies and students. As a group of highly-educated and 
influential individuals, the movement positioned itself as a forward-looking youth 
organisation that could represent a break with Afghanistan’s corrupt, violent and divisive 
politics. Consequently, the movement carefully chose the number ‘1400’ in its title to 
refer to the year, 1400, in the Persian solar calendar. Founded in the year 1391, the group 
aimed to become a platform of the youth by the turn of a new century and thus represent 
a new beginning for the new generation of the country. In its website, the organisation 
(Afghanistan 1400a) describes itself as,  
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… a civil and political movement aimed at mobilizing and creating a political 
platform for the new generation of Afghanistan. It will empower the new 
generation to partake in Afghanistan’s political, social and economic 
development. We seek to shape the present direction and to determine the future 
destiny of Afghanistan. We believe that the next ten years is critical for our 
country, calling for a new generation of responsible leadership. In this period, one 
principal responsibility is to promote civic duty and national pride. 
In one of the organisation’s key documents, M’arefinamah Afghanistan 1400, 
Introduction to Afghanistan 1400 (Afghanistan 1400b, n.d.), the organisation explains its 
conception of the ‘new generation’. It explains:  
The meaning of the new generation is the generation that was generally born 
during the three decades of war, and that with a view towards the future of 
Afghanistan has transcended regional and group boundaries, has gained the 
capability to work in state and private sectors and the national motivation to lead 
Afghanistan towards human development, good governance and global 
credibility. The new generation is not an exclusive concept; it can include future 
generations that possess these characteristics [My translation].  
The movement’s launch attracted significant domestic and international media attention 
(Kazemi, 2012). The Guardian’s Graham-Harrison (2012) reported that 
In a country where politics is often seen as a byword for corruption, and which is 
still dominated by jihadi-era commanders, a small group of influential young 
Afghans have started a civil and political movement that hopes to transcend old 
ethnic and sectarian divides. 
As a movement of middle class Afghans, Afghanistan 1400 was clearly a reformist 
movement, seeking to consolidate and deepen the liberal democratic order that was 
enshrined in the 2004 constitution. It sought to embody democratic values through its 
own organisational structure by emphasising internal democracy, collective and 
deliberative decision making, and embracing gender equality. Shaharzad Akbar and Sonia 
Iqbal Zeerak, highly educated and capable young women, were democratically elected as 
the first and second Chairpersons of the Central Council of the movement respectively. 
Representing the diverse ethno-cultural make-up of the country, the movement also 
sought to turn the ethnic diversity of the country into a source of ‘strength’ rather than 
‘liability’, as described by one of its founders (Interview [10]). Consequently, the 
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movement was clearly aimed at transcending the ethnic, factional and sectarian divisions 
that had roiled other social and political movements of the country.  
Transformationist, Jamiat-e Eslah  
Jamiat-e eslah wa inkishaf-e ijtemʿai Afghanistan (Association for Reform and Social 
Development of Afghanistan, henceforth Jamiat-e Eslah) was registered as a social 
organisation with the Ministry of Justice in Kabul in July 2003. It is inspired by the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Akbar, 2018, p. 151) and other Islamist movements in 
Turkey and Pakistan (See below). The manner in which founders of Jamiat-e Eslah 
responded to the statebuilding enterprise is captured by the following quote from Nasir 
Ahmad Nawidi, the Chairperson of the Central Council of the organisation. Reflecting on 
the ten years’ history of the organisation in August 2013, Nawidi (2013a) described how 
founders of the organisation chose a strategy of ‘spiritual’ building of the country,  
In the year 1380 (2001), the situation of Afghanistan witnessed a dramatic change; 
the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban was replaced by the West-supported regime, 
led by Hamid Karzai, and the society of Afghanistan, which was previously a 
closed and completely imitating (taqlidi) society, was suddenly opened to 
intellectual, cultural, economic and political products of the West. The country’s 
intellectuals and aware people were divided into two groups in relation to the new 
situation. [First], those who saw in the new situation a golden opportunity for 
themselves and for Afghanistan, and approved the new changes, and the 
government based on the Bonn model unconditionally and with all their strength. 
The second group were those who opposed the new changes, viewing them as not 
in the interest of Afghanistan, and as opposed to the values and beliefs of the 
country. The brothers who later formed Jam’iat-e Eslah belonged to this group, 
and because of this they started studying the new situation, and the challenges and 
problems that faced the nation.  
After prolonged discussions regarding the new regime and the changes after the 
Taliban, it was eventually decided that, despite opposition to occupation as a 
permanently negative phenomenon, the compatriots must not be left alone at this 
sensitive moment so that aliens and xenophiles play with their destiny. To the 
contrary, it was decided that [the founders of Jamiat-e Eslah] take their affirmative 
role (aijabi) in the spiritual building of the country through preaching (dawati) 
and reforming (eslahi) activities; however, the emphasis being that brothers 
choose civil spheres and free platforms (manaber azad) for their work, rather than 
government roles and positions which were predicted to go quickly down the path 
of corruption and decay (My translation).  
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Jamiat-e Eslah is a religiously-inspired organisation and is focusing on a bottom-up 
strategy of socio-cultural and political change. It pursues a three-phased strategy of ta’arif 
(introduction), takwin (formation) and tanfiz (implementation). As one activist of the 
organisation at Kabul University put it, each phase involves a particular level of 
commitment to the organisation and its values,  
In the phase of ta’arif, they say you introduce Islam and methods, the method of 
Ikhwan Al-Muslimin, well to the people that these are our methods. Next is the 
stage of takwin when you carefully choose (gulchin) pure brothers and then put 
them under training, a spiritual and physical training, so that they become ready 
for da’awah. This is the stage of listening and obeying (sama wa etaat) whereby 
you listen to the group (Jamaat) and obey [its directions). After you have been 
through ta’arif, now come listen and follow. In the phase of ta’arif there are no 
obligations to obey. It is your wish to come or not. But in the stage of takwin, you 
must both listen and obey and you should have [acquired] confidence in the leader 
(qayed) of the group. The stage of tanfiz involves a shift (sayr) towards action 
whereby you must be ready to give up for your goal [everything) starting from 
your time to your life. This is what Imam Al-Banna says (Interview [12]).  
After its formal launch in 2003, the organisation grew at a much faster pace than the vast 
majority of other social organisations. A founding member of the organisation remarked 
that in July 2003 the organisation’s membership did not exceed one hundred members 
but in November 2015 he estimated the organisation had more than 10,000 members, and 
was active in 28 of the country’s 34 provinces (Interview [26]). As is the case in the vast 
majority of organisations in Afghanistan, the membership figure for Jamiat-e Eslah is also 
a rough estimate as most organisations do not maintain active membership databases. 
This means that despite the organisation’s widespread reputation as highly organised with 
hierarchical organisational structures and extensive training of its members, the same 
member of Jamiat-e Eslah also admitted that the organisation does not maintain updated 
membership lists as it does not distribute membership identification cards. 
There are, however, strong indicators that the organisation has vastly expanded in terms 
of its wider support base and organisational resources. During the last months of 2015, 
when I was conducting field research in Kabul, the organisation was close to completing 
P a g e  | 141 
 
the construction of a multi-storey building as its permanent headquarters in Taimani, a 
prime neighbourhood of Kabul. The cost for construction of the building alone, according 
one of one of its leading figure, was estimated to be US$ 10 million. The most illustrative 
indication of the expansion of Jamiat-e Eslah is its success in spearheading the creation 
of a series of other organisations that focus on a wide range of social, cultural, educational 
and humanitarian activities. In its strategy, the organisations established by Jamiat-e 
Eslah focus on the following areas. 
 Publication and translation. The organisation includes a markaz-e taalif wa 
tarjuma, Centre for Writing and Translation. A senior member of the organisation 
estimated the number of books published by the centre might have exceeded one 
thousand, and may have reached millions in terms of individual copies of each 
book (Interview [8]).  
 Provision of educational services. Jamiat-e Eslah runs a series of educational 
services through schools and higher education institutes that are either formally 
or informally linked to it. In Kabul, the organisation is closely linked to Salam 
University, a private university where many founders of the organisation also 
teach. In addition, the organisation has established a number of private schools in 
Kabul and other provinces.  
 Public mass educational programmes and campaigns. Besides the formal 
educational programmes, the organisation has attracted most public attention 
through its mass public religious education activities that often attract thousands 
of participants in events that run for days and even weeks. One of the weekly 
programmes, called Haftheh Fahm-e Quran (Quran Learning Weeks) is often 
organised in public spaces such as parks and stadiums.  
 Mass media. During my interviews with the leaders of the organisation, they 
often referred to its media outlets as Eslah Media Group, a series of radios, 
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weeklies and monthlies, and online platforms that have been established by the 
organisation in Kabul and other provinces. These include monthly magazines 
Qafelah, published all over Afghanistan, Marefat published from Mazar-e Sharif, 
Bayyenah published by the women’s section of the organisation from Herat, and 
Najm published by the youth wing of the organisation (See below), and a weekly 
paper and a national weekly paper, Eslah-e Milli. In addition, the organisation 
runs the website eslahonline, which is regularly updated, and is highly active on 
social media platforms such as Facebook. The women’s wing of the organisation 
runs a separate website, Shabaka-e internet-e zan-e musalman (Internet Network 
of Muslim Women), with separate profiles on social media platforms such as 
Facebook. In addition, the organisation runs Radyu Sadayye Eslah (Eslah Voice 
Radio), with specific locally-tailored programming for the cities of Kabul, 
Jalalabad and Kunduz. In 2013, the organisation also launched Eslah Television 
Network, which is based in the western province of Herat.  
 Charity activities. In 2011, the organisation established the Ehsas (Ehsan) 
Welfare and Social Services Organisation, headed by Mawlawi Abdul Salam 
Abed, a prominent Islamic preacher in Kabul and a member of the Central Council 
of Jamiat-e Eslah. The charity organisation provides welfare services, including 
emergency support victims of natural disasters, winter support packages for the 
poor, and educational support for orphans (Eslah Media Group, 2017).  
 Occupational and youth and women organisations. Over time, Jamiat-e Eslah 
has established a series of organisations that aim to cater to the needs of particular 
social constituencies. These include Nehad-e Jawanan-e Musalman, 
(Organisation of the Muslim Youth, NAJM) as its youth wing; Majma-e Omumi 
Ulemayy-e Afghanistan (General Forums of Scholars of Afghanistan) for religious 
clerics; a separate women’s wing of the organisation; Islamic Medical 
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Association; and Islamic Engineers Association. The Medical Association 
includes doctors who work in private hospitals, and in September 2015 was 
planning to establish a private hospital; and the Engineers Association had 
established a private construction company. The most prominent and active of 
these organisations is NAJM, which was registered as a separate social 
organisation with the Ministry of Justice in March 2012.  
The central notion around which the organisation is conceived is eslah or reform, a term 
used in Arabic, Dari and Pashto languages to denote a transformationist agenda. The 
agenda consists of transforming existing conditions and creating alternative socio-cultural 
and economic models as part of a gradual programme of bottom-up Islamisation. During 
interviews, members of the organisation commonly referred to other members of the 
organisation or other entities linked to it as eslahi, and eslah is used part of the name of 
its several subsidiary organisations and media outlets. The organisation seeks to bring 
about reform at three levels: individual (fard), family (khanwadah) and society 
(Jameʿah). Members of the organisation were keen to emphasise comprehensiveness of 
the idea of reform. As one member put it,  
The purpose of eslah [here is] its comprehensive meaning which begins with an 
individual, including one’s beliefs, ethics, worships, then in the family, ranging 
from small issues of interacting with one’s brothers and mother and father, to 
issues of marriage, honour of the family, undertaking of religion in the family, 
and similarly in the society to ensure that everyone’s rights are preserved, and in 
the meantime everyone performs his/her obligations. Men and women should 
have equal opportunities for work and advancement. In general this is the meaning 
of the reform (eslah) (Interview, [8]).  
In its effort to present an alternative model to the formal state structure, the organisation 
is inspired and influenced by a number of Islamist movements in other countries. The 
most notable influence comes from the Muslim Brotherhood but many leaders of the 
organisation are also looking favourably to the experience of the Rights and Justice Party 
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(AKP) in Turkey (Asim, 2015), and Jamaʿat Islami in Pakistan where many of its 
founders lived during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Partial Rejectionist: Hezb-e Hambastagi  
Hezb-e Hambastagi Afghansitan (Solidarity Party of Afghanistan, SPA) was registered 
as a political party with the Ministry of Justice in April 2004. SPA is a left-leaning 
political party that advocates a secular system of government, opposes the US 
intervention in the country and demands prosecutions for crimes perpetrated during the 
years of war in Afghanistan. In the words of Ghaffar, its spokeswoman in Kabul,  
Our views, thoughts and ideologies match the left more than the fundamentalists. 
Our affinity with the right is little and with the left is more, but we do not consider 
ourselves a leftist organisation because in a leftist current you should be believe 
in leaders that belong to the left and we don’t yet believe in them. We regard 
ourselves as a democratic current that is based on ideology and views – if you 
place it between left and right – we are in closer agreement with the left than the 
right (Interview [11]).  
After several months of internal discussion and consultation, the first Constituent 
Assembly of the party was held on 15 April 2004 in Kabul (Hezb-e Hambastagi 
Afghanistan, 2004a). The assembly meeting approved the key documents of the party and 
elected Engineer Abdul Khaleq Neamat as its first leader. The main founding document 
of the organisation, Baranamah wa asasnamah hezb-e hambastagi Afghanistan 
(Programme and Constitution of the Solidarity Party of Afghanistan), which was 
approved by the Constituent Assembly, specifies 19 specific goals for the party. While 
most of the party’s goals such as preservation of independence of the country and the 
party’s commitments to democracy, human rights and gender equality were common 
statements by most of the parties formed in this period in the country, the document 
distinguished the party from others by its clearly secularist and highly critical tone 
towards the role of the former mujahedin groups in the post-2001 government. For 
example, in stating the sixth goal of the party, the founders of the party declared,  
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While Hezb-e Hambastagi Afghanistan respects religious beliefs of all peoples of 
Afghanistan, it demands an end to all forms of prejudice and misuse of religious 
beliefs of the people, immediate end of the traitorous wars of armed groups, and 
prosecution of all war criminals and national traitors and seizure and confiscation 
of the vast wealth they have accumulated during the 25 years of war; those 
compatriots who unknowingly or through compulsion joined the service of 
different involved factions after 27 April 1978 (7 Saur 1357) and have realised 
they made mistakes can be pardoned (Hezb-e Hambastagi Afghanistan, 
2004b)[My translation].  
At the outset, the party’s emphasis on prosecution of war criminals pushed it to a 
confrontational position towards the former mujahedin organisations who dominated the 
post-2001 political arrangements. As will be discussed further below, the party’s critical 
stance shifted towards an even harsher line. An important driver of the hardening of the 
position of the party towards the formal political process was the position of the party on 
the post-2001 situation as ‘under occupation’ of the US and NATO forces. By adopting 
this view, the party also took a moral and political position which limited its ability to 
access the resources that were injected through the country, and hence remained outside 
the network of distribution of patronage that dominated party politics during this period. 
Such a position placed it in a complicated position to recruit new members. Rasikh, a 
leading member of the party, said that in recruiting new members the party should explain 
its inability to dispense patronage,  
First, I should really believe that you have not come [with the hope] if the party 
gains victory you become a minister, or director. Or this party has money to give 
me, or they know some people who can appoint me [to a job]. On the first day we 
say: nay brother we are opposed to the government, we don’t accept the 
government, and we don’t have any resources [to give you]. On the contrary, when 
you become a member you should give money to us from your own income. You 
should pay membership fees (Interview [2]). 
Despite these significant constraints, since its registration, the party appears to have 
expanded in terms of its support base. According to the head of the Organisational 
Committee (Komittee Tashkilat), in 2004 the party had about 700 members (minimum 
membership requirement for party registration at that time) but in 2015, he said, the party 
had more than 30,000 members from all over the country. As is the case with other parties, 
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the membership figures of the party cannot be independently verified, but the organisation 
has demonstrated its capacity to mobilise hundreds or thousands of people in Kabul and 
a number of other provinces. Furthermore, the party successfully met more stringent 
requirements for a re-registration process that increased membership threshold from 700 
to 10,000 members.5 
Outside Kabul, the party’s support base and recruitment activities are concentrated in a 
number of specific provinces. Although the party has offices in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat and 
Jalalabad, and Bamyan, some of its strongest support bases are in the provinces of Farah 
in the west (where the organisation claims to have more than 10,000 members), and 
Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar and Nuristan (each with more than 1,000 members) in the 
east of the country. It appears that most of these membership figures come from collective 
support from entire communities, rather than members who are recruited individually. 
This became particularly clear when a party official described its support base among a 
specific community in the district of Hazarat-e Sultan in the northern province of 
Samangan. According to one party official, there is a community of 700 families in the 
district most of whom are members of the party (Interview [2]).  
 
 
Total Rejectionist Hezb ut-Tahrir 
Hezb ut-Tahrir, or Party of Liberation, is a pan-Islamist political organisation that is active 
in many countries around the world. The organisation was founded by Taqiuddin al-
Nabhani, a Palestinian Muslim jurist, in Jerusalem in 1953. The central concept that most 
frequently appeared in my interviews with members of the organisation was ‘Caliphate’. 
                                                          
5 The Head of the Organisational Committee of the Party said that as part of the re-registration 
process, the party provided to the government details of 13,000 members.  
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For activists of the organisation, the caliphate is central to implementation of Islamic rule 
and unequivocally linked to the honour, dignity and power of the imagined global Muslim 
community. One of the party’s main texts, to which I was referred regularly during my 
interviews, is Methods of Hezb ut-Tahrir for Bringing Change (Hezb ut-Tahrir 
Afghanistan, 2012a). The book defines the organisation as a vanguard of the Islamic 
ummah in a global scale. The book defines the restoration of caliphate as the central 
mission of the party.  
Hezb ul-Tahrir is a political party the origin of which is Islam. Consequently, 
politics is its work, and its origin and foundation is Islam, and the party works 
with and within the ummah so that the ummah adopts revival of Islam in life, state 
and society as a fate-determining priority (Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan, 2012a, p. 
30) [My translation].  
Consequently, the ultimate objective of the party is to re-establish the Caliphate, the 
traditional state that historically governed much of the Muslim world. Activists of the 
organisation I interviewed in Kabul frequently referred to what they considered as loss of 
authority (iqtedar), greatness (azamat) and prestige (haysiyyat) of the Muslim Ummah, 
conceived as a unitary and global community. For them, the loss of authority and prestige 
came after the dissolution of the Caliphate at the hands of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 
1924. The caliphate, they believed, served as a bulwark for Muslims against Western 
colonialism. Hence, they argued that revival of the caliphate was the only way of 
regaining lost glory and reviving the greatness of the past. In this mission of revival and 
reunification, the organisation positions itself as a vanguard political party for 
reunification of the Muslim majority nation-states into a single supra-national entity.  
For the activists of the organisation, revival of the caliphate is more than just a practical 
solution to the multiple crises that afflict the Muslim world; they believe it is a religious 
obligation, ordained by God. In the words of a Hezb ut-Tahrir spokesperson in 
Afghanistan, the organisation believes its ideology was revealed by the ‘creator of 
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mankind’ through Prophet Muhammad. One of the most significant tenets of that 
ideology is the idea of a supra-national Islamic state, which the organisation believes was 
historically manifested by the Caliphate (Interview [13]).  
In its strategy to re-establish the Caliphate, the organisation pursues a three-phased 
strategy: the first stage is called tʿalim and tasqif, meaning education and acculturation 
respectively; second is the stage of tafaʿaul or interaction with, and activities among the 
ummah, the global Islamic community; and the third is the stage of talab ul-nosrah, or 
call for help. To put it simply, the strategy involves preparation, action, and 
implementation.  
According to the Methods of Hezb ut-Tahrir for Bringing Change, each of these includes 
separate elements, which the organisation claims are derived from the methods of Prophet 
Muhammad for introduction of Islam first in Mecca and building of an Islamic state in 
Medina. The tʿalim and tasqif phase focuses on identification, recruitment and training of 
the individual members who form the initial cells of the party. Members go through 
intensive teaching and training to become ‘absorbed’ in the thoughts and methods of the 
organisation. At the end of the training members are expected to gain an Islamic 
personality (shakhsiat-e Islami) and Islamic way of thinking (Islamic aʿqliyat) so that 
they ‘view thoughts, events and incidents through the lens of Islam’, and an Islamic self 
(nafsiyyat-e Islami) ‘so that he/she goes wherever Islam goes’ (Hezb ut-Tahrir 
Afghanistan, 2012a, p. 41) [My translation]. Despite the heavy emphasis on the 
transformation of its members, which amounts to a kind of rebirth of an individual, the 
organisation does not define itself in spiritual, humanitarian or educational terms, 
Hezb ut-Tahrir is a political organisation which is founded on Islamic thought. Hence, 
it is not a spiritual, priestly, scientific, educational organisation or collective for 
charity works (building bridges, schools, hospitals etc) (Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan, 
2012a, p. 30) [My translation]. 
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In the second phase, cultural activities are combined with public political activities 
intended to take the message of the party to the public. The cultural elements consists of 
continued effort at training members and consolidating the organisation and general 
consciousness-raising efforts for the ummah, and refutation of what are considered infidel 
and corrupt thoughts and systems. Significantly, the political strategy in this phase 
combines a confrontation with ‘infidel and colonialist states’ with a struggle against and 
criticism of the current rulers in the Islamic world (pp. 42-43).  
Similarly, [the party] considers it haram [forbidden] to form parties that invite to 
capitalism, socialism, communism, secularism or Freemasonary or call for 
ethnocentrism, patriotism, racism or any religion other than Islam, or if a Muslim 
becomes affiliated to a member of one of these parties (Hezb ut-Tahrir 
Afghanistan, 2012a, p. 38) [My translation].  
The third phase begins when the ummah shows signs of ‘frigidity and dryness’ (p. 46) 
towards the party. In this phase, the party begins with talab ul-nosrah, that is, calling on 
powerful individuals to help the party in two ways: first, by providing protection for the 
party and its activities, and second, through constitution of the Caliphate and restoration 
of the rule of God ‘in the spheres of life, state and society’ (p. 48). According to the 
organisation,  
But third stage, which is the stage of reaching the government through the ummah 
and practices of talab ul-nosrah, so that Islam is implemented in whole without being 
divided into parts; thereafter the party assumes the practical duty for which it was 
formed, the Caliphate is set up, and the party oversees the thoughts and feelings of 
the society and implements Islam in a revolutionary manner that does not accept 
gradualism – regardless of the conditions and capacity of society – and carries the 
Islamic call for the whole world through jihad (Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan, 2012a, p. 
49) [My translation].  
As an Islamist group, Hezb ut-Tahrir heavily relies on Islamic symbolism and discursive 
resources. It defines itself as a political party and hence, in contrast to Jamiat-e Eslah, it 
does not view cultural, educational and charity activities as solutions to the problems it 
believes confront the Islamic world. On the contrary, it regards focusing on socio-cultural 
activities as an aberration from the main objective of reviving the caliphate. The 
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organisation also distinguishes itself from competitive party politics of Western 
democracies by defining its mission as a dʿawah, literally meaning invitation or call, a 
long-established tradition in the Islamic world whereby Muslims call upon others and 
invite them to understand or accept Islam, or call upon fellow Muslims to uphold Islamic 
principles. The spokesman of the party in Afghanistan emphasised politics had a different 
meaning for the organisation, defining it as ‘managing the affairs of the people on the 
basis of rules of Shariʿa and Islamic thoughts with complete honesty’ (Interview [13]).  
In comparison to the other case study groups of this thesis, Hezb ut-Tahrir is certainly the 
most hierarchical organisation with strict rules restricting information on the internal 
processes and organisational structure of the organisation. When I asked its activists how 
the organisation was structured internally, they commonly said those were idari or 
administrative issues that they were not permitted to share with me. Having said that, the 
activists made a distinction between two types of members: organisational members who 
are recruited and trained through its organisational cells, and another category of 
supporters that they describe as hami dʿawah, or supporters of the call. This category of 
members includes any persons in positions of authority and influence, including 
government officials, members of the parliament and local notables. Two members of the 
Afghan parliament confirmed that they had received telephone calls from members of the 
organisation, inviting them to support it. The two members of parliament also said they 
knew of several other MPs who had received similar calls (Interviews [22] and [24]). 
However, the group is not led by the traditional ulema, or religious scholars, who have 
historically taken upon themselves the responsibility to carry out dʿawah. Instead, the 
members I interviewed, or those who appear in public rallies, are generally laymen, 
mostly graduates of secular universities or state-run Islamic education institutes. As a 
result, there is often a deep schism over the concept of dʿawah between these activists 
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who grew up from the universities, and those who emerge from the traditional centres of 
Islamic education.  
In Afghanistan, the organisation’s first attempt to establish a presence was during the 
period of the Taliban regime (1996-2001). A delegation of the organisation travelled to 
the country and met with Mullah Omar, the Leader of the Taliban, who had assumed the 
title of Amir ul-Momenin and declared the country an Islamic ‘Emirate’. The delegation, 
which came from an Arab country, was extending the call for assistance (talab al-nosrah) 
to Mullah Omar for establishment of the Caliphate. According to two members of the 
organisation, Mullah Omar directly rejected the proposal, saying ‘Caliphate is the 
invention of companions’ (Interview [7]). Mullah Omar’s rejection was based on an 
interpretation of Islam that refuses to accept the idea that the caliphate was part of Islam 
as revealed in the Quran or practised by the Prophet’s companions after his death. 
Consequently, despite the Taliban’s emphasis on Islam as a framework for its Islamic 
Emirate, the country under their rule was effectively closed to Hezb ut-Tahrir.  
After its rejection by the Taliban in the 1990s, Hezb ut-Tahrir found a more favourable 
environment in Afghanistan after 2001. The relative liberalisation of social and political 
space, including the basic civil and political rights enshrined in the 2004 constitution, 
provided social and political spaces for expression and contestation of new ideologies. 
More significantly, the expansion of secondary and higher education, coupled with 
exposure of the country to globalisation through the internet and mass media, gave rise 
to a new generation of educated youth that transcended parochial local concerns and 
acquired national and global consciousness and concerns. Consequently, universities and 
high schools in major urban centres and provincial towns became the centre of 
contestation between Hezb ut-Tahrir and other groups with focus on national or global 
concerns (see below).  
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According to its members, the organisation first established a basic organisational circle 
among the students of Kabul University in 2003. Subsequently, the organisation has 
expanded its activities in other university campuses and among school students in a 
number of other provinces. A member of the organisation said that as of December 2015, 
the organisation was active in 20 out of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. These claims cannot 
be independently verified. What is certain is that as a highly-organised group, the group 
has established itself as a potential recruiter for the country’s politically-active and 
religiously-oriented educated youth.  
In Afghanistan, the implementation of the organisation’s clearly-delineated strategy is 
easier said than done. After 2001, the organisation has positioned itself in opposition to 
the basic foundation of the nation-state and liberal democracy on which the post-2001 
statebuilding enterprise was built. As a result, the organisation has not officially registered 
as a political party and operates in semi-clandestine fashion. Besides its clandestine 
recruitment activities, the organisation publishes and distributes a large amount of 
literature. It has translated a significant number of texts produced by the founding 
members and ideologues of the party into the Dari and Pashto languages. It translates, 
produces and distributes these books through its publication wing, Ummat Publishers, 
which has an active online presence. The books translated from Arabic include Menhaj-
e Hezb ut-Tahrir baray-e awardan-e taghir (Methods of Hezb ut-Tahrir for Bringing 
Change) (2012a), Demokrasi nezam-e kofri ast (Democracy is an Infidel System) 
(2012b); Mafahim (Concepts) (2012c), and Takattul (Party Formation) (2012d). In 
addition to these foundational texts and books, the organisation publishes the following 
magazines and periodicals that provide commentaries on current affairs in Afghanistan 
and the world:  
 Khilafat monthly magazine, the first issue of which appeared in April 2014; 
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 Taghyyer monthly magazine, the first issue of which appeared in February 2016; 
 Khilafat periodical, the first issue of which appeared in April 2014; 
In addition to these regular publications, the organisation also publishes and distributes 
pamphlets, and issues statements on current socio-cultural and political developments in 
the country and participate in protest activities 
Group Strategies and Environmental Responses  
Broadly speaking, the four groups demonstrate different responses to the international 
intervention and the subsequent statebuilding process after 2001. As outlined in previous 
chapter 5, the Afghan state suffered from the triple weaknesses in extending its authority, 
providing basic public services, and in developing effective and legitimate institutions. 
These weaknesses provided specific sets of constraints and opportunities for the rise of 
social movements and contentious politics. These four groups offer insights into how 
groups attributed opportunities and threats that resulted from weaknesses of the state as 
well as the international efforts to strengthen and revive the state. In this section, I follow 
up the discussion in the preceding section by exploring (a) how these groups responded 
to the 2014 presidential elections (See table 2) as an opportunity to participate in the 
formal political process, and (b) whether they engaged in protest activities against specific 
policies or programmes of the state. The aim of the section is to explain how group-level 
responses are facilitated or rejected by the triple state weaknesses. 
Table 6 Group Responses to the 2014 Presidential Elections 
Afghanistan 1400  divided and fragmented 
Hezb-e 
Hambastagi  
Formally boycotted 
Jamiat-e Eslah  Did not participate but launched a parallel campaign of ‘national 
unity’ 
Hezb ut-Tahrir  Launched a campaign against elections 
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As a result of mutual interaction between environmental changes and group level 
responses the following four patterns can be surmised:  
 In nearly five years since it was launched, Afghanistan 1400 has gone through a 
period of stagnation and fractures that divided the group between proponents of a 
direct engagement in the political process and advocates of pursuing a social 
movement strategy.  
 Beginning with a cautious optimism towards the formal political process and 
electoral politics, Hezb-e Hambastagi has gradually shifted from a reformist 
towards a partial rejectionist stance.  
 Beginning with a mission of ‘spiritual rebuilding’ in 2004, Jamiat-e Eslah has 
shifted towards a more ambitious transformationist agenda.  
 Hezb ut-Tahrir has created a small and vocal support base for its version of pan-
Islamist ideology; however, its strategy of peaceful social and political change has 
been mired by the ongoing war and violence in Afghanistan and the Muslim world 
more generally. 
These group-level outcomes are not the products of group strategies alone, as the 
particular social and political environment in which they emerged facilitate or constrain 
particular courses of action. Consequently, to explain these variations in trajectories of 
these four groups, I look at process of interaction between group-level strategies and the 
responses by the formal political process.  
Internal Fragmentation and External Co-optation: the Case of Afghanistan 1400 
Within months of the launch of the group in December in 2012, founders of Afghanistan 
1400 were invited to international forums to speak of the hopes and desires of the rising 
generation of Afghanistan. Many international observers saw in the movement a new 
generation of Afghan activists and politicians who could bridge the traditional divides in 
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the country and move towards a shared and democratic future (Gienger & Wilder, 2013). 
However, the movement was as fast in attracting international attention as it was slow in 
deepening its roots in the country, and becoming a ‘credible platform’ of the wider youth 
population of the country. 
Driven by English-speaking elites who were socialised in the post-2001 humanitarian and 
consulting sectors, the movement faced some important hurdles in reaching out to the 
ordinary young members of the society. To be sure, reaching out to the society was an 
important priority of the movement soon after it was launched. The movement sent a 
delegation of its senior leaders to the western province of Farah on 13 April 2013 to 
express their solidarity with victims of a major suicide attack. On 3 April, a Taliban attack 
on a court building in the province where suspected Taliban were being tried left 44 dead, 
including 34 civilians (Stanekzai, 2013). In a symbolic gesture, members of the 
delegation donated blood to the victims of the attacks and held meetings with local 
government officials and youth groups. The visit, which was covered by national media, 
also underscored the challenges facing groups such as Afghanistan 1400 in their efforts 
to reach out to the rural communities (Tolo News, 2013). A western scholar familiar with 
the movement pointed to how members of the delegation travelled to the province in a 
government helicopter (Conversation with a Western scholar of Afghanistan, 10 April 
2017). As in several other provinces, many districts in the province of Farah were either 
controlled or contested by the militant groups. These areas were effectively off-limits for 
most members of Afghanistan 1400. As a movement of individuals with known affiliation 
with government or western agencies, Afghanistan 1400 also faced significant security 
challenges in reaching out to the people in the countryside. With the rapid deterioration 
of security conditions after its launch in 2012, most founders of the movement would be 
targets of the Taliban and other militant organisations who have been attacking, 
P a g e  | 156 
 
kidnapping and killing individuals linked to the government and international 
organisations.  
However, security threats were only some of the challenges facing the expansion of the 
movement. To the disappointment of many of its own sympathisers, the movement’s 
performance has been similarly weak in places such as Kabul and even in areas of great 
strength of its members. The media and tech-savvy members of the movement might be 
expected be to be most effective in exploiting social media platforms, and the internet. 
However, its official Facebook page is rarely updated and as of September 2017, its 
website, www.1400.af, provides basic introduction to the movement in English, with little 
to no texts in Dari or Pashto, the two main languages of the country. 
The combination of great expectation generated by the launch of the movement in 
December 2012, and its inability to create a working organisational structure internally, 
exposed the organisation to the deep social and political polarisation that was created by 
the 2014 presidential elections. As a group of highly educated and articulate 
professionals, Afghanistan 1400 was highly attractive for the main presidential 
contenders of the election on 5 April. Members of the organisation I interviewed in the 
second half of 2015 recounted how they were approached by different political factions 
join one of the coalitions. However, for many members, the desire to influence politics 
through direct participation was counteracted by fears of being compromised by the 
country’s divisive and patronage-based politics. As one senior member of the movement 
put it,  
Unfortunately, most of the existing political groups are based on linguistic, ethnic 
and religious values. We were also a group that wished to participate in politics, 
we wanted to bring a new form of politics. On the other hand, we wanted to make 
sure that somebody who engages in politics is not seen with doubt and suspicions 
because politics can also be undertaken for good purposes (Interview 25 August 
2015). 
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Not all members of the movement shared the same level of ambivalence towards direct 
engagement with politics. Inside the movement, there was a group of former government 
officials and others who were motivated to engage directly in the political process. For 
this group, besides their individual political ambitions, the election was also an 
opportunity to introduce the movement and its platform to a national audience. By 
contrast, the other faction was opposed to direct participation in the process for they 
believed the organisation was not ready to compete in the process and still be able to 
maintain its integrity; there were even others who wanted to movement to remain as a 
civic and social movement without directly participating in politics.  
After several rounds of discussions in the Central Council of the movement, it was 
decided that the movement would refrain from endorsing any particular electoral 
candidate. However, individual members of the Central Council could join one of the 
political coalitions only if they resigned from membership of the movement. The decision 
opened the way for many politically-ambitious members of the movement to join various 
teams of the electoral candidates. In the words of one of its members, one member of the 
movement ‘pinned himself to Ashraf Ghani, because he saw he could not gain much out 
of it [Afghanistan 1400]’, and asked ‘Why should I lose my immediate goals?’ Referring 
to another member who joined another electoral team, the same respondent said, he 
‘stapled himself to Mohaqiq6 and found the opportunity [to be there]. Now the question 
for Afghanistan 1400 is, what you have offered to them?’ (Interview 13 September 2015). 
Waheed Omar, one of the best known members of the movement, first joined the 
campaign team of Zalmai Rasoul for the first round of elections, and of Dr. Abdullah for 
the second round. A number of other members who joined various electoral camps 
                                                          
6 Mohammad Mohaqeq is a Hazara politician who ran as second Vice-President of Dr. Abdullah 
Abdullah in the 2014 presidential elections.  
P a g e  | 158 
 
subsequently were given prominent positions in the National Unity Government that was 
formed by the two leading candidate in September 2014.  
Those members of Afghanistan 1400 who refrained from backing any particular 
candidates remained with the movement. However, the departure of a number of key 
figures and disappointment of a number of others pushed the movement into a period of 
abeyance, significantly damaging the momentum it created with its launch in 2012. In 
November 2015, after some months of internal discussions and evaluations the movement 
issued a public statement, accepting it had been through two years of stagnation but 
announcing it was ready for a fresh return in the public sphere. The brief one page 
statement stated, 
While our launch and aftermath were impactful and grandiose, we have also 
suffered unwanted pauses and were affected by the general political environment 
in the country. We begin our return with the honesty that our people deserve: 
Afghanistan 1400 was challenged in the past two years due to internal issues and 
the general political environment. We have faced our own deadlocks, bottlenecks 
and dare we say even crises. In the critical electoral year 2014, Afghanistan 1400 
was also fronted with questions bigger than its then two year long presence on the 
scene could address. We have learned that in our growth path as a movement, we 
are not an exception to but rather at the forefront of overcoming the deficit of a 
culture of collective action in Afghanistan.  
Our immediate call, therefore, became overcoming our challenges—and enabling 
Afghanistan 1400 to return in public with greater cohesion, and that very spirit of 
forward-looking that sets us apart. We are here to build—inspired by the immense 
needs of Afghanistan, and energized by the dedication of 1400 members that 
persisted despite all the challenges (Afghanistan 1400, 2015). 
The success of renewed efforts to revitalise Afghanistan 1400 depend on both group-level 
dynamics and the overall political and security conditions of the country. As of 2017, 
Afghanistan 1400 is an informal social and political group that is not formally registered 
with the Government of Afghanistan 
The Gradual Shift of Hezb-e Hambastagi towards Contentious Politics 
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Since its formation in 2004, Hezb- Hambastagi has shifted from its broad programmes 
towards a narrower focus on prosecution of war crimes and the status of the US and 
NATO forces in Afghanistan. The shift can be illustrated by the party’s changing stance 
towards elections. In the October 2004 presidential elections, the party backed the 
candidacy of Hamid Karzai in the elections. The statement declared (Hezb-e Hambastagi 
Afghanistan, 2004c),  
Our nation has found itself in a specific position between Mr. Karzai, on the one 
hand, and the warlords, on the other. Despite his indecisiveness towards the 
warlords, lack of reliance on the people, and his collusion with some of the most 
unclear figures, the Hezb-e Hambastagi Afghanistan has evaluated Hamid Karzai 
as the suitable candidate for occupation of this post and [therefore] call upon its 
members and sympathisers all over the country to support Mr. Karzai during the 
presidential elections (My translation).  
Subsequently, leaders of the party have claimed that it had boycotted the election. For 
example, in an interview with CISDA, an Italian association of organsations supporting 
women in Afghanistan, Rasikh, one of the leaders of the party, said the party had 
boycotted the 2004, 2009 and 2014 presidential elections, condemning them as a 
‘mockery’, believing in ‘Afghanistan no president can be elected without the White 
House’s approval’. In the same interview, Rasikh said the party believed the ‘country is 
occupied by the US-Nato forces and governed by a puppet regime formed by corrupted 
criminals: there’s no sign of democracy in Afghanistan’ (Rasikh, 2014). However, the 
party makes a distinction between presidential and parliamentary and provincial council 
elections. In his interview with me, Rasikh said that although the party does not formally 
field candidates for parliamentary and provincial council elections, it informally supports 
candidates and allow members to nominate themselves without party affiliation.  
Our thinking is that we want a fundamental change in Afghanistan and this change 
is not possible through [election of an] MP or [appointment of] a minister. We 
must change the system, the Nezam. And this requires some time, it is taking time 
and we are working for it (Interview [2]).  
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The exclusion from both the formal political process and the informal patronage system 
that developed after 2001 led the party towards a highly contentious approach, with 
periodic rallies in the streets and regular skirmishes with members of the mujahedin and 
government officials on the country’s television networks. The change of views of the 
party towards national elections also overlapped with a change in leadership of the party. 
During the second congress of the party held on 11 April 2010, the leadership of the party 
was criticised for the party’s poor record of action and support for women and the youth 
of the country. More specifically, the party leadership was criticised for having supported 
a candidate during the 2004 presidential elections and it was hoped that boycott of the 
2009 elections by the party would to some extent ‘compensate for past mistakes’. It 
declared that the seven candidates of the elections were ‘known national criminals’. The 
second congress also elected a new leader, Daoud Razmak, a young medical doctor, who 
declared ‘decisiveness and steadfastness against criminals’ and building of ‘extensive ties 
with the people’ as his main priorities for the party (Hezb-e Hambastagi Afghanistan, 
2010).  
Parallel to the internal organisational restructuring and increased radicalism towards the 
political process among its leadership, the party turned towards street politics. The 
following are some of the main protest rallies organised by the party: 
 On 31 January 2008, Hezb-e Hambastagi organised rallies in Kabul and Jalalabad 
against a death sentence given for Parviz Kambakhsh, a journalism student, by a 
court in Mazar-e Sharif over allegations of apostasy.  
 On 9 May 2010, it organised a rally in Kabul in support of left-leaning political 
activists who were facing execution In Iran.  
 On 11 July 2011, the party organised a rally against Pakistan for its alleged 
interference in domestic politics of Afghanistan.  
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 On 19 August 2011, it organised a rally in Jalalabad to celebrate the independence 
of Afghanistan. 
 On 13 January 2012, it organised a rally to protest mistreatment of Afghan 
refugees in Iran by Iranian authorities.  
 On 29 January 2011, it organised demonstrations in Kabul, Herat, Nangarhar and 
Mazar in support of Iranian political prisoners in Iran.  
 On 7 October 2011, it organised a demonstration to condemn the 10th anniversary 
of the US-led military intervention in Afghanistan.  
 On 20 November 2011, it organised a rally in Kabul to express its opposition to 
the Loya Jirga decision to sign a strategic partnership agreement with the United 
States.  
 On 30 April 2012, it began rallies to condemn both 7 and 8 Saur as black days.  
 On 12 October 2014, it organised a demonstration to express its support for the 
resistance of Kurdish forces against ISIS in the Syrian city of Kubani.  
 On 23 March 2015, it protested against the killing of Farkhunda in Kabul (See 
chapter 9).  
The most controversial of these demonstrations were those organised against the former 
mujahedin and the PDPA. On 30 April 2012, the party organised a rally in Kabul to call 
for the prosecution of crimes perpetrated during the years of war in the country. The 
protestors carried crossed-out pictures of leaders of both the mujahedin and the PDPA. 
The rally was organised on the 20th anniversary of the arrival of the mujahedin on 28 
April 1992 (8th Saur 1371), following the collapse of the Soviet-backed government in 
Kabul. Incidentally, only fourteen years and one day prior to the victory of the mujahedin 
the PDPA had gained power through a coup on 27 April 1978. In the post-2001 period, 
the mujahedin who dominated the government announced the 28 April as a ‘national 
holiday’ celebrating the victory of the mujahedin. However, Hezb-e Hambastagi became 
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the most vocal voice challenging the dominant narrative of jihad, accusing both the 
mujahedin and the PDPA of having committed atrocities during those years. 
Consequently, they have been calling both 27 and 28 April (7th and 8th of Saur) as rozhay-
e siah, or black days, and lakkaye nangin, or shameful stains in the history of the country.  
The slogans of the 30 April 2012 rally quickly outraged the former mujahedin who were 
dominant in both the government and the national assembly. According to Human Rights 
Watch (2012) 
Condemnation of the demonstration from members of the Afghan parliament was 
swift. The day after the protest, members of the Meshrano Jirga called for the 
party to be banned and its leaders prosecuted. On May 8, the Solidarity Party was 
asked, along with the Minister of Justice, to appear the next day for questioning 
by the Legislative, Judicial, and Justice Committee of the Meshrano Jirga. Several 
delays occurred, but on May 22, representatives of the Solidarity Party met with 
the Complaints Committee of the Meshrano Jirga. On May 29, the Meshrano Jirga 
wrote to the Ministry for Parliamentary Affairs asking the ministry to inform the 
Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, and 
the National Security Directorate that the Solidarity Party’s activities should be 
suspended and the organization be investigated by law enforcement agencies. 
On 2 June 2012, the Ministry of Justice sent an official letter to the party to inform it of 
the decisions of the Meshrano Jirga to call for their suspension and possible prosecution 
of its leaders. However, in the face of rising criticisms and pressure from human rights 
groups the government backed down and on 15 June announced that the party was not 
suspended, although a government official warned that preparations were underway for 
prosecution of its leaders (Ahmadi M. , 2012). One year later, the demonstration of Hezb-
e Hambastagi on 2 May 2013 was disrupted by government security forces. According to 
Human Rights Watch (2013), at least, 9 members of the party were arrested by the 
security forces, six of whom were tortured and beaten while they were in detention. 
Subsequently, they were all released without any further proceedings against them.  
Jamiat-e Eslah’s Strategy of Bottom-Up Socio-Cultural Reform 
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As a social organisation, Jamiat-e Eslah is avowedly non-political organisation, and hence 
elections and protest activities are outside its realm of activities as envisaged by the Law 
on Social Associations. However, in reality the work of the organisation is deeply 
political. In contrast to the other three groups, Jamiat-e Eslah appears to have successfully 
insulated itself against the polarising effects of the political process, while steadily 
expanding its socio-cultural activities. The success of the organisation in maintaining its 
organisational focus in a polarised political environment is partly the result of a deliberate 
strategy of avoiding direct engagement in the formal political process, including 
elections. 
During the intense months of campaigning ahead of the first round of voting for the 
presidency on 5 April 2014, the organisation launched a campaign of ‘national unity’ that 
specifically targeted, in the words of one of its leaders, ‘ethnicist and secessionist 
currents’ (Rahimzay, 2014). During the week-long campaign that ran from 15 to 21 
February 2014, the organisation organised seminars and public meetings, distributed 
brochures, and raised large billboards in Kabul and a number of other provinces to 
promote its message of unity. The launch of the parallel campaign of unity was 
symptomatic of the organisation’s efforts to present itself as a unifying organisation, 
offering an alternative to the divisive electoral mobilisation by the ethno-political 
networks that dominated the post-2001 elections. Commenting on the 2014 presidential 
elections Nawidi, the Chair of the Central Council of the organisation (Nawidi, 2014) 
wrote, 
Jamiat-e Eslah Afghanistan does not believe the presidential election is the 
solution to the fundamental problems of the country. But in the meantime it does 
not oppose elections in general, and believes it is better they be held than not [My 
translation]. 
Although, unlike Hezb ut-Tahrir, the organisation is not opposed to elections per se, until 
2014 it had prohibited its senior members from participating in the elections as 
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candidates. In 2014, the organisation decided to allow its members to participate as 
independent candidates for parliamentary seats. In my interviews, senior members of the 
organisation emphasised that the organisation did not have any ideological opposition to 
elections. Instead, they emphasised that the organisation was concerned that it could not 
secure sufficient seats in the parliament to influence the outcomes of parliamentary 
proceedings. One member specifically cited the US-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership 
Agreement as a bill to which the organisation was opposed, but could not reject even had 
it elected a few members in the parliament.  
Besides the fear of being unable to influence politics through direct participation, the 
organisation had a wide range of options to express its policy positions. As a network of 
organisations covering a number of different activities, Jamiat-e Eslah has diverse 
instruments at its disposal to express its socio-cultural or political concerns. This means 
that, as one member put it, 
Demonstrations are one of our instruments for declaring our positions. To declare 
our positions on national and international issues, we use different instruments, 
ranging from issuing a declaration on our website, and organising press 
conferences, to organising a large gathering or conference with demonstration 
perhaps being our last option (Interview 30 August, 2015) 
 According to Nawidi (2013a) states, the organisation seeks to go beyond the traditional 
protests in the streets, 
While in our imitating society Islamic activities were mostly reduced to street 
demonstrations, conferences, large gatherings and fiery speeches, Jamiat Eslah 
managed to use good experiences of the contemporary world and launch new 
initiatives that transform Islamic activities qualitatively as well as quantitatively. 
Nonetheless, Jamiat-e Eslah has regularly organised protest rallies in the streets of Kabul 
and other provinces to protest against national and international developments that 
concern it leaders. The following are some of the major rallies held by the organisation: 
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 A 2 January 2009 rally in support of the people of Gaza at the height of the 2008-
2009 Gaza War between Israel and Hammas (Eslah Online, 2009a).  
 On 7 April 2011, the organisation organised a rally to protest against burning of 
Quran by the controversial US preacher, Terry Jones (Eslah Online, 2011).  
 On 20 September 2012 Jamiat-e Eslah organised a rally to demonstrate against 
the Innocence of Muslims, a film produced in the US which allegedly contained 
anti-Islamic contents (Eslah Online, 2012).  
 On 5 July 2013, Jamiat-e Eslah organised rallies in Kabul, Qandahar, Jalalabad 
and Qunduz to protest against the removal of Muhammad Morsi from the 
Egyptian presidency by the Egyptian army (Radio Azadi, 2013). 
 On 13 June 2013, the women wing of Jamiat-e Eslah organised a rally to protest 
against the Law on Elimination of all Violence against Women in Afghanistan 
(Eslah Media Group, 2013) 
 On 2 January 2015, Jamiat-e Eslah held a demonstration outside the French 
Embassy in Kabul to protest against the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo 
for controversial satirical cartoons about Prophet Muhamamd (Eslah Online, 
2015a).  
 On 18 September 2015, Jamiat-e Eslah and NAJM jointly organised a rally against 
the Israel Occupation of Al-Aqsa Mosque (Eslah Media Group, 2015b). 
 2 February 2016, Jamiat-e Eslah organised a demonstration in Kabul demanding 
the closure of the Guantanamo Prison (Eslah Online, 2016a). 
Although as the list shows, Jamiat-e Eslah is a regular organiser of protest rallies, most 
of its rallies are organised as expressions of solidarity with Islamic communities across 
the world. However, domestically it has attracted most attention through its educational 
and cultural activities. In 2015, the wider effects of its educational and cultural activities 
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were increasingly followed with concern by the more secular civil society groups. Many 
civil society groups suspected the organisation of orchestrating a wave of ‘soft 
radicalisation’, by training and educating a new generation of young radical Islamists 
(Akbar, 2018).  
Hezb ut-Tahrir’s Rejectionist Path 
Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan is vehemently opposed to electoral processes. The 
organisation’s spokesman clearly stated that the organisation believed that an election 
was a human-made principle (aosuloi bashari) that contradicts the basic tenets of Islam 
(Interview 19 September 2015). Consequently, the organisation actively campaigned 
against the idea of elections as a method for election of rulers, terming participation in 
the process as haram, religiously-forbidden. It regards electoral democracy as an ‘infidel 
system’ and any participation in it as a ‘great sin’ (Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan, 2014a). 
Consequently, the organisation’s presence in the country tends to attract significant media 
attention during presidential elections. On 31 May 2009, less than three months before 
the presidential elections on 20 August, the organisation issued a statement, declaring 
elections as definitely haram or forbidden, and the presidency as ‘a position of violating 
the rights of Muslims, traitor to the material and immaterial values, and a participating 
hand in murder and massacre of innocent Muslims who are murdered brutally by the 
bombardment of foreign forces on daily basis (Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan, 2009). The 
organisation re-issued the same statement on 26 September 2013, as the country was 
preparing for the 2014 presidential elections. In February 2014, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, 
leader of the militant faction of Hezb-e Islami that until May 2016 engaged in an armed 
insurgency against the government, issued a statement, supporting the candidacy of 
Qutbuddin Helal in the presidential elections. Hezb ut-Tahrir reacted by condemning the 
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position by Hekmatyar as ‘surrender to the Western crusaders’ and ‘clear betrayal of the 
holy jihad’ (Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan, 2014b).  
By taking such a clear and hard position on the elections, Hezb ut-Tahrir has closed off 
avenues for peaceful engagement in the mainstream political process. In the meantime, 
as elsewhere in the world, Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan consistently emphasises its non-
violent character, strongly denying any links to violent organisations such as the Taliban 
and the so-called Islamic State that emerged in Iraq and Syria. The closure of both 
mainstream political participation and rejection of violent subversion has pushed the 
organisation towards underground networks that occasionally surface in mobilisation 
against government policies and international forces in the country. Although the 
movement distances itself from the insurgency, in practice maintaining a distance 
between the rhetoric of establishment of an Islamic state and the violent strategies pursued 
by militant groups has not been easy for the organisation. On 9 November 2015, about 
200 students of Nangarhar University organised a rally at the university campus in the 
eastern city of Jalalabad. The protest, which was initially planned with regard to living 
conditions at the university’s dormitory, was quickly seized by a number of Islamist 
groups that raised anti-government and pro-Caliphate slogans. Some of the protestors 
carried flags of the Islamic state and others shouted ‘we are tired of democracy. We want 
an Islamic caliphate. We want a fair caliphate and an Islamic system’ (Ghazi, 2015). The 
white and black flags of the Taliban and the ISIS carried by the Taliban created a national 
concern about the situation in some of the country’s universities.  
On 21 November, a government delegation sent from Kabul to investigate the protest 
declared that about 200 students of the Nangarhar University were affiliated with the 
Taliban, the ISIS, and the militant faction of Hezb-e Islami. They also announced that 27 
students were arrested in connection to the protest (Tolo News, 2015a). In the meantime, 
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on 23 November 2015, Abdullah Abdullah, the Chief Executive of the National Unity 
Government declared that ‘one of the issues of the country neglected by the government 
[is] the activities of Hezb ut-Tahrir, one of the branches of terrorist groups in Afghanistan. 
This will be addressed in a fundamental manner at this meeting of the Council of 
Ministers’ (Office of the Chief Executive of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2015a). 
The statement by Abdullah was apparently triggered by the protest at Nangarhar 
University. On 25 November 2015, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) 
announced that it had arrested Abdul Qayyum, whom it identified as General Director of 
Hezb ut-Tahrir in the South-western province of Nimruz. Qayyum was reportedly a 
student of Nimroz Teacher Training Centre and was involved in spreading Hezb ut-Tahrir 
materials and other anti-government materials (Pajhwok Afghan News, 2015).  
However, not all officials of the government, including officials of the Office of the Chief 
Executive, agreed with labelling Hezb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organisation. These 
differences of opinion became apparent a week later, in another meeting of the Council 
of Ministers, on 30 November 2015. During the meeting, the first and second deputies of 
the Chief Executive Officer made the following remarks.  
Engineer Muhammad Khan, First Deputy of the Chief Executive Officer, 
remarked that Hezb ut-Tahrir does not existed legally. Nonetheless, as of now 
members of this party has not taken any violent initiative but it is likely they join 
extremist organisations. In the meantime, Muhammad Mohaqiq, the Second 
Deputy of the Chief Executive Officer viewed the organisation as part of radical 
organisations that are opposed to the system of Islamic republic and constitution 
of the country (Office of the Chief Executive of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 
2015b).  
In an interview with me in December 2015, two members of Hezb ut-Tahrir, strongly 
denied they were involved in the protest at Nangarhar University. They emphasised that 
Hezb ut-Tahrir would acknowledge its role in a rally in which it participates (Interviews 
[39] and [40]). However, in April 2016, a local court gave 31 students of Nangarhar 
University prison sentences, ranging from two months to two years, for disrespecting the 
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national flag and carrying the insurgent groups’ flags. Among those who received two 
year prison term was a member of Hezb ut-Tahrir (BBC Persian Service, 2016) . 
Contention and the Uncertain Spaces between State, Non-State and Anti-State 
Domination 
As the previous section of this chapter showed, the four groups represent highly diverse 
ideological orientations, and pursue different goals through very different strategies and 
tactics. The diverging patterns of group formation and responses to the post-2001 
statebuilding can be explained by (1) the social and political characters of their founding 
networks and circles and (2) the interactive processes of group responses and 
environmental feedback.  
The Role of Initial Founding Networks 
The initial founding networks shaped foundational, programmatic and policy preferences 
of these groups by endowing them with particular symbolic and material resources at 
crucial moments of their formation. In addition to broad ideological frameworks 
(Islamism, liberalism and left-leaning nationalism), the networks of founders also 
introduced to these movements particular social networks, political connections and 
moral dispositions. To begin with, for the founders of Afghanistan 1400, a reformist 
strategy was a natural position of its founders, members of a socially-mobile English-
speaking elite who met one another at workshops, seminars and conferences in Kabul or 
abroad. This group owed their rise to prominence to the international intervention and 
statebuilding enterprise, and the chances of social mobility created by the formal state 
structures, as well as the vast humanitarian, consulting and service sectors created by the 
international intervention.  
In contrast to the reformist posture of Afghanistan 1400, the transformationist agenda 
pursued by Jam’iat-e Eslah originated from the broadly cultural and ideological activities 
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of Afghan and international Islamists networks that go back at least to the 1980s. 
Consequently, instead of western-style workshops, seminars and conferences, the 
founding members of Jamiat-e Eslah were brought together in cultural offices, media 
outlets and schools and universities that were established by the seven major Sunni 
mujahedin organisations that emerged in Pakistan during the 1980s (Abdulbaq, 2009). 
The founding circles that established Jamiat-e Eslah also had a proclivity towards a 
culturalist and bottom-up socio-political strategy that would dissociate them from both 
the violent strategy of the Taliban, which banned their activities when they were in power 
in the late 1990s, one the one hand, and the former political leaders who dominated the 
post-2001 government, on the other. Consequently, most members of the organisation 
tend to be highly articulate and well-educated as a result of skills they have accumulated 
over several years of teaching at the mujahedin educational institutions or writing for their 
various media outlets. 
Similar to Jamiat-e Eslah, Hezb-e Hambastagi has deeper roots in the conflict in 
Afghanistan. Although it did not exist as an organisation with the same name prior to 
2001, its founding members had a relatively well-established history of activism both in 
Afghanistan and among the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Consequently, its 2001 position 
was also profoundly shaped by the specific position of its founders at that time. Rooted 
in various factions of the Maoist movement of Afghanistan that were persecuted by the 
both the pro-Soviet PDPA and mujahedin and the Taliban in the 1980s and 1990s 
respectively, the founders of the party in 2004 were inclined to take a critical position 
towards the US-led military intervention and the empowerment of the groups that had 
persecuted them. 
In this respect, Hezb ut-Tahrir offers an interesting case in that its members and founders 
in Afghanistan do not have a similar history of involvement in the wars and violent 
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conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s. Having said that, the experience of the initial members 
who were attracted to the movements at Kabul University from 2003 onwards may well 
illustrate similar patterns, although given the limited information available about its 
internal structures it is hard to make such an assertion with certainty. However, beyond 
these initial postures, these groups exhibit social and political dispositions that result from 
their interaction with the social and political environment of Afghanistan.  
Facilitation, Rejection or Co-Habitation  
Beyond the role of initial founders, the development of these groups was also shaped by 
the ongoing contestation over the nature of state sovereignty in Afghanistan. 
Characterised by the tripe weaknesses of credibility, capacity and service delivery the 
Afghan state had a mixed effect on the outcome of these movements. As was shown 
above, the state elites co-opted many members of Afghanistan 1400, the group that had 
policy-level conflict with the post-2001 state. However, significantly the co-optation did 
not entail the movement as a collective entity. Rather, the politically-ambitious 
individuals were recruited through personal networks. The outcome is even less clear 
certain in the other three groups. Hezb ut-Tahrir, which was in conflict with the 
foundational, programmatic and policy orientation of the post-2001 state in Afghanistan, 
offers an illustrative example. Although, as discussed above, it was accused of promoting 
terrorism, the accusation did not lead to a systematic policy of repression against the 
organisation. Similarly, for Jamiat-e Eslah and Hezb-e Hambastagi, which show similar 
levels of programmatic conflicts, the outcomes of interaction with the state do not show 
clear facilitation or repression and rejection. On the contrary, despite their significant 
differences, these groups have managed to co-habit with the neopatrimonial political 
order, pursuing their own programmes and policies independently of government policies 
and programmes. In this environment of co-habitation, Jamiat-e Eslah, and, to lesser 
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degrees, Hezb ut-Tahrir and Hezb-e Hambastagi devise and implement their own 
programmes of social control independent of the state.  
The cohabitation is partly facilitated by the weaknesses of the state, and the ability of 
groups to draw on material and symbolic resources that are outside the control of the state 
authority. In this respect, Afghanistan 1400, the closest to the state from the four, is 
illustrative. By virtue of the background of its members, Afghanistan 1400 was firmly 
rooted in three separate fields: the formal institutions of the state, and the aid and 
advocacy sectors. At least 8 out of the 15 members of the Central Council of the 
movement were current or former government officials. The best known figure of the 
movement was Waheed Omar, who, prior to joining the movement, had served in senior 
government positions, including as Spokesman of President Karzai in 2010-2011. Other 
senior figures included Ershad Ahmadi, who at that time, was working as Director-
General of the Fifth Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sediq Sediqi, Spokesman 
of the Ministry of Interior, and Abdullah Ahmadzai, who served as Chief Electoral Officer 
for the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan from 2010 to 2012.  
Other members of the Central Council of the movement are noted for their strong 
connection to international academic, humanitarian and advocacy sectors. For example, 
Shaharzad Akbar, the group’s first Chairperson, holds a BA from Smith College in the 
US and an MPhil in Development Studies from Oxford University. At the time of 
founding of the movement, Akbar was a senior consultant at Qara Consulting, a private 
consulting firm, the Director of which, Haseeb Humayoon, was also member of the 
Central Council. Most other members of the Central Council had either worked in the 
government or moved between private sector or aid, and government jobs. What 
distinguishes members of the movement is the ability to transition seamlessly from the 
social worlds of government bureaucracy and politics, on the one hand, and the activism 
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of NGOs and entrepreneurial activities of the private sector, on the other. Yet the very 
ability of Afghanistan 1400 leaders to navigate and move between these fields is partly a 
result of the educational opportunities and career paths of the founding members of the 
organisation. The same ability of the Afghanistan 1400 to shift between formal 
government and the NGO and private sectors was also the chief constraint on its ability 
to connect easily to wider sections of Afghan society.  
The evolution of Jamiat-e Eslah after its establishment in 2003 offers even more important 
insights into the uncertain outcomes of group-level strategies and environmental 
responses. Drawing on the past connections of its founders with the political leaders of 
the mujahedin and blending its Islamist ideology with practical local concerns, the 
organisation has walked a fine line between the government and its western backers and 
the violent opposition groups. While the organisation has benefited from its official 
recognition as a social organisation, it has limited its participation in the statebuilding 
process to the level of directors and deputy ministers. With its self-imposed limits on 
participation in state institutions, the organisation has focused on expansion through 
creation of alternative structures of power and authority in the forms of schools, 
universities, media organisations and charitable activities. Consequently, rather than 
taking control of state institutions, it is creating alternative networks of authority and 
service provision that assume some of the functions of the state.  
Rather surprisingly, both Hezb ut-Tahrir and Hezb-e Hambastagi share a common 
position towards the post-2001 international intervention and statebuilding in 
Afghanistan, although for very different historical and ideological reasons. Despite its 
long history in other Muslim-majority countries, Hezb ut-Tahrir was a late-comer in the 
ideological and political history of Afghanistan. In its strategy to recruit members and 
build party cells, the organisation has focused on schools and university campuses. 
P a g e  | 174 
 
Although, as will be discussed further in chapter 7, the organisation aims to recruit diverse 
social groups, the centres of its activities are universities and high schools. In its 
implementation, the pan-Islamist ideology of Hezb ut-Tahrir, once articulated and 
pursued in the context of Afghanistan, becomes intertwined with the specific socio-
cultural, security and political environment of the country, and the particular socio-
political experiences of its members. The new generation of Islamist activists that 
emerged after 2001 clearly benefits from the transformation of the former mujahedin into 
dominant political forces. On the one hand, most former mujahedin organisations, except 
for the militant faction of Hezb-e Islami led by Gulbudin Hekmatyar, deradicalised and 
embraced the political and socio-economic opportunities presented by the international 
intervention and statebuilding enterprise.  
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have attempted to explain the formation and evolution of the four groups 
in relation to the particular contexts of Afghanistan, characterised by fragmentation and 
contestation of state sovereignty, ongoing violence and weak government capacity to 
devise and enforce policies. I also have made a distinction between three levels of change 
or stability: foundational, programmatic and policy. Evaluating these groups against how 
they attributed opportunities and threats in these levels, I identified four types of 
responses to the changes. Afghanistan 1400, which was driven by policy-level concerns, 
was accepted by the state, and hence many of its members were co-opted into the state 
structures after the 2014 presidential elections. At the other end of the spectrum, Hezb ut-
Tahrir Afghanistan, which positioned itself against the state-building processes at all 
levels - foundational, programmatic and policy – was rejected by the formal structures of 
the state but was not repressed.  
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The manner in which the four groups positioned themselves with regards to the post-2001 
statebuilding process also has two other dimensions that are central to the overall 
arguments of this thesis. First, each of the four groups demonstrates the significance of 
symbolic and value-based dimensions of politics alongside interest-based politics. 
Despite their significant differences, the four groups share important value-based and 
symbolic forms of contention alongside interest-based forms of collective action. Second, 
these groups responded to threats and opportunities created by both the statebuilding 
process and ongoing contestation over the nature and limits of state authority. On the one 
hand, the basic civil and political liberties provided by the 2004 constitution and mass 
social changes and expansion of the education sector provided unprecedented 
opportunities for the rise of various political and ideological groups. On the other, 
corruption and state inability to meet popular demands generated popular discontent that 
is central to the shared ambivalence and scepticism of these groups towards the state. 
Hezb-e Hambastagi and Jamiat-e Eslah began by seeking opportunities at the 
programmatic levels but showed two diverging tendencies. Hezb-e Hambastagi began 
with a cautious optimism from an initially-reformist position, but gradually shifted 
towards more programmatic opposition. By contrast, Jamiat-e Eslah cautiously moved 
towards greater programmatic alignment with the statebuilding process while 
simultaneously expanding its activities in presenting alternative models and seeking to 
Islamise the state and society in a bottom-up process of socio-cultural reform. Given the 
contested and fragmented nature of state authority, the rejectionist and transformationist 
agendas of Hezb ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e Eslah respectively also brought them closer to 
the violent rejectionism of the Taliban and other militant groups. Consequently, in the 
environment of contestation over state sovereignty, the groups responded to threats and 
opportunities in state, non-state and anti-state spaces as they attempted to survive and 
cohabit in a highly-polarised and contested environment.  
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Chapter 7: From Texts to Contexts: Ideologies and Collective Identity 
Formation 
Introduction 
Assessing their foundational, programmatic and policy orientations, the previous chapter 
developed a typology of responses by the four groups to the post-2001 international 
statebuilding enterprise in Afghanistan. The chapter also explained how these group-level 
strategies were initially formulated and then shaped through processes of interaction with 
the broader environment of Afghanistan: Afghanistan 1400’s reformist response led to 
internal fragmentation and partial co-optation by the government; Hezb-e Hambastagi 
shifted from an initial reformist position of cautious optimism towards partial 
rejectionism and contentious politics; Hezb ut-Tahrir’s total rejectionism met with 
rejection by the formal state institutions but found pockets of support among the educated 
youth; Jamiat-e Eslah continued with a bottom-up transformationist agenda whilst 
attempting to present its own models of alternative reform and statebuilding.  
The chapter concluded that while the particular institutional design of the post-2001 state 
played important roles in the shift in strategies of these groups, the overall picture that 
emerges is not one of clear facilitation or rejection. On the contrary, between full response 
and rejection there emerged a wide space marked by ongoing contestation over the nature 
of statehood and sovereignty in the country. To complement these institutional analysis, 
the chapter highlighted the important roles played by initial founders of these groups, as 
sources of particular resources, and particular political and ideological orientations, and 
the challenges facing the state’s capacity and credibility to claim sovereign rights.  
This chapter discusses the discursive mechanisms and processes in formation and 
evolution of the four groups, highlighting group-level dynamics and the agency of actors, 
both individually and collectively, in making strategic and tactical choices. It explores 
processes of identify formation through describing mechanisms of boundary activation 
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and narrative articulation to assess how these groups construct meaning and social 
categories, and legitimate the particular claims they advance. These mechanisms and 
processes connect group-level dynamics with broader shifts in the discursive environment 
of Afghanistan.  
The first section of this chapter discusses the importance of shared meaning and collective 
identities for contentious politics. The second section explores how the broad ideological 
frameworks of the four groups are articulated in the particular context of Afghanistan by 
identifying their most significant agendas. The third section highlights the importance of 
narrative by describing how these groups build on existing historical narratives or 
articulate new ones. The fourth section moves beyond the role of ideology and narrative 
by underlining the importance of social differentiation in highly-contested discursive 
fields. The fifth revisits some of the main themes that emerges from the chapter before I 
draw some general conclusions.  
Identity formation and Mechanisms of Boundary Activation 
The construction of collective meaning and identities is central to any group formation 
and collective action. As Fligstein and McAdam (Fligstein & McAdam, A Theory of 
Fields, 2012, p. 49) argued, ‘any collective action requires identity and meaning in order 
to convince individuals that they are part of something real, important, and tied to their 
“interests”’. Identity construction involves ‘boundary activation’, a discursive 
mechanism that separates group-members from outsiders, and defines the protagonists 
(Tilly, 2004). For McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2004, p. 143), the mechanisms involves 
either invention, borrowing, encounter or a combination of them,  
Invention involves authoritative drawing of a boundary and prescription of 
relations across that boundary, as when Bosnian Serb leaders decree who in 
Bosnia is a Serb and who not, then regulate how Serbs interact with non-Serbs. 
Borrowing involves importation of a boundary-cum-relations package already 
existing elsewhere and its installation in the local setting, as when rural French 
revolutionaries divided along the lines patriot/aristocrat that had already split Paris 
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and other major French cities. Encounter involves initial contact between 
previously separate (but internally well connected) networks in the course of 
which members of one network begin competing for resources with members of 
the other, interactively generating definitions of the boundary and relations across 
it. 
The manner in which groups construct collective social identities has highly 
consequential implications for the particular claims groups can make on the state. It is 
through formation and legitimation of social categories that groups can assert themselves 
in a society, making particular moral or interest-based claims on the state or other actors. 
The meaning and significance of social boundaries may vary depending on the particular 
social contexts. Some social boundaries such as those based on tribal identities or kinship 
networks may have entirely local significance. Others built around broader socio-political 
categories such as religion, ideology or ethnic identities may have broader significance. 
Consequently, beyond localised settings, the significance of social boundaries and 
identities may lie in their ability to connect multiple social relations and sites for 
coordinating collective action at a national or transnational levels.  
As chapter 4 argued, historically in Afghanistan, collective action and group formation 
were profoundly shaped by a long-standing cleavage between the traditional and modern 
modes of social organisation. The traditional-modern divide presented these movements 
as well as the modernist state elite with a particular set of choices for construction of 
group identities. Throughout the twentieth century, in their encounter with the traditional 
social segmentation and divisions, modernist movements would either replicate and 
reproduce these social segmentations or seek to transcend them by inventing or borrowing 
new social categories. The modernist intelligentsia grappled with the challenges of 
modernisation in a deeply traditional and conservative society.  
The historical divide between the modern, usually urban, and the traditional and rural 
segments of the society was altered by deep social changes that occurred after the onset 
of conflict in the country in 1978. The war and violence that began in 1978 radically 
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transformed social relations, weakening traditional patterns of authority and creating new 
actors such as commanders of armed groups (Dorronsoro, 2005, pp. 93-136), and 
Islamists (Roy, 1994, pp. 147-167). In the post-2001 period, the dynamics of the 
traditional-modern divide changed further as a result of unprecedented social changes, 
most notably expansion of the education sector, and exposure of the society more 
generally to forces of globalisation. The exposure of Afghanistan to the forces of 
globalisation and the rapid social, cultural and political changes that accompanied it have 
transformed the underlying structures of constraints and opportunities that faced social 
and political groups in the country.  
Consequently, the four groups studied in this thesis, and their underlying socio-cultural 
networks, are shaped by the rise of a new generation of educated Afghans who have been 
profoundly transformed through their formal education at schools and universities, or 
exposure to transnational ideas and methods of socio-political organisation. In this 
respect, the four groups are the products of social change. The expansion of mass 
education and connection of Afghan youth to global ideological forces have created a 
deep rift between the ideas and ideals of a new society, and the reality of Afghan social 
segmentation, corruption of political elites, and government incompetence and 
inefficiency. A profound sense of ambivalence, disillusionment, and frustration with 
capture of the post-2001 state apparatus by divided and predatory elites appeared in 
almost all of my interviews with activists and members of all groups.  
Abstract Ideologies and Concrete Realities 
As the previous chapter showed, these four groups are highly diverse, ideologically, 
socially and politically. Ideologically, these four groups represent four orientations: 
radical pan-Islamism (Hezb ut-Tahrir), Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamism (Jamiat-e 
Eslah), left-wing nationalism (Hezb-e Hambastagi), and liberalism (Afghanistan 1400). 
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Taken together, these groups also represent a secular-religious divide among 
Afghanistan’s post-2001 educated elites who have come to espouse different ideologies 
with divergent conceptions of a good society. In their broad ideological orientations, Hezb 
ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e Eslah are driven by Islamism, although of different varieties. As a 
pan-Islamist political movement, Hezb ut-Tahrir positions itself as a vanguard of a global 
community of Muslims whereas Jamiat-e Eslah attempts to maintain a balance between 
its national focus, and global pan-Islamic inspirations and concerns. By contrast, despite 
their significant differences, Hezb-e Hambastagi and Afghanistan 1400 are secular in 
their social and political orientation. The important distinction between the two groups, 
however, is that the Hezb-e Hambastagi is an avowedly anti-fundamentalist group, openly 
calling for a secular government, whereas for Afghanistan 1400 the divide is a relatively 
less salient issue.  
Ideologies are, however, among a number of important drivers of formation and evolution 
of political groups. As Munson (2016) argues, social scientists tends ‘to elevate and even 
essentialize ideology in our study of political organizations’ formal ideologies’, 
neglecting the actual processes in which groups, including their ideologies, change over 
time. For the purpose of understanding these four groups, it is important to explore how 
they connect and relate their broad ideas to the specific social and cultural environment 
of Afghanistan.  
In my interviews with respondents from each of the four groups, I asked them to name 
some of most important goals and ideas that unite members of their organisations. The 
responses illustrated both the broad ideological orientation, and the actual significance 
attached to ideologies, in these four groups. For members of Hezb ut-Tahrir, revival of 
the caliphate was unequivocally the most important goal of the organisation. One Hezb 
ut-Tahrir activist referred to the caliphate as central to dignity and honour of a global 
Islamic community. For him, until its dissolution in 1924, the caliphate was like a ‘shield 
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for Muslims’ that protected the dignity, and honour of the Islamic Ummah (Interview 
[7]).  
Similar to Hezb ut-Tahrir, members of Jamiat-e Eslah shared important concerns for the 
global Islamic community, often highlighting a competitive struggle with other groups 
that they believed were inspired by western ideas and models of social and political 
organisation. However, the organisation follows a different strategy for bringing change, 
one that is inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood. The most central notion that unites the 
organisation and its various affiliated organisation is eslah, literally meaning reform, but 
used to imply a broad idea of re-Islamisation of the society through bottom-up social and 
cultural changes. The organisation seeks to follow its broad and transnational goals within 
the frameworks of nation-states whilst expressing a significant degree of solidarity with 
Muslims and Islamist movements around the world. A supporter of the organisation in 
Kabul University argued that broadly speaking, there are two groups competing in the 
society:  
First, [there are] associations (Jama’at) and social forces that work in the society 
to bring reform to the society based on western values. This is one type of people. 
There are other associations that seek to reform the society and achieve their goals 
based on Islamic values. So there are two types of people. Now, naturally 
associations and groups that [seek] to work and bring reform based on western 
values are inspired by western scholars who are also their models. Islamic forces 
that work in the society and [seek] to bring reforms based on Islamic values 
naturally take their roots from Islamic models. One of the great associations, 
which everybody believes inspires many Islamic movements, is the Muslim 
Brotherhood which was founded by Martyr Hassan Al-Bana (Interview [12]).  
Similar to Jamiat-e Eslah, members of Hezb-e Hambastagi could refer to a number of 
goals and ideas as top priorities of the organisation. Some of the most significant ones 
mentioned were national independence, freedom from foreign occupation, secularism, 
and prosecution of atrocities of war in Afghanistan (Interview [2]). Consequently, 
members of Hezb-e Hambastagi had a high level of clarity and consistency over the core 
ideas and goals of the party. In practice, the emphasis on these goals has turned the party 
P a g e  | 183 
 
into a fierce opponent of the US-led military intervention, and of the empowerment of the 
former mujahedin that followed from it. As will be shown further below, each of these 
goals found a particular meaning with the party’s opposition to the presence of US and 
NATO forces in the country.  
The core concerns uniting members of Afghanistan 1400 ranged from embracing the 
ethno-cultural diversity of the country, through gender equality, to espousing democracy 
as a system of governance for the country as well as internal decision making within the 
movement. As one leading member of the movement put it,  
The first and most important value, in which we always take pride, is that of our 
diversity, the diversity that exists in Afghanistan, [and] has always been seen as a 
point of our weakness. Diversity here is our ethnic, linguistic and religious 
diversity – all forms of diversity, including intellectual diversity. This diversity 
has always been a negative point, a point of weakness for us. I tell you this because 
if you go deep into the background of this group you will find that this is a 
generation that no longer shares thought with their fathers. They have even come 
out of family values with which they grew up (Interview [6]).  
The emphasis on diversity, equality and democracy clearly put Afghanistan 1400 in a 
liberal-democratic camp. It is, however, important to understand that these goals and ideas 
may have particular meanings and ideas in the context of Afghanistan. By embracing 
diversity, the group clearly aims to distance itself from the divisive ethno-political 
alignments of the post-2001 ruling elites. Similarly, by emphasising democracy, members 
of the group differentiate themselves from the patronage-based and person-centred 
politics that characterise most of the dominant political factions.  
Despite these significant differences, these four groups are the products of Afghanistan’s 
social, cultural and political transformation after 2001. To varying degrees, all of these 
groups owe their rise and growth to the expansion of the education sector and exposure 
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of Afghanistan to forces of globalisation.7 At the core of this social transformation is a 
new generation of young Afghans who have acquired new individual and collective 
consciousness through education, travel, mass media and connectivity to the outside 
world. 
In important respects, the identities of these groups are shaped by the particular 
ideological and ideational frameworks by which they are inspired. However, in building 
and communicating a collective identity, these four groups confront a large number of 
other groups that lay similar claims to the major goals and values of these organisations. 
To begin with, Islam features extensively in the political and cultural rhetoric of the 
groups who dominated the post-2001 state institutions, including the former mujahedin, 
and those who challenged the statebuilding process, most notably the Taliban, Islamic 
State and other violent groups. Similarly, the notions of civil society and human rights 
that underpin demands for democracy and recognition of diversity also gained widespread 
currency following the 2001 international intervention. Backed by extensive efforts and 
spending by international donors and human rights organisations, as chapter 5 showed, 
thousands of domestic and international NGOs and other groups emerged with avowed 
goals of embracing and spreading the conception of ‘civil society’. Finally, despite the 
fuzzy nature of the claim of the post-2001 Afghan government to national sovereignty 
(Monsutti, 2012), national independence and sovereignty were also widely endorsed as 
principles by both the government and political elites of the country.  
Consequently, the process of boundary activation and identity formation confronted these 
four groups with two challenges: first, in constructing their identities around their primary 
goals, they were confronted by a highly contested field, demanding an effective strategy 
                                                          
7 Although most founders of Hezb-e Hambastagi and Jamiat-e Eslah were politically active 
prior to 2001, as formal organisations with particular programme and collective identity they 
were established after 2001.  
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of social differentiation; second, in scaling up beyond their relatively small network of 
founders, these groups faced the reality of existing social and political cleavages that 
either overlapped or cut across their primary identity markers. To put it simply, the choice 
was between inventing or borrowing social boundaries, or creating one through process 
of encountering other rival groups, and responding to the existing social cleavages of the 
country.  
Identity Formation: the Role of Historical Narratives 
Social boundaries and categories develop over time, and through contestation or 
cooperation with existing social and political groups. At the national level, as chapter 5 
showed, in 2001 the building of a liberal democratic state was faced with a domestic 
discursive environment that was dominated by various forms of Islamism, and ethno-
national politics. In an attempt to establish historical roots for the statebuilding enterprise, 
the crafters of the post-2001 political process sought to build on the similar experience of 
the constitutional democracy from 1963 to 1973. Similarly to the statebuilding enterprise, 
groups also sought to establish roots in history to enhance their claims of authenticity. 
Historical narratives play a highly-important role in construction of collective identities, 
and legitimation of claims made by groups to the state and society. Such historical 
narratives gain particular significance with deep divisions and social polarisation that 
result from protracted conflicts. In Afghanistan, the war and violence since 1979 have 
produced new social divisions or strengthened existing ones, and most of the prominent 
groups that dominated the state institutions, and the Taliban that challenged them, adopt 
and articulate particular historical narratives as part of their broader legitimation 
strategies.  
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Hezb-e Hambastagi 
The identity of Hezb-e Hambastagi is built around three main ideas: independence of 
Afghanistan from foreign (colonial) influences, opposition to the presence of the US and 
NATO forces, and demand for prosecution of those involved in the foreign-led wars since 
the late 1970s. The leaders of the party combine these claims to build the identity of the 
party as nationalist, non-compromising, and clean from the atrocities of war. Hezb-e 
Hambastagi’s nationalist identity is interwoven with a historical narrative that celebrates 
King Amanullah for his modernist policies as well as his role in leading Afghanistan in 
the Third Anglo-Afghan War that led to the country’s full independence from the British 
in 1919. In this context, the party celebrates the country’s independence on 19 August, 
and condemns the 27 and 28 April as ‘black days’; the first for the 27 April 1978 coup 
that brought the pro-Soviet regime to power, and the latter date for the arrival of the 
mujahedin in Kabul on 28 April 1992 after the fall of the last pro-Soviet government in 
the country.  
On 20 August 2015, a few days after I had interviewed one of Hezb-e Hambastagi’s 
leaders, I was invited by one of the party’s leaders to attend its annual celebration of the 
national Independence Day in Kabul. The event was highly symbolic in a number of 
respects. First, it was organised outside the Darul Aman Palace in West Kabul. The 
palace, built by Amanullah during the 1920s, stands as a symbol of the country’s first 
major modernisation programme. It was destroyed during the years of war, becoming a 
powerful symbol of destruction of the state institutions caused by war and violence, and 
the country’s failed efforts at modernisation. Consequently, the venue had symbolic 
significance for the Hezb-e Hambastagi’s historical narrative of foreign and colonial 
interferences and national popular resistance. Second, the event that drew several hundred 
participants was also marked by clear signs of exclusion of most of its participants from 
the distribution of foreign aid and resources that had given rise to a wealthy elite in Kabul. 
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Most evidently, the event did not have any trappings of usual public events in Kabul that 
are characterised by a display of wealth of their main organisers and a socio-economic 
hierarchy among their participants. There were no participants with armed body guards 
or expensive vehicles. The party leaders were even switching between speaking and 
working with other members to set the stage and organise chairs for the participants as 
they were arriving. Third, unlike most events in Kabul at this time, the event was 
evidently secular, with little efforts to employ any form of religious language and 
symbolism, or cite Quranic verses to legitimate the party’s symbolic narratives.  
The speakers at the event used the symbolism of the venue to combine celebration of the 
legacy of Amanullah with a strong criticism of the post-2001 US-led intervention, 
statebuilding and socio-economic conditions of the country. Selay Ghaffar, the 
spokeswoman of the party and the main speaker at the event, made the following points 
to contrast the present condition with the role played by Amanullah. First, Amanullah 
prioritised modern education, particularly for women and girls. At present, she argued, 
the education sector is neglected and dominated by the extremists, and is particularly bad 
for women. Second, as part of his effort to make Afghanistan self-sufficient, Amanullah 
supported domestic products and industries. She stated that the king even asked foreign 
embassies in Kabul at that time to buy local products such as matches. By contrast, she 
argued, the current elites even important their own household items from Dubai and other 
foreign cities. Third, she argued that corrupt officials were punished and prosecuted under 
Amanullah Khan while now the Afghan government is one of the most corrupt in the 
world. Like other speakers, she emphasised the importance of sacrifice and devotion for 
preserving and gaining national independence. 
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Afghanistan 1400 
Unlike Hezb-e Hambastagi’s articulate narratives of national independence and anti-
fundamentalism politics, Afghanistan 1400 does not invest much in building its historical 
narrative. It does not organise many regular public events. In fact, for founders of the 
movement, the lack of interest in articulating a narrative of the history of the country or 
organising public events is a conscious decision made to avoid being embroiled in the 
country’s mostly controversial and divisive past. Defining itself a forward-looking 
movement of the ‘new generation’, the group does not identify with any particular period 
or movement in the history of Afghanistan. Commenting on the dominant ethno-political 
networks’ use of historical narratives, one founder of the movement said,  
Most of the factions and groups that are somehow prominent gain legitimacy from 
the past, from the history of Afghanistan, the narrative they have from the history. 
We thought something that could divide us - as young Afghans – are our narratives 
from history. Everyone has their own narratives and these narratives can make a 
movement that is multi-ethnic particularly fragile. Therefore, we agreed that we 
may have differences in our narratives about the past but we focus on the future. 
You might say that the main cause of adversity in Afghanistan was its unequal 
structures of power that preferred one ethnic group over the others. Others might 
say that the main cause is foreign intervention. Still others might say it is religious 
extremism or conflict between religion and politics. You know better, everyone 
has a different definition [of the problem]. So if we focus on agreeing a common 
definition of the main cause of adversity, we get divided, not united. For example, 
when Sayyaf stands [to speak] for him it is very clear what are the main causes of 
adversity in Afghanistan, in the past or in the present. And based on that 
[narrative] they also define [who are] the saviours of Afghanistan (Interview [38]).  
As the quote illustrates, the awareness of the multiplicity, complexity and divisive nature 
of the country’s past did not lead to articulation of another alternative historical narrative 
among the founders of Afghanistan 1400. Fearing that the contentious nature of the past 
might create divisions among its members, the movement focused on developing an 
alternative framed around a shared future that began with the limited achievements of the 
post-2001 liberal democracy. This put the group in a clearly disadvantaged position in a 
country where rival groups use historical narratives to legitimate their current and future 
social and political demands.  
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Jamiat-e Eslah 
Jamiat-e Eslah adapts its version of Islamism to the history of Afghanistan, anchoring its 
roots in the country’s Islamic movements and personalities. The organisation’s particular 
way of blending of Islamist ideology with national history is most powerfully illustrated 
by its celebration of the legacy and life of Sayed Jamaluddin Al-Afghani (Keddie, 2011), 
and the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Muslim Youth Organisation that emerged in the 
1960s (See chapter 4). The legacy of Afghani is so important for Jamiat-e Eslah and its 
associated organisations that the establishment of NAJM, the youth wing of the 
organisation was planned to coincide with the anniversary of the death of Afghani on 9 
March. The organisation usually combines celebration of the anniversary of its own 
establishment with conferences on the history and thought of Afghani. As a senior leader 
of NAJM put it,  
Another main goal of Najm is to instil in the youth a feeling of love for the country 
(hob ul-watan) and defence of national interests, or public property. For this 
purpose, we organise programmes such as visit to museums and historic site and 
organise conferences about national personalities such as Sayed Jamaluddin 
Afghani and other personalities in national, cultural and even religious fields 
(Interview [8]). 
It is important to note that as an early Muslim reformist of the nineteenth century, Afghani 
is widely respected by Islamic movements across the world. In his role as a pioneer of 
Islamic awakening in the nineteenth century, he is so widely regarded that there is even a 
controversy over his nationality. The Iranians have long been claiming that Afghani was 
in fact from Iran, born in the town of Asadabad near the Iranian city of Hamadan, and 
therefore call him Asadabadi. The Afghans claim Afghani was born in the town of 
Asadabad in the province of Kunar in the east of the country. Nawidi, one of the senior 
leaders of Jamiat-e Eslah, refutes the Iranian claim that Afghani was an Iranian, 
describing him as the ‘greatest reformist of the nineteenth century’ (Nawidi, 2013b).  
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The controversy over Afghani’s nationality is partly a result of his own extensive travels 
and political activism in many countries that included Afghanistan, India, Iran, Turkey, 
Egypt and Europe. During the 1860s, he served as political counsellor to Afghan kings 
and princes in Kabul, before spending nearly the three next decades in Iran, the Middle 
East and Europe. He died in Istanbul in 1897. Based on a request from the government of 
Afghanistan in 1944, his remains were transferred to Kabul and reburied inside the main 
campus of Kabul University, where a mausoleum is also built in his name (Keddie, 2011). 
Consequently, Afghani has gained a prominent significance for Afghanistan’s national 
history more generally.  
For Jamiat-e Eslah and its affiliated organisations, while Afghani offers an important 
historical point of reference where ideological Islamism and national history can be 
blended, his approach was rather different from that of the organisation. Afghani spent 
most of his career attempting to bring about top-down reform through working with kings, 
princes and other rulers of the time. In contrast, Jamiat-e Eslah follows a bottom-up 
strategy of change. Furthermore, beyond Afghani and the early Muslim reformists, 
Jamiat-e Eslah views itself as more directly influenced by the Islamist movement that 
emerged in Afghanistan in the 1960s. As will be shown further below, the claim over the 
legacy of the Islamists of the 1960s brings the organisation into ideological conflict with 
the mujahedin organisations that claim to be more direct descendents of the Islamists of 
this period.  
Hezb-ut Tahrir Afghanistan 
As a pan-Islamist organisation that established its presence in Afghanistan only in 2003, 
Hezb ut-Tahrir lacks a particular historical precedent on which it can draw to establish a 
national historical narrative. This means that the organisation’s views on history are 
shaped more by its ideology than its relatively short history of existence in Afghanistan. 
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Ideologically, the organisation is opposed to the basic notion of the nation-state, viewing 
it as western and colonial construct, and a ‘fundamental cause of the decline of the Islamic 
Ummah’ (Ummat Production, 2014). This means that, in the view of the organisation, 
Islamist movements that limit their goals the nation-state system or adapt Islamic 
principles to national and local concerns deviate from the principles of Islam, and sustain 
the western colonial domination. Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan’s spokesman went to great 
lengths to criticise Sayed Jamaluddin Afghani for adapting his messages to national 
contexts as he travelled from Afghanistan to Iran, Turkey and other countries during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. He argued that, similar to Afghani, the Muslim 
Brotherhood also compromised by ‘taking the national colour of every country they went 
to’ (Interview [13]).  
Hezb ut-Tahrir’s ideological rejection of the idea of the nation-state is most clearly 
reflected in the views of some of its commentators on the emergence of Afghanistan as 
an independent country. One Hezb ut-Tahrir commentator denounces all of Afghanistan’s 
rulers for their alleged submission to the influence of foreign powers, thus failing to 
uphold the principles of Islam (Ahmadi, 2015a). According to another Hezb ut-Tahrir 
commentator, Solaiman (2015) the problem runs even deeper.  
In launching a war against the colonial force of the day in the year 1919, Shah 
Amanullah Khan, who was among those deeply influenced by Kemal Ataturk – 
the main player behind the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 – succeeded 
in freeing Afghanistan from their direct military occupation. However, the indirect 
political occupation of the Britain of the day persisted through their culture, 
thoughts and concepts. And after independence, [Amanullah’s] reforms went in a 
direction that did not lead to real progress, and because of this once more [the 
country] was occupied by the Soviet Union of the day, and today, after 2001, it 
has been under direct occupation of the US and its allies [My translation].  
As Solaiman further explains, the Hezb ut-Tahrir’s lack of interest in history goes beyond 
the influence of Kemal Ataturk on Amanullah Khan. The organisation views nationalism 
and nationalist histories as diametrically opposed to its ideology, 
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The values and concepts that are daily promoted among the people by the ruling 
system are un-Islamic and have no connection to Islam. For example, we are told, 
Happy Independence Day, at a time we are currently living under occupation; [it 
is] like saying congratulations on your freedom to a slave who is under the chain 
of slavery. Furthermore, it is not permissible for Muslims to defend the current 
geographical framework called Afghanistan, and view those living outside it as 
aliens. The reason is that first of all Afghanistan, with its current name and 
symbol, was created by a few infidels such as Durand and McMahon and Mellan8 
and secondly Islam is a global religion that does not recognise geographical 
borders, that believes the whole world deserves Islam, and that this faith is 
revealed for all the peoples of the world [My translation].  
Hezb ut-Tahrir’s refusal to anchor its roots in any particular period of history of 
Afghanistan is a part of its broader strategy of resisting any adaptation to national and 
local contexts. In defining its identity around what it sees as a global conflict between the 
Islamic community and the West, the organisation also complicates its mission of 
recruiting people whose primary interests and concerns remain local, or national.  
Social Differentiation in a Polarised and Contested Environment 
The divergent approaches by these four groups to the national history of the country are 
closely linked to their strategies of responding to the ongoing contestation for power and 
legitimacy in the country. The narratives of the past are often deployed to legitimate the 
particular positions these groups take in relation to the problems of war, presence of 
western forces, and the dependence of Afghan state on western political, military and 
financial assistance. Groups draw on the past to give meaning and legitimacy to the 
current social constituency they represent, and the particular claim they make on the state 
and society more broadly.  
Civil Society, Democracy and Pluralism 
As a movement, Afghanistan 1400 was united by a shared desire to embrace democracy 
and diversity. However, these ideas did not provide a sufficiently distinctive core around 
which an organisational identity could be built. The rhetoric of democracy and national 
                                                          
8 Apparently, the name refers to an official of British India in the nineteenth century.  
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unity were among the buzzwords of most of the political elites of the country and the 
international actors from 2001. The most distinctive mark of the group’s collective 
consciousness was underpinned by a shared estrangement from the actual practices in 
Afghanistan of pluralism and democracy. This led many members of the movement to 
define the group’s identity by emphasising the differences that distinguished its members 
from the underlying dynamics of divisive and violent politics. In other words, members 
of the movement had greater collective awareness of what the movement was not than 
what it was. As one senior founder of the movement put it,  
These features separated us from a number of [other groups]. They showed who 
we were not rather than defining who we are: We were not interested to enter into 
politics from an ethnic angle. We were not interested to ascertain the right and 
wrong sides of the civil war, meaning intellectually we were neither close to the 
mujahedin nor to the leftists. In the definition we had of the future of Afghanistan, 
we stressed on values of mutual tolerance, diversity and equality of men and 
women. Some issues were ambiguous. For example, until today we have not had 
the discussion about the role of religion in the state, recognising the sensitivity of 
the discussion in Afghanistan and recognising the controversial past of the 
discussion in Afghanistan (Interview [38]). 
Dismayed by the bitter and divisive politics of the past, rather than anchoring the 
movement’s roots in a particular history of the country, the movement emphasised its 
futuristic outlook. The futuristic outlook was combined with an emphasis on civil society 
both as a social category with which most members were comfortable to identify, and as 
a source of a particular set of values and of models of social and political organisation. 
The underlying motivating factor behind the stress on civility and the future was a 
reluctance to accept identification with existing social and political cleavages. This led to 
a profound tension in building the movement’s identity between what was often described 
as a ‘social and civil movement’ as opposed to a ‘political movement or party’. As 
explained in chapter 6, the tension over emphasising its civil-social characteristics or 
political aspiration of its members as identity markers led to a roiling internal tension over 
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how the movement could respond to political polarisation during the 2014 presidential 
elections.  
National Independence and Accountability for Crimes during War 
Hezb-e Hambastagi emphasised national independence, opposition to empowerment of 
the mujahedin, and accountability for crimes as its core identity markers. Similarly to 
Afghanistan 1400, the party distances itself from ethnic and sectarian politics. However, 
the party goes beyond simply underlining the intrinsic values of diversity by highlighting 
the shared sufferings of members of all communities as part of its call for accountability 
for atrocities of war. As one leader of the party put it,  
If a Pashtun is oppressed, a Tajik cannot live in peace, and if a Hazara is oppressed 
a Pashtun cannot live in peace. We have a common destiny. We have shared 
affiliations, we have shared pride and we have shared history. If you look at the 
three Anglo-Afghan Wars, no ethnic group has achieved the pride alone. All 
ethnic groups of Afghanistan share that pride. The same is true in the Anti-Russian 
War. I remember from the time of resistance, when we were travelling from 
Pakistan to different regions, we went to eat food in a Hazara tent, we went to eat 
food in a Pashtun tent and everyone’s home. There was no such conflict because 
the [shared] thought was the country was under occupation (Interview [2]).  
In contrast to Afghanistan 1400, Hezb-e Hambastagi’s clear demands, particularly its 
demand for accountability for crimes perpetrated during the years of war, brought the 
party into direct conflict with the former mujahedin who stand accused by human rights 
groups of having committed mass atrocities during the war. Although clearly secularist 
in its outlook, the party does not seek to deny entirely the ideological and religious 
foundations of jihad. On the contrary, as the quote above shows, it stresses that the 1980s 
jihad was a national war of resistance against the Soviet occupation, and hence every 
citizen of the country participated in it. By emphasising the popular nature of jihad, the 
party aims to question and criticise the symbolic and political privileges claimed by the 
mujahedin as organised groups in formal distribution of power in the government.  
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However, the demand for accountability for crimes perpetrated during the war does not 
bring the party necessarily close to another movement of national and international human 
rights advocates that coalesced around the idea of transitional justice (Winterbotham, 
2010). In fact, similar to the gradual shift of the party away from initial optimism about 
elections and political reform, some members of the party show a similar shift in their 
views towards transitional justice and accountability processes. Some members of the 
party reported that they were active in NGOs that worked to promote transitional justice. 
The shift maybe illustrated by the change in attitude of a senior member who was leading 
an NGO prior to joining the party. She explained how she was attracted to the party while 
she was still working for an NGO, 
At the top of its [Hezb-e Hambastagi’s] programme was that Afghanistan was an 
occupied country. Eventually, I came to the conclusion that Afghanistan is 
occupied. I was someone who was directly in touch with them [western actors] – 
as the civil society the international community or the occupiers – including 
Hillary Clinton, the Embassies and other institutions. Every day, I was in touch 
with them, you come and see [them]; and I was also in touch with the government 
including Karzai at that time. When I closely grasped the nature of civil society, 
and closely grasped the nature of this government, - because I was in contact with 
them every day – and closely grasped the nature of civil society of the occupying 
countries, I came to the conclusion that Afghanistan is an occupied country. These 
sayings that they have come to help us are ill-founded claims because I saw 
closely how they were misusing [these ideas], and closely saw their policies. Of 
course, reading [party policies has its own roles), so that we understand what does 
imperialism want in Afghanistan (Interview [11]).  
The quote illustrates that, unlike some NGOs that viewed transitional justice as a technical 
and non-political process, the party politicised it by turning it into a major element of its 
political platform, and linking it to the broader goals of the US-led intervention in the 
country.  
The Mujahedin in Power and the New Generation of Islamists 
As religious groups, both Hezb ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e Eslah are confronted by a wide 
range of challengers who lay similar claims to Islam and Islamic values. As Osman (2015, 
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p. 2) argues, the diversity and multiplicity of Islamist movements that were active during 
this period meant that there was a ‘variety of ‘flavours’ on offer, allowing these groups 
to accommodate audiences with different types of religious dispositions’. Consequently, 
the success of these organisations in inventing and forming social boundaries requires a 
social differentiation strategy that distinguishes them from other, sometimes more 
entrenched, groups that also rely on Islam and the history of Islamist movements to 
construct their identities and legitimate their claims. In this respect, members and activists 
of Jamiat-e Eslah and Hezb ut-Tahrir were at pains to distinguish themselves from one 
another, the former mujahedin who dominated the post-2001 state apparatus, and the 
Taliban, the Islamic State and other violent groups who participated in the armed 
insurgency against the international intervention and statebuilding process.  
Not surprisingly, when I asked what were the main challenges confronting the 
organisation in Afghanistan, the spokesperson of Hezb ut-Tahrir in Afghanistan pointed 
to what he described as ‘the so-called mujahedin’. He argued that as a result of ‘failure of 
the mujahedin’ people have lost ‘faith in all mujahedin organisations’. He contended that 
the failure of the mujahedin to live up to their ideals, and establish an Islamic state meant 
that other organisations seeking to do the same need to prove to the people that they are 
different from the former mujahedin (Interview [13]).  
For Hezb ut-Tahrir, the social differentiation begins with a relentless criticism of the 
former mujahedin while praising the actual idea of jihad and resistance against western 
powers. The Hezb ut-Tahrir spokesperson presented a particular definition of the causes 
and types of failures of the mujahedin. For him, the failure of the mujahedin in 
establishing an Islamic state after their victory in April 1992 resulted from their practise 
of maslahat (expediency). For him, expediency-based politics led the former mujahedin 
towards pragmatic and unprincipled forms of politics that he thought were determined by 
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the interests of Pakistan and the West. He argued that these forms of politics were 
responsible for the mujahedin’s internal disunity, and their subordination to the interests 
of Pakistan and ‘Western colonialism’, one the one hand, and their entanglement with 
ethnic, linguistic and nationalistic movements, on the other (Interview [13]).  
Hezb ut-Tahrir in Afghanistan makes a distinction between the practice and the idea of 
jihad in the country. The mujahedin and their supporters are an important constituency 
for Hezb ut-Tahrir, and it cannot risk alienating them entirely. As discussed in chapter 6, 
the organisation makes a distinction between two types of members: first organisational 
members who are recruited and given extensive individual training, and second, those it 
considers hami dʿawah, or supporters of the call. The former mujahedin who occupied 
important positions of power after 2001 are considered important supporters or even full 
members of the organisation.  
The tension between rejection of the former mujahedin’s power politics, and a desire to 
recruit them as members or supporters was evident in a conversation between two 
activists of the organisation that was published online in June 2016 (Ummat Production, 
2016). The programme, featuring Ahmad Kayhan as interviewer and Walid Omar, as 
commentator, focused on the ‘condition of the mujahedin in the framework of 
democracy’. In the interview, Omar began by highlighting the role of the mujahedin in 
defeating communism. This was, however, only a short prelude to a more detailed 
description of a fundamental conflict that the commentator argued existed between the 
mujahedin and their western backers. He argued the ‘US, as an ideologically capitalist 
country, or a system of democratic capitalism, is opposed to the [Islamic] groups and 
Islamic ideological system’. Consequently, after 2001, the mujahedin presented a threat 
to the US’s goal of creating a secular system in the country. To overcome the threat, the 
commentator argued, some former mujahedin such as Ahmad Shah Massoud and 
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Burhanuddin Rabbani were assassinated, others were marginalised, and the remaining 
were absorbed into the system. Emphasising the alien nature of western capitalism and 
secularism, the organisation believes that the collusion of the former mujahedin with the 
US-led military intervention is making them responsible for importation of another alien 
ideology into the country. Consequently, for Hezb ut-Tahrir, communism and capitalism 
are ‘two sides of the same coin, and with the rule of either of them the life of the ummat 
is under the sovereignty and banner of infidelity’ (Sayes, 2016).  
As an organisation established by members of former mujahedin organisations, Jamiat-e 
Eslah faces a more difficult challenge in differentiating itself from the former mujahedin. 
Many of its founding members gained prominence in cultural and educational centres 
established by the mujahedin organisations in Peshawar in the 1980s. The association of 
the initial founders of the organisation with the mujahedin was so strong that during the 
late 1990s the offices and libraries of the Islamic Cultural Centre (the forerunner of 
Jamiat-e Eslah) were closed by the Taliban in the eastern city of Jalalabad.  
Jamiat-e Eslah emphasises its roots in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan during the 
1980s. However, the organisation makes a distinction between jihad against the Soviet 
occupation of the country in the 1980s, and the behavior of the mujahedin after the 
downfall of the pro-Soviet regime on 28 April 1992. For some of its members, the ‘glory’ 
of the victory on 28 April was ‘squandered’ (Jalali, 2011). The emphasis on the 
organisation’s origin in the jihad and the religious nature of its ideology have led Jamiat-
e Eslah to make a distinction between the idea and practice of jihad, on the one hand, and 
between the period of jihad against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, and the civil war 
among the mujahedin after 1992, on the other. Accordingly, and similar to Hezb ut-Tahrir, 
the alleged deviation of the former mujahedin from what is considered the true principles 
guiding jihad is central to the social differentiation strategy of Jamiat-e Eslah. However, 
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for Jamiat-e Eslah the deviation had a different reason from that cited by Hezb ut-Tahrir, 
and hence the organisation pursues a different strategy. As one senior member of the 
organisation put it,  
The reason we first want to increase the level of awareness of the people is the 
unfortunately unsuccessful experience after jihad. Jamiat-e Eslah is of the view 
that during [the years of] jihad, based on our religious feelings, we fought a jihad 
against Russians to the extent that they concluded that it was no longer good for 
them to stay here. Therefore, they left and were defeated. But there were very few 
trained and aware individuals in the country who could preserve the victory, and 
advance this great victory. As a result, the victory we had achieved is 
overshadowed by claims that the mujahedin did this or the mujahedin did that 
(Interview [8]). 
Another senior member of Jamiat-e Eslah similarly emphasised that while the 
organisation commends the jihad against the Soviets, it distances itself from the behaviour 
of the mujahedin after 1992. After this period, he maintained that the mujahedin shifted 
towards what he described as ‘person-centred’ and ‘regional’ (samti) politics. For him, 
the underlying reason for the deviation was lack of selflessness (khodgozarai) and 
commitment to Islam, which, he argued, can be acquired through proper education and 
training (Interview 16 November 2015). Other leaders of the organisation laud the 
international significance of jihad whilst distancing themselves from, and even 
condemning, the behaviour of the mujahedin after 1992 in Afghanistan. As Fakhri (2014) 
puts it,  
At the international level, the people of Afghanistan taught the world the lesson 
of freedom… After the defeat of the Soviet Union and the emergence of jihadi 
and independence movements, especially where Muslims were in chain, the 
thought of political Islam stood and spread in the world as a rival against the 
thought of liberal democracy; until today, as a political-social system that present 
appropriate solutions to all problems of the society, Islam stands tall and proud 
against Western secularising programmes, and every year its firmness and 
progress expands as it pushes secular and West-dependent systems to retreat and 
marginality (My translation).  
The emphasis on educational and cultural credentials as markers of identity of the 
organisation underscores a broader strategy of identity construction that aims to blend an 
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Islamic identity with ideological purity, and practical competence. In other words, the 
organisation’s leaders claim that they represent not only ideological purity but also a 
practical competence and ability to respond to the practical demands of modern societies. 
As one member claimed, the organisation has ‘the largest number of people with 
doctorates and master degrees’ (Interview [8]).  
Jihad, Violence and the New Generation of Peaceful Islamists  
In criticising the former mujahedin’s pragmatism and entry into mainstream politics, the 
new generation of Islamists run the risk of being conflated with the violent and subversive 
strategy of the Taliban, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other violent groups 
that also employ similar narratives of national and religious resistance against western 
powers. The gradual rise to prominence of both Hezb ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e Eslah as 
Islamist groups overlapped with the intensification and spread of extremist violence by 
the Taliban, the ISIS, and the other militant groups. While both Hezb ut-Tahrir and 
Jamiat-e Eslah claim to be peaceful in pursuit of their agendas of Islamisation, many of 
their critics have pointed fingers at both groups, blaming them for expansion of violent 
ideologies. One respondent in Kabul described the Hezb ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e Eslah’s 
activities as contributing to a process of ‘soft radicalisation’ (Interview [4]). The concerns 
over the role of these groups in promoting ‘soft radicalisation’ were not expressed by 
individual critics. Such concerns were reflected in a number of other research reports that 
also point to the role of the Hezb ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e Eslah in the spread of violent and 
extremist ideologies (Fazli, Johnson, & Cooke, 2015; Ibrahimi, Omer, & Irfani, 2015).  
For Hezb ut-Tahrir, the most significant challenge to its ideological and organisational 
identity came with the rise of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the terrorist proto-
state that first emerged in Iraq and Syria in 2013. In June 2014, ISIS declared itself a 
worldwide Islamic Caliphate, and its leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, as the Islamic 
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world’s leader (Hashim, 2014). The rise of ISIS in the battlefields of Iraq and Syria and 
its particularly brutal and violent strategy for establishment of a caliphate system posed 
tough questions for Hezb ut-Tahrir, an organisation that proclaims to have struggled for 
several decades for revival of caliphate through peaceful means. The challenge was both 
ideological and practical. Ideologically, ISIS’s brand of caliphate with its trademark of 
brutality faced rejection by mainstream Muslim scholars and communities worldwide. 
More practically, the very notion of the caliphate, which is cherished by groups such as 
Hezb ut-Tahrir as a symbol of Islamic unity and power, came under closer scrutiny. 
Muslim activists and scholars were presented with the horrors of violence, bloodshed and 
deep divisions that came with the rise of the ISIS. In other words, the caliphate, the 
imagined symbol of unity and power, became a source of deep divisions and despicable 
violence against Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Furthermore, internationally, ISIS 
became a challenger to both violent and peaceful Islamists in seeking to recruit members 
and attract loyalty and support from Muslim communities in many countries.  
ISIS established its own branch of the caliphate in Afghanistan and Pakistan, declaring 
the region as Wilayah Khorasan, or Khorasan province of its global caliphate. In January 
2015, Afghan officials confirmed that the group had established a presence in the country 
(Al Jazeera, 2015). With the advent of ISIS and its own brutal tactics of beheading its 
local enemies in Afghanistan, the Hezb ut-Tahrir’s national chapter and its calls for 
establishment of a caliphate also came under spotlight. The distinction between the two 
groups was often blurred as both employed the same religious symbols and narratives. 
For instance, both ISIS and Hezb ut-Tahrir uses very similar flags with black backgrounds 
and white writing or vice versa. The ideological and symbolic dimensions of the two 
groups are so close that in October 2014, when Hezb ut-Tahrir activists used their own 
flags in a rally in Kabul University they were arrested by security forces on suspicion of 
being supporters of ISIS (Khaama Press, 2014; Osman, 2014).  
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In 2015, the Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan chapter used its online platforms to highlight its 
distinctive conception of the caliphate and its peaceful strategy for change. In its public 
communication, members of the organisation blamed the West for creation of ISIS. For 
example, Ahmadi (2015b) wrote a piece that discussed the historical background of both 
ISIS and the Hezb ut-Tahrir, arguing that 
But in the present conditions, when as a result of tasqif (cultural) activities of Hezb 
ut-Tahrir the Muslims are awakening and the political power is nearly being 
restored according to the methods of the Prophet, the West and its collaborators 
have begun conspiracies at regional and even global levels to scare the peoples of 
the world, especially Muslims; [One can] name the creation of the terrorist group 
Daesh as an example [of this conspiracy], the brutal acts of which they link to the 
political activities of Hezb ut-Tahrir (My Translation). 
In another similar effort, in March of the same year, the organisation’s Ummat Production 
broadcast online an interview with Sayfullah Mustanir, the organisation’s spokesman in 
Afghanistan. In the interview, Mustanir distinguished Hezb ut-Tahrir’s political activities 
from the violence of the ISIS by portraying the latter as a ploy of Western strategy to 
defame Islamic movements (Ummat Production, 2015).  
Two members of the organisation I interviewed in Kabul in December 2015 were quick 
to denounce ISIS’s brutality, stating that the Hezb ut-Tahrir is ‘completely different from 
ISIS’. One pointed to an important ideological difference between Hezb ut-Tahrir, and 
the Taliban and ISIS regarding the status of Muslims living under what they regard as 
non-Islamic powers, including the post-2001 Western-backed government in 
Afghanistan. At the core of the debate, he argued, was whether Muslims, who quietly live 
under un-Islamic rules in Muslim countries, are also culpable for maintaining these rules. 
For Hezb ut-Tahrir, they argued, the acquiescence of ordinary Muslim to their present 
rulers does not amount to infidelity. However, those Muslims may commit sins and 
become sinful by not challenging un-Islamic rulers. In contrast, they argued, the ISIS and 
the Taliban were not making such distinction between the rulers and the ruled (Interviews 
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[39] and [40]). Having said that, it is important to mention that the Hezb ut-Tahrir’s views 
about the Muslims living under what it considers non-Islamic rules is far from benevolent. 
One of the organisation’s key texts, Methods of Hezb ut-Tahrir for Bringing Change, 
declares that the reality is that ‘today, in all nooks and corners of the world, Muslims are 
living in the abode of infidelity (Dar ul-Kufr), not in the abode of Islam (Dar ul-Islam)’ 
(Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan, 2012a, p. 7) [My translation].  
The challenges facing Jamiat-e Eslah in its effort to construct its identity as a peaceful 
activist group are no less acute than those facing Hezb ut-Tahrir. Over the years, the 
intensification of insurgency and the propaganda of the Taliban and other militant groups 
against the government in Kabul created an environment in which peaceful Islamist 
activism could easily be confused with the militants’ violent jihad and anti-state 
propaganda. Furthermore, in an environment where insurgent violence, including suicide 
bombing, killed or maimed thousands of civilians on a regular basis, it became 
increasingly untenable for any notable social or political group to stay silent towards 
violence and the profound suffering it brought to the civilian population of the country. 
The challenges of creating a distinctive identity in such a contested and highly-polarised 
environment were noted by one of Jamiat-e Eslah’s members,  
There are two main challenges facing Jamiat-e Eslah activities: one is that on the 
one hand, because most activities of Jamiat-e Eslah are religious, people who are 
outside the organisation, particularly who follow new thoughts, or [those who] are 
influenced by the West, or have returned from the West, think that Jamiat-e 
Eslah’s activities may cause the spread of radical thought or extremist thought 
among the people. On the other side, persons who follow the Taliban’s thought or 
that of Hizb-e Islami, [which believes] only armed jihad is the solution, criticise 
us because our activities are peaceful or civil and cultural (Interview [8]). 
Jamiat-e Eslah’s position towards the Taliban and their violent insurgency came under 
the spotlight after it was revealed in July 2015 that Mullah Muhammad Omar, the leader 
of the Taliban, had died in Pakistan in April 2013 (Nordland & Goldstein, 2015). Once 
the death of Mullah Omar was formally confirmed by the Taliban, some groups, which 
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were sympathetic to the Taliban and its ideology, organised memorial services for the 
Taliban leader in Kabul. Some leaders of Jamiat-e Eslah participated in these events, and 
the organisation issued a public statement, expressing its own condolence for the death 
of the Taliban leader, describing him as ‘one of the important and prominent personalities 
of the last two decades’. The statement, however, stressed that every personality will be 
judged by history (Eslah Online, 2015b). Despite this qualification and an expression of 
a hope for resumption of peace talks between the government and the Taliban, the 
statement enraged many in the country. Hasht-e Sobh, one of the country’s leading daily 
newspapers, criticised the move as an effort to ‘free Mullah Omar from the obscenity 
(qabahatzodayye) of his legacy’ (Azhand, 2015).  
Identity Construction Processes and Mechanisms: Borrowing, inventing and 
encountering? 
The previous three sections explored how the four groups combine ideologies with 
specific narratives to construct collective identities and social boundaries that separate 
group members from their antagonists and the rest of the society, and generate shared 
meanings to make sense of their social and political environment. The sections 
demonstrated that abstract ideologies only find their meaning and relevance when 
articulated in relation to existing social cleavages, which are among other things, based 
on specific narratives.  
To what extent can these boundary-drawing processes be explained through the 
mechanisms of inventing, borrowing, and encounter? At the first instance, it might appear 
that the empirical description above shows that some of these groups are inventors and 
others are more borrowers of social boundaries and categories. For instance, Hezb ut-
Tahrir’s emphasis on a global conflict between the Islamic ummah and the West may 
appear to involve inventing a new religious and political faultline that cuts across all 
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domestic social cleavages. Similarly, Afghanistan 1400’s refusal to adopt any particular 
historical narrative, and its ambition to embrace the ethno-cultural diversity of the 
country, may also create the impression of a group seeking to differentiate itself through 
invention. However, such an analysis can be profoundly misleading. At a deeper level, 
the identities of these groups are formulated and constructed through an interactive 
process of group-level strategies for drawing boundaries, and ongoing contestation with 
other groups over the meaning of the core concepts and values that define these groups. 
To illustrate these interactive process, a brief discussion of the role of ideology will be 
followed by a discussion of key identity markers of the four groups: civil society 
(Afghanistan 1400), accountability for war crimes (Hezb-e Hambastagi), Islamic 
nationalism (Jamiat-e Eslah) pan-Islamism (Hezb ut-Tahrir).  
Ideology and Identity Formation  
In an important respect, the broader ideological frameworks of these groups shape the 
manner in which they construct their identities. Hence, these groups use ideologies to 
define their identities and imbue social categories with meanings. Hezb ut-Tahrir is 
opposed to the foundation of the nation-state system on which the post-2001 statebuilding 
project was based. Rejecting it as a western, and therefore non-Islamic construction, the 
organisation naturally refuses to adopt any existing national narratives or articulate new 
ones. By contrast, although Jamiat-e Eslah has significant pan-Islamic concerns, it is 
largely limiting itself within the framework of Afghanistan as a nation state. However, in 
pursuit of its transformationist agenda, the organisation selectively draws on historical 
narratives and symbols to construct an alternative vision of nationhood.  
Similarly, Hezb-e Hambastagi’s partial rejection of the post-2001 international 
intervention and statebuilding is backed up by an organisational collective image built 
around a nationalist and pro-independence narrative. The party goes beyond accepting 
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the idea and framework of the nation-state by positioning itself as the most pro-
independence and authentic movement of the country. To strengthen its claims, the party 
draws on the history of national struggle for independence. In comparison to the other 
three groups, ideology is relatively less salient for members of Afghanistan 1400. As a 
reformist movement, Afghanistan 1400 accepts both the idea of the state and liberal 
democracy as a system of governance but is opposed to specific policies and practices of 
the state. In other words, founders of the movement were mostly concerned with the 
manner in which liberal democracy was put into practice.  
Identity Formation through Interaction and Competition  
The identities of these groups are not shaped by ideologies alone. Rather, the process is 
better understood through an interactive process of group-level articulation of ideologies 
and boundary drawing that separates ingroups from outgroups, and environmental 
responses. The competitive interaction may involve foundational, programmatic and 
policy conflicts with rival groups. At the foundational level, these groups face particularly 
high levels of contestation as many actors with divergent programmatic and policy ideas 
seek to draw on a limited number of ideational and symbolic resources. It is at these 
deeper levels that overarching normative ideas for construction of broader identities at 
national and transnational level are articulated.  
Table 7: Ideological Orientations and Social Differentiation Strategies of the Four Groups 
 Hezb-e 
Hambastagi 
Afghanistan 
1400 
Jamiat-e Eslah Hezb ut-Tahrir 
Ideological 
Orientation 
Left-leaning 
nationalism 
Liberalism MB-Style 
Nationalism 
(Islamic 
Nationalism?) 
Pan-Islamism 
Central Identity 
Markers 
Authentic and 
non-
compromising 
Civil and 
modern 
Competent and 
Pious 
Authentic and 
global 
Core concerns Justice for 
crimes of war, 
and 
Democratic 
and pluralistic 
Bottom-up 
socio-cultural 
Revive the lost 
glory and 
power through 
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establishment 
of an 
independent 
and democratic 
state 
parties and 
movements 
reform and 
transformation 
re-
establishment 
of the 
caliphate 
Communicative 
strategy 
Emphasising 
shared identity 
and suffering 
of the victims 
of war and the 
poor 
Citizenship 
and citizen 
responsibility  
Islamic and 
national 
solidarity and 
emphasising 
Afghanistan’s 
Islamic history 
and identity 
Emphasising 
pan-Islamic 
solidarity 
through 
linking 
incidents and 
issues to a 
global conflict 
between the 
Islamic and the 
rest.  
 
At the foundational level, the ideological conflict between the four groups revolved 
around three core ideas of civil society, nationalism, and Islam (See table 1). These 
foundational ideas are central to the broad identities these groups aim to construct at the 
national or transnational levels. These ideas are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A 
political group can argue that Islam, civil society and national identity are compatible and 
draw on a combination of them to construct its identity. The key point, however, is that 
these foundational frameworks, particularly when combined, can give rise to multiple and 
contradictory identities and claims. The contestation that emerges from the multiple 
claims over limited options at the foundational level pushes social differentiation at the 
programmatic and policy levels. As part of a social differentiation strategy, groups can 
often make small adjustments in their foundational ideas, but mostly rely on 
programmatic and policy discourses to carve out their distinctive identities. It is at this 
stage that groups combine their ideologies with specific narratives, and appropriate or cut 
across existing social cleavages.  
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Afghanistan 1400 as Civil Society Movement 
In emphasising the civility of its collective identity and members, Afghanistan 1400 
employed a highly-powerful discursive strategy. On the one hand, this particular mode of 
identity construction could link the organisation to international donors’ efforts for 
promotion of civil society as a force to watch and even counterbalance the state, and on 
the other, they could safely protect themselves from risks of involvements in the 
corruption, violence and divisive nature of the country’s politics and history.  
However, the notion of civil society is intensely debated. First, some Islamist groups 
charge that the whole notion of civil society is western, and therefore, alien to the Islamic 
world. For example, some Hezb ut-Tahrir commentators view it as diametrically opposed 
to the concept of Islamic society (Hayati, 2015). Second, if one accepts that there exists 
a civil society in Muslim majority countries such as Afghanistan, there is often a tension 
between two forms of civil society groups: the urban sector that is dominated by NGOs 
and formally-registered organisations, and the mainly traditional sphere dominated by the 
local councils, tribal institutions and religious networks (Winter, 2010; Harpviken, 
Strand, & Ask, 2002).  
Hezb-e Hambastagi as Vanguard of National Independence 
Hezb-e Hambastagi’s core ideological claims (national independence, an anti-
fundamentalist stance, and demand for prosecution of crimes of war crimes) are closely 
interlinked with its narrative of foreign invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (both 
Soviet in the 1980s, and US and NATO after 2001), the rise of the mujahedin during the 
1980s, and the atrocities perpetrated throughout the years of war. In other words, the party 
differentiates itself from groups that it alleges perpetrated war crimes and compromised 
the independence of the country by aligning themselves with foreign powers. In this 
respect, as noted earlier, the party describes 27 and 28 April as ‘black days’ for bringing 
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the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, and the mujahedin to power on those days 
in 1978 and 1992 respectively.  
Consequently, Hezb-e Hambastagi’s historical narrative and thus identity construction is 
based on a claim of non-involvement in either foreign occupation, or perpetration of 
atrocities of war. Beyond their specific meanings as used by the Hezb-e Hambastagi, 
national independence, resistance against foreign occupation and even demands for 
accountability for crimes of war are cherished and celebrated by a wide range of other 
groups, including the mujahedin who dominated the post-2001 state institutions. Hezb-e 
Hambastagi is not alone in demanding accountability for atrocities perpetrated during the 
years of war. The human rights discourse promoted by the international actors and 
domestic civil society groups since 2001 also aimed to address the atrocities perpetrated 
by all parties to the conflict. The demand for accountability by human rights and peace-
building group was centred on the idea of transitional justice. There was, however, an 
important difference. The human rights groups that called for transitional justice were 
accepting the broader frameworks and values of a liberal democratic order. Their demand 
for accountability was often based on the argument that a long-term consolidation of the 
liberal-democratic order required accountability for crimes of war and an end to a culture 
of impunity that had emerged as a result of the war (Rubin, 2003). By contrast, as the 
previous chapter showed, Hezb-e Hambastagi gradually shifted from an initial position 
of optimism for reform in the early 2000s towards a more critical approach.  
In their demand for prosecution of crimes of war, most members of the party also reflected 
their own social and political experience as members of Maoist groups and factions 
(Ibrahimi, 2012b). There are a number of other Maoist groups that were reconstituted in 
response to the 2001 US-led military intervention. These groups claim more direct 
descent from the Maoist circles of the past. The most prominent of these is the Communist 
(Maoist) Party of Afghanistan that was announced in 2004, and claims direct descent 
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from the original Maoist movement that emerged in the 1960s. Atkinson (2016) describes 
another group, Left Radical Afghanistan, an underground group of former Maoists that 
has shifted from Maoism towards a Trotskyist-style international communism. However, 
what is clear is that except for underground networks and an active online presence, none 
of these groups has achieved any significant social and political mobilisation capacity.  
As a political movement, the Maoists of the country were persecuted by both the pro-
Soviet PDPA regime and the mujahedin and the Taliban. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
the Maoist factions were either pushed into exile or forced to conceal their identities by 
collaborating with moderate and traditional mujahedin groups inside the country during 
the war and conflict. Consequently, a demand for prosecution of atrocities of war is a 
natural response by a movement that saw many of its members summarily executed, 
forced into exile, or simply condemned to more than two decades of underground 
activities. However, Hezb-e Hambastagi no longer subscribes to a Maoist ideology or a 
strategy of militarily overthrowing the post-2001 government in Kabul. On the contrary, 
it describes itself as a democratic party, although with greater tendency towards the left 
rather than the right end of political spectrum in Afghanistan (Interview [11]).  
From Islamic Nationalism to Pan-Islamism  
Hezb ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e Eslah are both Islamist organisations, seeking to Islamise the 
state and society, although in very different ways. Consequently, both share important 
foundational roots. However, the two groups diverge significantly at the programmatic 
and policy levels. Consequently, the activists of these groups need to frame their messages 
in a way that resonates with the moral and cultural sensibilities of the common people. 
As a lecturer of a private university in Kabul put it, both of them are highly ideological 
groups.  
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The Afghan culture does not show equal reactions to all foreign phenomenon. It 
depends on the package in which you present the idea to this society. This is a 
very important point. It can attract a lot more acceptability – whatever its nature 
and content - if it is presented with religious flavour and colour. From the point 
of view of nature, there does not exist much difference between Hezb ul-Tahrir 
and Marxism. Both show a utopia in the future, both show you a virtuous city in 
the future and both of them are violent and speak in the language of politics. That 
means they have no difference from this point of view. But [their] terminology 
and literatures are very different. In the end, one literature is rejected and 
supressed and faces resistance and another literature is accepted (Interview [23]).  
Hezb ut-Tahrir seeks to follow a strictly political approach aimed at establishing a pan-
Islamic state whereas Jamiat-e Eslah focuses on bottom up change, beginning with 
individuals and families. Highlighting the differences between Jamiat-e Eslah and Hezb 
ut-Tahrir a member of the former said that they often challenge the Hezb ut-Tahrir by 
asking,  
‘Have you established an Islamic village so far now that you want to establish an 
Islamic caliphate? Do you have a programme to build an Islamic family? Look at 
the essential difference that exist’ (Interview [12]). 
Hezb ut-Tahrir activists in Afghanistan often responds to such criticism by accusing 
groups such as Jamiat-e Eslah of diverting attention from the political nature of struggle 
for revival of the Islamic ummah by focusing on cultural, educational and charity 
activities (Interview [13]).  
Beyond the ideological conflicts, the history of experiences of these groups also shapes 
the particular identity construction that might be available to them. As a relatively new 
actor in Afghanistan’s social and political landscape, Hezb ut-Tahrir faces a difficult 
challenge in appropriating historical narratives. Consequently, it seeks to construct a pan-
Islamic identity whilst trying to avoid being drawn into dynamics of local and national 
politics. In its endeavour to project a global conflict involved the Islamic ummah and the 
West, the Hezb ut-Tahrir certainly benefited from the presence of the US and NATO 
forces in the country. The foreign forces became the object of the organisation’s globalist 
rhetoric in an otherwise fragmented local and national socio-political environment.  
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By contrast, Jamiat-e Eslah draws on elements of national history and pan-Islamic 
solidarity to construct its own identity. In this endeavour, as former members of various 
factions of the mujahedin who also had longer histories of Islamist and nationalist politics, 
the organisation faces a tougher challenge in building its distinctive collective identity. 
As an organisation it lays claim to historical movements and symbols that are already 
claimed by a wide range of groups, most notably the mujahedin. To increase its 
distinctiveness, the organisation emphasises the authenticity of its members, highlighting 
their history of non-involvement in ethnic politics, violence and corruption of the post-
2001 statebuilding. Emphasising its cultural and bottom-up cultural transformation 
strategy, the organisation highlights the competence, and efficiency of its members. At 
the broader level, this emphasis means that members of the organisation combine a 
commitment to Islam with an ability to respond to the needs of modern world, and remain 
true to the jihad for national independence without being tainted by corruption of 
involvement in politics and violence.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to explore the processes of construction of identity by 
these four groups. The aim of this chapter has been to identify how the discursive 
environment of Afghanistan facilitates or constrains particular models of collective 
identity construction. The chapter highlighted a number of important points that are 
relevant for the overall arguments of this thesis. First, the discussion of the processes and 
mechanisms of construction of identities showed that the four groups have invested 
considerable time and effort to mobilise ideational and symbolic resources to build their 
collective identities. However, the process of constructing collective identities and 
producing social categories cannot be reduced to straightforward choices between 
inventing, borrowing or encountering, as suggested by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 
(2004). By highlighting the foundational and programmatic underpinning of contention, 
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the chapter demonstrated that at deeper levels the available choices for construction of 
collective identities were rather limited. The chapter identified civil society, national 
history and symbols, and Islam as the main frameworks through which the groups tried 
to build their identities. 
Second, and following from the first point, the symbolic and ideational processes of 
building a collective identity are highly contentious processes. The contentious politics 
involves intense competition over ideational and symbolic resources, including ideologies 
and narratives. In constructing collective identities these groups are confronted with a 
wide range of actors, including anti-state elements, who make the same or very similar 
claims to similar sources of ideas. Consequently, the experiences of the four groups show 
that contentious politics does not necessarily emerge in response to changes in the state’s 
discursive strategies. As the cases of Jamiat-e Eslah and Hezb ut-Tahrir show, in the 
context of Afghanistan, groups are responding to pressures from both the state and anti-
state forces. Third, ideologies alone cannot serve as the basis of collective identities, 
although they have more significance for some groups than others. Abstract ideologies, 
communicated through texts, can only find relevance in local contexts when they are 
interwoven with local narratives and experiences. It is through these processes of 
ideological articulation in local contexts that groups adapt to specific national conditions.  
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Chapter 8: Organizational Approaches and Social Appropriation 
Strategies 
Introduction  
Chapter 6 discussed the broad political and socio-cultural positions of the four case study 
groups towards the international intervention and statebuilding in Afghanistan. Chapter 7 
focused on the mechanisms of boundary activation to explore the manner in which these 
groups constructed their collective identities. This chapter aims to explore the role of 
individual and group agency by taking a closer look at group-level dynamics of the four 
case study groups. It identifies the broader organisational approaches and social 
appropriation strategies of the four groups, focusing on their role in and approach towards 
the education sector and students.  
The first section discusses the broad organisational approaches of the four groups. The 
second follows by undertaking a detailed analysis of the approach of these groups towards 
youth and students. The third offers a broader overview of the social appropriation 
strategy of these groups by linking their activities at schools and universities to their 
efforts to develop a mass following. The fourth section attempts to offer some explanation 
for the patterns identified before the fifth section concludes the chapter.  
Organisational Approaches 
At its core, collective action is about mobilisation of people and resources. As reviewed 
in chapter 2, beginning in the 1970s the Resource Mobilisation Theory became one of the 
main theoretical perspectives on social mobilisation in the United States. In subsequent 
decades, the theory’s definition of resources was expanded beyond its originally 
economistic conception to include a wide range of socio-organisational, cultural, moral, 
and material resources. In Dynamics of Contention (2004) McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 
used the concept of social appropriation as a mechanism to account for accumulation and 
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mobilisation of resources as broadly defined. Central to the process is the role of 
organisations. In the words of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2004), ‘would-be activists 
(members no less than challengers and subjects) must either create an organizational 
vehicle or utilize an existing one and transform it into an instrument of contention’ (2004, 
p. 47).  
How do Afghanistan 1400, Solidarity Party of Afghanistan, Jamiat-e Eslah and the Hezb 
ut-Tahrir chapter in Afghanistan appropriate and mobilise resources as organisations? 
Broadly speaking, the four organisations manifest four distinctive internal organisational 
structures and social appropriation strategies. To begin with, these organisations 
demonstrate various levels of capacity to appropriate and mobilise internal and external 
resources in pursuit of their collective goals. Jamiat-e Eslah and Hezb-e Hambastagi have 
created publicly-known organisational structures, including permanent offices, staffed by 
paid or volunteer members of the organisations. Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan also appears 
to have established a working internal structure with dedicated activists, although given 
its un-registered status it does not have permanent offices. Afghanistan 1400 is weakest 
in terms of building a permanent organisational capacity. As of 2015, three years after it 
was established, the movement lacked a permanent office or dedicated paid or volunteer 
staff, being largely run through periodic and voluntary contributions of its members.  
Internally, except for the Hezb ut-Tahrir, the three organisations adhere to various levels 
of internal processes for deliberation and consultative decision making. Hezb-e 
Hambastagi, Jamiat-e Eslah and Afghanistan 1400 have clearly-established rules that 
define the terms and responsibilities of the key leaders of the organisations. These 
organisations have used their internal procedures to make and enforce collective 
decisions, and change their leaders through internal election. In the context of 
Afghanistan, what is striking about the three organisations is that, unlike most political 
parties, they are not led by a single charismatic leader. In this respect, Afghanistan 1400 
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stands out with a particularly high emphasis on internal collective deliberation, and even 
resistance against personality-based politics. Hezb-e Hambastagi and Jamiat-e Eslah are 
relatively high on both organisational cohesion and internal democracy and Afghanistan 
1400 is high on internal democracy, and extremely weak in developing an organisational 
capacity. Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan is strong in building an internal organisational 
structure but is opposed to western-style forms of internal deliberation and collective 
decision-making.  
Centralised and Secretive: Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan 
Little is known about the internal organisational structure and decision-making processes 
of Hezb ut-Tahrir in Afghanistan or elsewhere in the world. Members of the organisation 
in Afghanistan emphasise that the organisation in Afghanistan is a chapter of the global 
Hezb ut-Tahrir. In fact, in its publications in the Dari and Pashto languages, the 
organisation describes itself Hezb ut-Tahrir welayah Afghanistan, the latter meaning 
province of Afghanistan. Given the secret nature of the organisation, it is nearly 
impossible to establish clearly how the national chapter of the organisation in Afghanistan 
coordinates its activities with its global leadership. It is, however, clear that Hezb ut-
Tahrir is ideologically opposed to western-style collective decision-making processes. 
When I posed questions to members of Hezb ut-Tahrir in Afghanistan, they often declined 
to reveal any details about the inner workings of the organisation. Describing them as 
administrative (idari) issues, they often stated they were not permitted to discuss them 
with me. Sayfullah Mustanir, the organisation’s spokesperson, emphasised that Hezb ut-
Tahrir is a ‘centralised organisation’ with the same ‘ideas, platforms and strategies’ across 
the Muslim world (Interview [13]). When I pressed two other members about the 
organisational structure of Hezb ut-Tahrir in Afghanistan, they recommended that I read 
Al-Takattul Al-Hezbi (Party Organisation), one of the main texts produced by the founders 
of the movement in the 1950s in Arabic.  
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The Al-Takattul Al-Hezbi, which is also translated into Dari by Hezb ut-Tahrir 
Afghanistan, prescribes an almost Leninist-style method of political organisation. The 
most fundamental unit of the organisation is halqah, or a cell, where members of the party 
first get recruited and trained. The organisation is built and expanded through formation 
of cells, with each cell taking the responsibility for formation of additional cells. 
Consequently, the first also assumes the leadership role of subsequent circles as they 
gradually multiply.  
In the beginning, the person who possesses a prominent reasoning talent and sharp 
understanding faculty will acquire the ideology. The ideology will interact with 
him until it becomes clear for him and crystallises in him. In this way, the first 
party cell is formed, and after its emergence the cell will begin to multiply, 
although the [process of] multiplication will go slowly. New persons will join this 
collective, and more cells shall be formed. The relations of these persons will be 
entirely based on ideology. It is in this way that the first party cell (party 
leadership) is formed and has become evident. Ideology is the only pivot of the 
organisation and the sole force of attraction for these individuals (Al-Nabahani, 
2012, p. 31) [My translation].  
The Al-Takattul also predicts that as founders of the first circle, the first members of the 
organisation face a long and challenging task of convincing the society to accept the party 
as manifestation of its interests.  
The number of persons in this first circle will usually be small and their activities 
will be limited and slow as although the party expresses the feelings of the society 
in which it has emerged, it uses words and concepts with which the society is not 
familiar, and the party has new concepts that contradict the dominant concepts in 
the society. Nonetheless, the new concepts reflect the feelings of the society. As 
a result, the first circle will appear as unfamiliar in the society, and only those 
persons will be attracted to it that have strong feelings; feelings that give them the 
ability to be attracted to the ideology that is embodied by the first circle (Al-
Nabahani 2012, p. 31).  
However, it is not just the language and concepts used by the party activists that make 
them hard to be accepted in the society. Rather, the party views itself as simultaneously 
in conflict with, and vanguard of, the global Muslim community that it seeks to represent. 
In other words, beginning with a strong assumption about moral corruption and decay of 
P a g e  | 218 
 
the Muslim world, the organisation seeks to represent a new global Islamic ummah, a 
community built and transformed through the party’s activities.  
The thought of the first circle will be usually be deep, and their method of thought 
will be fundamental. This means that this circle will begin with the basics, and 
because of this the first circle will rise above the bad and stagnant condition of the 
ummah and see the issues from a higher point of view, and is fully aware of the 
reality (the new Islamic life) to which it seeks to transition the ummah. Similarly, 
it is fully aware of the methods for transformation of the present conditions. 
Because of these, this collective (that has risen above the society and has clear 
foresight) can see the other side of the wall and curtain whilst most members of 
the society in which they live only see that which appears to them. Because of the 
strong ties they have to the bad circumstances in which they live this majority 
cannot rise above their own conditions. Hence, it is difficult for them to 
understand accurately the solutions for changing the presently bad circumstances 
as the thought of the society that has become stagnant is superficial and sees 
everything from the point of view of the realities in which they live. Hence, they 
[the majority] make wrong inferences and adapt themselves accordingly. 
Consequently, they see their interests on the basis of realities in which they live 
(Al-Nabahani, 2012, pp. 31-32).  
While the exact details of the internal working of the organisation are not available, such 
a high level of emphasis by the party and its activists on texts and an ideological model 
in itself offers important insights about the organisation. First, it is clear that the 
organisation follows a highly pyramidal structure which restricts the flow of information 
even to the organisation’s members beyond their immediate circles (Osman, 2015, p. 5). 
This means that the party is highly ideological and hierarchical, even in comparison to 
other Islamists groups. The organisation does not follow western-style models of internal 
democracy and collective deliberation. As will become clear below, the combination of a 
hierarchical top-down leadership model and the development of basic organisational 
structures and dedicated staff provides Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan with some important 
advantages over other case study groups of this thesis. Second, it is highly likely that 
actual organisational models and behaviours of the party members and supporters do not 
reflect the texts. The party’s activists and supporters may very well make adjustments to 
the organisation’s prescribed structure to adapt to local and national conditions.  
 
P a g e  | 219 
 
The Flagship Approach of Jamiat-e Eslah 
In contrast to Hezb ut-Tahrir, Jamiat-e Eslah combines internal collective deliberation 
with a strong element of hierarchical structures. In its organisational structure, Jamiat-e 
Eslah includes the following main structures: a Central Council (Shuray-e Markazi), an 
elected body of more than 40 members that is responsible for the overall strategic 
leadership and policies of the organisation and meets twice a year; an Executive Council 
(Shuray-e Tanfizi) that is responsible for executive leadership of the organisation; and the 
General Assembly (majlisi umumi). Externally, the organisation is represented by the 
heads of the central and executive councils. It is not clear how the two roles are defined, 
as the asasnamah, the document that outlines the organisational structure of the 
organisation, is not made available to the public.9 As Osman (2015, p. 9) states ‘the head 
of the Central Council is the de facto leader of the organisation, although publicly, the 
head of the Executive Office is presented as the general leader’.  
Nonetheless, it is clear that these internal structures are more than just symbolic bodies. 
They are regularly convened to discuss and deliberate on collective decisions. Since its 
formation in 2003, the organisation has used these internal procedures to elect and replace 
its leaders. In November 2009, the General Assembly of the organisation voted to elect 
Nasir Ahmad Nawidi as Head of its Central Council, replacing its previous head, 
Sefatullah Qanet (Eslah Online, 2009b). In May 2015, in another meeting of the council, 
Nawidi and Fakhri’s terms were extended for another three years as heads of the central 
and executive councils respectively. On occasion, the organisation uses the meeting of its 
central council to issue public statements on current affairs of the country. For example, 
in October 2016 the meeting of the council issued a public statement in which the 
                                                          
9 In July 2017, after repeated queries regarding the precise roles of the various councils of the 
organisation, a senior member sent me the moramamah of the organisation, the constitution that 
explains the overall goals and strategies of the organisation.  
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organisation expressed its concerns at intensification of violence in the country and 
demanded negotiations for resolution of the conflict (Eslah Online, 2016b). Below the 
leadership councils, Jamiat-e Eslah’s organisational structure follows the model of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in which the basic unit of is a circle called usra, which is 
headed by a naqib. Circles can cluster to form shubas (branches) at a provincial or sub-
provincial levels (See also Osman 2015, p.8).  
As an organisation, Jamiat-e Eslah stresses collective deliberation as one of its organising 
principles. However, the organisation does not define its internal working structure in 
terms of western-style decision making processes. Central to its organisational model is 
the concept of shura’iyyat, the historical tradition of consultation and deliberation in the 
Islamic world, which underpins the collective deliberations in the general assembly and 
the central and executive councils of the organisation. The founding document of the 
organisation declares shura, next to its commitment to Islam, as its defining features, 
declaring ‘all affairs of Jamiat-e Eslah, from bottom to the top, will be managed on the 
basis of shura. No member of organs of Jamiat-e Eslah has the right individually to make 
decisions in collective affairs’ (Eslah Online, 2013).  
While the internal structures and deliberative processes are highly important, they are not 
the defining features of Jamiat-e Eslah. In comparison to the other three organisations, 
Jamiat-e Eslah is characterised by its role as flagship organisation in a network of 
organisations. Over the years since its formation in 2003, the organisation has created a 
range of other organisations that includes media outlets, charity organisations, schools 
and universities, and professional associations (See chapter 6). While some of these 
organisations have assumed their own organisational identities, they are linked to the 
parent organisation through a shared ideology and strategy. Consequently, in its strategy 
to expand beyond its core members, rather than integrating all activities in one 
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organisation it has created a range of other organisations that focus on particular themes 
or areas of activities or respond to the needs of particular constituencies.  
Combining Hierarchy with Internal Democracy: the Approach of Hezb-e Hambastagi  
In its organisational structure, Hezb-e Hambastagi follows a hierarchical model. The local 
unit of the organisation is a council that can be formed at local and district levels. These 
local councils elect members of provincial councils, and finally members of the provincial 
councils constitute the party’s General Council (Shuray-e umumi). The 43-member 
General Council is the party’s highest leadership body and is convened once a year. In 
2015, it represented 24 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. According to the Head of the 
party’s Organisation Committee, the number of representatives from the provinces at the 
General Council is based on the relative strength of membership as well as the overall 
population of each province. Accordingly, in 2015, according to him, 10 out of 43 
members of the council came from Kabul ((Interview [2]). The General Council elects a 
9-member Executive Council (Shuray-e ijrayee), which in turn elects from amongst its 
members a 5-member Permanent Committee composed of the party leader, two deputies 
and another two members elected by the Executive Council. The Executive Council is 
convened every three months, with its Permanent Committee responsible for the day-to-
day leadership of the organisation (Hezb-e Hambastagi Afghanistan, 2010).  
As with other organisations, it is hard to verify independently whether the organisational 
structure as outlined here is fully implemented by the party in practice. For one thing, the 
deteriorating security situation and declining confidence in political parties after the first 
few years following the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 are likely to have affected the 
enthusiasm of many party members to participate in multiple councils within an 
organisation. However, it is clear that the party has elaborated internal working 
procedures which it uses to make important collective decisions. At its second congress 
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in 2010, the party elected a new leadership, replacing Engineer Khaleq Neamat, an urban 
planning engineer from the Pashayee minority community in the east of Afghanistan, with 
Daoud Razmak, a young medical doctor and a Tajik from the western province of Farah 
(See chapter 6).  
While certainly weaker in comparison to Jamiat-e Eslah, Hezb-e Hambastagi has 
developed a basic bureaucratic capacity, with a permanent office and dedicated staff. In 
August and October 2015, when I visited the party’s headquarter in Kabul, it had a 
relatively small but functional office with dedicated staff members and volunteers who 
were running the party’s day-to-day affairs. However, in contrast to other political parties 
of Afghanistan during this period, the Hezb-e Hambastagi Headquarters in Kabul and the 
life style of its leaders plainly demonstrated that the party had benefited little from the 
resources that flowed to the country after 2001.  
High Internal Democracy and Poor Organisational Capacity: the case of Afghanistan 
1400 
Although relatively young in comparison with the other three organisations, since its 
launch in 2012 Afghanistan 1400 has adopted internal decision making processes that 
demonstrate its organisational approach. Based on my interviews with senior leaders of 
the movement as well as key organisational documents of the movement, Afghanistan 
1400 is composed of the following key organs:  
  General Assembly of its members, convened every two years;  
  Central Council elected by members of the General Assembly;  
  General Presidency (Riasat-e omumi) that includes a General President and a 
Vice-President;  
 Executive Board (Rayes Ijrayyi), led by an Executive President,  
 And finally a Constituents Council.  
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The General Assembly of the movement, which is convened every two years, is designed 
as the highest body within the organisation, with the power to elect the General President 
and members of its Central Council and deliberate and approve amendments to its 
organising documents. To ensure organisational continuity, members of the Central 
Council are elected by the General Assembly for three separate terms of three years, two 
years and one year. The council makes its decisions by a two-thirds majority, and the 
General President is usually a non-voting member, only allowed to cast a vote if the body 
reaches a deadlock when all other members are equally divided over a decision. Similarly, 
the Executive President who serves as Secretary of the Central Council does not have a 
right to vote. The Executive President reports to the General President and is tasked with 
implementing the decisions made by the Central Council, and overseeing the day-to-day 
coordination between the departments and offices of the movement.  
Since its launch in 2012, Afghanistan 1400 has been regularly convening its general 
assembly and central council meetings. The first two General Presidents were young 
educated women. Shaharzad Akbar who was elected as the first General-President of the 
movement in 2012 was also the first Afghan woman to graduate from the University of 
Oxford. In July 2013, at the conclusion of Akbar’s term, the organisation elected Sonia 
Iqbal Zeerak, another young woman with a postgraduate degree from the University of 
York as its second General President. In July 2014, the organisation elected Shoaib 
Rahim, a young man and graduate of Duke University in the United States as its third 
General President. While very strong in its emphasis on internal democracy, Afghanistan 
1400 is weakest in developing a bureaucratic structure. As of early 2017, the organisation 
lacks both a permanent office and dedicated professional staff to carry out its activities. 
Instead, the organisation largely relies on voluntary contributions of its members to cover 
the costs of organising events.  
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As the brief overview of the structure of the movement shows, in the context of 
Afghanistan’s post-2001 patronage-based politics, members of the movement placed an 
unusually high degree of emphasis on internal democracy. By comparison, Jamiat-e Eslah 
and Hezb-e Hambastagi have changed their leadership only once since they were formed 
in 2003. This high turnover in leadership of Afghanistan 1400 can be interpreted as 
indication of a strong adherence to internal democracy by founders of the movement. In 
a country where most parties are led by life-long leaders, the movement elected three 
separate leaders within a period of four years, and the terms of none of its General 
Presidents were extended beyond their first appointment. However, such rapid changes 
in leadership can also be a source of instability and rapid changes in the movement’s 
leadership styles and policy priorities. For a movement that is in the early stages of its 
development, such rapid pace of change can potentially be highly damaging. In my 
interviews, members of the organisation recounted how the emphasis on internal 
deliberation and collective decision making processes resulted in prolonged discussions, 
turning the movement’s meetings into a major source of frustration for its members.  
Mobilising the Educated Class 
How do the various organisational approaches, as represented by these four groups, synch 
with or shape their broader social appropriation strategies and tactics? More specifically, 
do the way in which these groups are structured affect their capacity to navigate through 
broader social change processes that Afghanistan experienced between 2001 and 2016? 
These are important questions to ask because to various degrees, each of these four groups 
is a product as well as an instigator of social change during this period. The rise and 
activities of these groups would not be possible without the social and political 
liberalisation of the post-2001 period as well as the dramatic social changes such as 
urbanisation, expansion of the education sector, and the emergence of mass media and 
global connectivity that took place during this period (See chapter 5).  
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Mobilising the Students, the Case of Kabul University  
The education sector is a social and political field where the success and strategic 
approaches of the four groups in developing a mass following can be usefully assessed. 
Groups and individuals make organisational and tactical choices under a specific socio-
cultural and political environment. As Giustozzi (2010) argues, for the politically-active 
students the available options have historically involved a choice between ‘rebellion’ and 
‘patronage’. The former involves challenging the status quo as demonstrated by the 
Islamist and leftist student groups of the 1960s, and the latter is centred on a transactional 
exchange in which students provide political support to a dominant ethno-political 
network in return for political backing for getting jobs and provision of material assistance 
such as accommodation. Giustozzi argues that ‘since 2001, student politics seems to have 
been characterised by the predominance of patronage-based relationships between 
students and political parties’ (2010, p. 6). The perception of predominance of student 
careerism and opportunism among students of the post-2001 period was echoed by some 
of my own interviewees. Some argued that the country’s post-2001 intelligentsia had 
succumbed to pressures of consumerism and careerism generated by globalisation. A 
lecturer at a private university in Kabul made a distinction between three generations of 
intelligentsia in Afghanistan: a generation of tafsir (interpretation) who were concerned 
with understanding and interpreting the world up to the middle of the twentieth century; 
a generation of taghyir (change) who sought to change the world after the 1960s 
according to their ideologies; and finally a post-2001 generation of tamatto’a (fruition or 
enjoyment) who prioritised fulfilling personal desires and ambitions (Interview [23]). 
Nonetheless, a clear-cut distinction between generational attitudes or predominance of 
patronage or rebellion in a particular era is too simplistic to capture the complexity of 
student politics. One might find evidence of rebellion and careerism among students in 
any period in the history of the country. 
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Despite their shared futuristic outlooks and emphasis on the youth as drivers of change, 
the four groups demonstrate significant differences in their approach to recruiting and 
mobilising the youth. The first such major difference is marked by a secular-religious 
divide across the four case-study groups. The two religiously-oriented groups, Jamiat-e 
Eslah and Hezb ut-Tahrir, invest heavily in developing mass following among the 
country’s students. By contrast, Afghanistan 1400 and Hezb-e Hambastagi lack any 
systematic policy of mass recruitment in the universities.  
The lack of investment in recruiting the educated class is particularly surprising for 
Afghanistan 1400, an organisation, which describes itself a movement of the ‘new 
generation’ of the country. Furthermore, the movement has also brought together some 
of the most educated and most influential members of the educated class with degrees 
from prestigious western universities. A member estimated that about 10 of the 42 
founding members of the movement had degrees from western universities with the rest 
having studied inside the country. Ironically, the type and level of educational attainment 
by some of the movement’s leading figures also created a gap between it and the mass 
educated class. Although most founders of the movement had studied inside the country 
and some even lacked university education, the socially-mobile and western-educated 
members exercised greater influence in shaping public perception of the movement. One 
such perception was that the movement recruits a particularly elitist section of the 
educated class. The same member noted with regret that 
Unfortunately an impression was created that this [Afghanistan 1400] is a group of 
people who have MAs and PhDs from abroad. How did I get to know this? One of 
our relatives in the family said “I am very interested [to join] but I don’t qualify”. I 
asked, “How do you not qualify?” He said, “We are told we need to have degrees” 
(Interview [6]) 
The elitist perception was also underpinned by a deep social divide that separated the 
urban western-educated youth from the mass of mostly rural students who competed to 
find places in universities such as Kabul University.  
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Similarly to Afghanistan 1400, Hezb-e Hambastagi recognises youth and university 
students as important constituencies but the party lacks the resources and policy to launch 
a significant drive for student recruitment. The Head of the Organisational Committee of 
Hezb-e Hambastagi emphasised that the students were a highly important constituency 
for the party. To recruit the students, he said the party had a Student Affairs Committee 
in its organisational structure. In 2015, the committee was headed by a female university 
student (Interview [2]). However, as will be shown below, the party has not developed 
any significant following in the universities.  
In stark contrast to Hezb-e Hambastagi and Afghanistan 1400, Jamiat-e Eslah and Hezb 
ut-Tahrir are widely recognised as two of the most active organisations on university 
campuses. Hezb ut-Tahrir began its presence in Afghanistan by establishing its first cell 
at Kabul University in 2003. Similarly, Jamiat-e Eslah has been active in Kabul 
University and other state-run universities at least since its formal launch in 2003. Both 
of these organisations have been accused of training a new generation of radical students 
in the country (Nazari, 2015). Both organisations have used their networks in university 
campuses to organise rallies in Kabul and a number of other provinces. However, the two 
organisations follow different approaches to appropriating the socio-cultural spaces that 
have been made available as a result of the expansion of the education sector. A major 
source of difference in the recruitment and mobilisational strategy of the two organisation 
is their official status in the country. As a legally-registered organisation, Jamiat-e Eslah 
recruits and mobilises students without facing repression by the university administration 
or government security agencies. Furthermore, as a social organisation it can always 
claim to be a non-political entity, and hence present its activities as educational and 
cultural. Consequently, it organises and recruits more openly. A student who lived in the 
dormitory of Kabul University for four years stated that Jamiat-e Eslah’s publications 
were widely distributed among the residents of the dormitory. For example, he described 
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how every week, the organisation’s activists would leave leaflets and magazines of the 
organisation at the doors of every student at the dormitory. He contrasted Jamiat-e Eslah’s 
relatively open recruitment and freedom in distribution of its publications with Hezb ut-
Tahrir more direct and face-to-face recruitment. While both Hezb ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e 
Eslah expand through formation of cells, the character of these cells varies significantly 
between the two organisations. For Hezb ut-Tahrir, the cells are more secretive, and 
information about its internal organisational structures is strictly guarded. The 
organisation seldom organises public events under its own name and banner. Most often, 
its cells of activists are mobilised to join, and even take control of, rallies and events 
organised by other groups (Interview [28]).  
Both Hezb ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e Eslah have their own allies among the faculties of 
Kabul University. Many members of the Sharia (Islamic Law) Faculty of Kabul 
University are consistently cited as the main allies and supporters of radical Islamist 
students of the university. The faculty trains students in Islamic law, history and culture, 
and has historically been the main driver of Islamist politics in the university. The 
faculty’s influence extends over students of other faculties as offers courses that are 
mandatory for all students. A chief way in which the faculty exercises influence over 
students of other faculties is through the subject of saqafat-e Islami (Islamic culture). First 
introduced by the mujahedin government in 1992 and taught by members of the Sharia 
Faculty, the course has become mandatory for students of all faculties. The course has 
often been the object of the highly-charged debates, with many blaming its particular 
interpretation of Islam as responsible for training a new generation of radical students. In 
November 2016, Hafiz Mansur, a Member of Parliament and a former mujahed, provoked 
intense debates by specifically accusing the course of training ‘terrorists’ (Royee, 2016). 
Critics have argued that some of the texts taught as part of the course promote the 
caliphate and emirate as the legitimate Islamic political system, thus indirectly 
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challenging the Islamic legitimacy of the post-2001 democratic political system (1TV, 
2016). 
In the Sharia Faculty, some lecturers are particularly known for their hard-line views. One 
such figure is Muhammad Maruf Rasikh, a lecturer of the faculty and Imam of Kuwait 
Al-Khair Mosque, which is strategically located across the road from the main building 
of the university’s male dormitory. A student of Kabul University claimed he supported 
Hezb ut-Tahrir in the university (Interview [28]). Rasikh was detained in April 2016 by 
the National Security Directorate for his alleged involvement in promotion of radical 
activities (Ettilaat Roz Daily, 2016a). He was released from detention in October 2016 
without being formally charged. Abdul Zaher Da’ai, another lecturer of the Sharia 
Faculty, was cited by two interviewees in Kabul University as supporting activities of 
Jamiat-e Eslah in the university. One respondent, for example, alleged that these faculty 
members would give students marks based on the articles they were writing for the 
various publications of these organisations (Interview [28]). The validity of these claims, 
or other details of the way in which these faculty members allegedly supported these 
organisations, could not be independently established as restriction on political activities 
in the universities mean that such political activism is usually not made public (See 
below).  
Nonetheless, it was clear that these lecturers who also served as imams of a number of 
mosques across Kabul were playing a highly-influential role in connecting networks of 
the Islamist students with like-minded groups outside the university. According to another 
student of Kabul University, one way in which these lecturers connect the networks of 
students at university campuses with Islamist groups is through their teaching circles 
(halqah), informal and loosely-structured groups of university students and other 
participants who gather at mosques or private residences of these lecturers-preachers. In 
these circles, the lecturers combine university education with their own interpretation of 
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Islamic texts and history. A student provided an account of his own experience in one of 
these circles,  
When I went there, their lessons had become more intellectual (fekri). There, they 
would read Sahih Bukhari10, exegesis and other [usual] religious texts that exist, 
books of hadith and Quran and its exegesis. They would also teach, for example, 
Islamic world wiew (Jahanbini Islami). The chapters we read at the university are 
taught there, considering the level of education [of participants] because there 
people come from all levels. There are students of universities, students of 
schools, porters as it is an open circle; everybody is free to come and participate. 
These were taught gradually. Then, naturally [scholars] are named, as Hassan Al-
Bana said this and Sayed Qotb said that. This gives you the motivation that if your 
teacher quotes him I should also read the sources. Then we begin to read about 
the lives of these people and became very interested (Interview [12]). 
Although some of these lecturers and preachers are widely known as supporters of one of 
these organisations, in practice they share strong ideological commonalities. This means 
that even if some lecturers are clearly linked to one organisation, they can still offer strong 
ideological support for rival groups. For example, Abul Zaher Da’ai, who is generally 
known as a Jamiat-e Eslah supporter, has spoken highly favourably of Hezb ut-Tahrir’s 
ideology and the importance of its efforts for revival of the caliphate. In a video statement, 
published by an online media group called Risala (2016), Da’i refers to Hezb ut-Tahrir 
members as ‘brothers’, and emphasises revival of the caliphate as the ultimate goal of all 
Islamist groups. In another indication of cross-organisational recruitment and solidarity, 
a member of Hezb ut-Tahrir was a participant in a teaching circle of a Jamiat-e Eslah 
supporter before joining the organisation (Interview [7]).  
Recruitment and Visibility at High Schools 
The general patterns that emerged from my own interviews with university students in 
Kabul are supported by other research. In this respect, a survey of Afghanistan’s high 
school by Giustozzi and Muhammad Ali (2015) is particularly relevant. The survey 
demonstrates the extent of politicisation of the new generation of students at the level of 
                                                          
10 Sahih Al-Bukhari is one the six main collections of Hadith, prophetic traditions, for the Sunni 
Muslims.  
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secondary education. The survey, which involved by 28 teachers and 403 students in a 
total of 136 schools in 18 provinces of the country, offers some broad indications of the 
level and type of political activities in the country’s rapidly-expanded high school sector. 
At the national level, the survey found that 91.8 of the respondents had personally 
witnessed political activities at their high schools, although there were significant 
variations across regions and time periods. The most common political activities reported 
by the respondents were political debates (96.7%) followed by verbal arguments among 
students (64.3%), recruitment (52.3%), graffiti (38.2%), political meetings (23.2%), and 
distribution of leaflets and political literature (22.6). Significantly, open protest was 
among the least reported activities (2.3%) across the 18 provinces. However, the 
respondents in Herat (37.5%) and Kabul city (18.2%) reported much higher levels of 
protest activities.  
The issues covered in the political debates offering important insights into what attracts 
the greatest attention at the level of schools. The issues most debated were elections 
(96.7%) followed by the presences of foreigners in the country (80.8%), and political 
corruption (50.5%), Islam versus the West (41.9%), women’s rights (29.9%), and the 
status of languages of the country (36.5%) (Giustozzi & Mohammad Ali, 2015, pp. 6-9). 
The survey also reported on the respondents’ perception of the type of political groups 
that were most active in the schools. According to the report the most active groups as 
reported by the respondents were Islamic groups (81.9%) followed by groups derived 
from the militias of the civil wars (75.4%), ethno-nationalist groups (51.4%), Maoists and 
other leftists (20.6%), and liberals and democratic groups (10.2%) (Giustozzi & 
Mohammad Ali, 2015, pp. 9-10).  
It is important to make one qualification regarding the typology of active political groups 
described in the survey. The survey report makes a distinction between Islamic groups, 
and groups derived from militias of the civil wars, with the former referring to the post-
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2001 Islamic groups (both the Taliban and peaceful groups such as Jamiat-e Eslah) and 
the latter referring to the mujahedin groups. While it is important to make a distinction 
between various forms of political Islamist groups, when it comes to their avowed 
adherence to Islam the distinction between most former mujahedin and the other groups 
is not always easy to make. As discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis, most of the mujahedin 
groups were born out of student activists groups, and many groups such as Jamiat-e Eslah 
claim descent from the network of activists of the 1960s.  
The most relevant findings for this thesis that come from the survey concern the level of 
reported activity of Jamiat-e Eslah, Hezb ut-Tahrir and Afghanistan 1400. As indicated 
above, the report places Jamiat-e Eslah and Hezb ut-Tahrir in the category of Islamic 
groups, and the latter in the liberal and democratic camp. Nearly a third (32.9%) of the 
respondents of the survey reported having witnessed activities by Jamiat-e Eslah at their 
high schools. It was reported as strongest in Kabul, Kunar and Parwan and weakest in the 
two mainly Pashtun provinces of Paktia and Logar in the southeast of the country. Across 
the 18 provinces, Hezb ut-Tahrir activities were reported by a similar number, a little 
below a third of the respondents (29.2%). However, in contrast to Jamiat-e Eslah, the 
activities of Hezb ut-Tahrir were reported to be particularly concentrated in some 
provinces more than others. They were strongest in the provinces of Baghlan (96.7%), 
Takhar (93.3%) Badakhshan (71.4%), Parwan (66.7%) Herat (62.5%), Kabul city 
(54.5%) and Kabul districts (55.0%), with very little or no reported presence in the 
provinces of the south and east of the country (Giustozzi & Mohammad Ali, 2015, p. 11).  
Although the survey does not look at the activities of Hezb-e Hambastagi specifically, the 
trend reported on the level of activities of leftist groups more generally offers some 
indications of the broader trend in leftist group activities in the country. In this respect, 
the report makes an important distinction between groups which derived from the Maoist 
Shoʿalayi Jawid and those with roots in one of the factions of the pro-Soviet People’s 
P a g e  | 233 
 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Activities by groups derived from the Maoist 
movements were reported mainly from Kabul city (40.9%), followed by Herat (12.5%), 
Helmand (11.8%), and Kandahar (5.7%) (Giustozzi & Mohammad Ali, 2015, p. 13). 
Although the groups derived from the PDPA were reported to be active in urban centres, 
they were reported to be active by substantial number of respondents in other provinces. 
For example, 63.6 percent of respondents from Kabul city reported activities by such 
groups (Giustozzi & Mohammad Ali, 2015, p. 13). Beyond Kabul, although much weaker 
than the Islamists, the former PDPA groups were reported to be active in a number of 
other provinces. Among the liberals, the survey elicited the views of the respondents on 
activities of Afghanistan 1400, along with five other groups.11 The unmistakable pattern 
that emerges from the responses is that the so-called liberal and democratic groups are 
almost entirely restricted to Kabul, with little activity reported from other provinces. Less 
than a quarter of the respondents in Kabul city (22.7%) reported activities by Afghanistan 
1400, with no positive response from Kabul’s district or other provinces (Giustozzi & 
Mohammad Ali, 2015, p. 10).  
The general picture that emerges is that the secular groups, both leftist and liberals, are 
largely restricted to urban centres. The Hezb ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e Eslah are far more 
successful in reaching out beyond Kabul. However, the survey data indicate that Hezb ut-
Tahrir is most active in areas traditionally dominated by Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan. In 
particular, the centre of activities of the organisation is reported to stretch from Kabul 
with greater reported activities in north-eastern provinces of Baghlan, Takhar, Qunduz, 
and Badakhshan. Outside the northeast region, Herat is also a traditional Jamiat 
stronghold in the west of the country. By contrast, Jamiat-e Eslah has spread out more 
evenly across the provinces, although it is also stronger in some provinces than others.  
                                                          
11 These were Rights and Justice Party, Afghanistan Awareness and Analysis, Afghanistan 
Forward, Republican Party and Green Trend. 
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Going Beyond Schools and Universities: Creating Social Space and Resources 
Hezb ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e Eslah efforts at recruitment are not restricted to major state-
run universities. Hezb ut-Tahrir targets government officials, security forces, members of 
the parliament, and local notables and former mujahedin leaders. Osman (2016, p. 6) 
reports that two senior members of the organisation worked in ‘administrative and 
technical’ capacities in the National Security Council of the country. Similarly, Jamiat-e 
Eslah has members who are working in various government departments, especially in 
ministries of education and Haj and Islamic affairs. I interviewed a senior member of the 
organisation at a department of the Ministry of Education in Kabul, and Mawlawi Abdul 
Salam A’bid, a member of the Central Council of the Organisation, served in senior 
positions in the same ministry, including as Head of Policy in 2017. Two members of 
Jamiat-e Eslah served as members of the parliament from 2005 to 2010. Subsequently, 
the organisation banned members for running for the parliament fearing that that ‘having 
members in the legislative or senior executive positions would endorse the legitimacy of 
the state, which it believed it did not have, and would harm its own standing among the 
more conservative segments of society’ (Osman, 2015, p. 7) 
Transcending ethno-cultural divisions? 
Ideologically, both Hezb ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e Eslah are opposed to any form of 
association with ethnic or other forms of particularistic identities. When I raised the issue, 
my interviewees in both organisations responded by citing verses from the Quran or the 
sayings of Prophet Muhammad to argue ethno-centrism is in fact haram, explicitly 
banned in Islam. As discussed in chapter 6, Hezb ut-Tahrir goes even further by declaring 
the very foundations of the international nation-state system as non-Islamic. By contrast, 
Jamiat-e Eslah seeks to combine its pan-Islamic concerns with a focus within the 
framework of the nation-state of Afghanistan. Beyond its recognition of a national 
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identity, the organisation strongly campaigns against sub-national, ethnic or otherwise, 
political associations. However, in a country with deep ethnic divisions that challenged 
the coherence of past ideological groups such as the PDPA and the mujahedin, and in an 
environment in which distribution of political power is based on an informal ethnic 
hierarchy among the country’s major ethnic groups, staying aloof from ethno-cultural 
divisions requires more than mere ideological refutation.  
In its organisational leadership, Jamiat-e Eslah represents both Pashtuns and Tajiks. The 
first President of the organisation from 2003 to 2010 was Muhammad A’tif, a Tajik from 
the north-eastern province of Takhar. Subsequently, the General Assembly of the 
organisation elected Abdul Sabur Fakhri, a Tajik from the province of Panjshir, as its 
President, and Nasir Ahmad Nawidi as Head of its Central Council. Nonetheless and 
despite its expressed ideological opposition to ethnic politics, Jamiat-e Eslah is seen by 
many as being dominated by Pashtuns. The ethnic perception of the organisation was 
even expressed by a Tajik supporter of the organisation in Kabul University who 
remarked that  
They have slogans and programmes against ethno-centrism. I mean that 
sometimes they organise a conference and have published brochures against 
ethno-centrism. [They say] these things are rejected and we should abandon them. 
But some brothers complain that [members] of Pashtun ethnic groups are more in 
the organisation of Jamiat-e Eslah (Interview [12]). 
Others added to the ethnic charges against Jamiat-e Eslah by pointing to foreign hands 
behind its rapid expansion. A member of parliament who was critical of the organisation 
argued that an ideological void created by entry of the former mujahedin into mainstream 
politics after 2001 was going hand in hand with support by Pakistan’s Jama’at Islami to 
account for the expansion of the organisation. Pointing to the factors behind the rise of 
the organisation, he said,  
Void, void! Foreign money plus persuading Pashtun businessmen. They have 
become a big economic group… In Herat too, there are the Pashtuns. It is mostly 
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the void, an ideological void. Other parties became busy in the government and 
other things. The world does not stop. The youth expects to hear something and 
the nation is a Muslim nation and they exploit the void (Interview [21]). 
Ethnicity and other forms of identity do not just confront these organisations when they 
assume political roles. Another way in which they become the objects of ethnicised 
perception is through their campaign against what they regard as non-Islamic cultural 
traditions, some of which predate Islam and are closely associated with ethno-cultural 
identities. One such example is the festival of Nawruz, the ancient New Year on 21 
March, celebrated across many countries in the region. In Afghanistan, although it is a 
national holiday, the tradition tends to be particularly strong among the non-Pashtun 
communities with its largest event organised in the province of Balkh in the north of the 
country, and birthplace of the Zoroastrian religion. Jamiat-e Eslah and other groups have 
questioned the basis of the festival, pointing to its origin in pre-Islamic Zoroastrian 
civilizations. In response, some critics have even accused the organisation of leading a 
campaign of ‘ethnicide’ by attacking the cultural traditions of the country’s non-Pashtuns 
as non-Islamic whilst remaining silent on similarly non-Islamic tribal practices of 
Pashtuns. Criticising Jamiat-e Eslah’s declaration of the annual celebration of Nawruz as 
haram, Saqeb (2013), a Tajik commentator, argued that ‘the goal of Jamiat-e Eslah is not 
religious reform but consolidation of ethnic hegemony. Jamiat-e Eslah wants to achieve 
this goal through suppression of culture and identity of non-Pashtun ethnic groups’.  
Similar to Jamiat-e Eslah, Hezb ut-Tahrir’s public perception is also getting entangled 
with ethnic politics, although its very strong pan-Islamist rhetoric and open hostility to 
any forms of national and sub-national politics make it less vulnerable to such allegations. 
My own interviews, as well as the survey by Giustozzi and Muhammad Ali, show that 
Hezb ut-Tahrir has met with greater successes in the mainly Tajik provinces stretching 
from Kabul to Badakshan in the northeast. The organisation appears to be relatively 
weaker in the Pashtun provinces of southern and south-eastern Afghanistan. Members of 
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the organisation admitted their relatively weak success in establishing a presence in the 
mainly Pashtun provinces of the south and east. One member cited the concentration of 
insurgency and violence in these areas as the primary cause of the delay in the expansion 
of the movement in provinces such as Kandahar in the South and Paktiya in the East 
(Interviews [39] and [40]). Hezb ut-Tahrir spokesman in Afghanistan went even further 
by admitting the different rates of success of the organisation at the sub-national level but 
stressed that, depending on their socio-cultural traditions, the peoples of these regions 
could complement one another in supporting the organisation. He contrasted the Tajik’s 
relatively long history of literacy and education with what he described as a tradition of 
‘bravery’ in fighting fields among the Pashtuns. Drawing on the contrast, he contended 
that the Tajik communities’ cultural capacity and greater awareness were being used by 
the organisation, and the Pashtun’s warring culture could be exploited in future stages of 
the organisation’s mission (Interview [14]). While fiercely pan-Islamist in its rhetoric, 
such clearly ethnicised perceptions of the dynamics of political power in the country may 
point to an emerging adaptation of the organisation’s ideology to the context of 
Afghanistan. 
Consequently, the rivalry between Jamiat-e Eslah and Hezb ut-Tahrir gains ethnic 
dimensions (if not motivations) by virtue of finding greater levels of support among the 
two major ethnic groups of the country. In the long-term, these ethnicised perceptions of 
Jamiat-e Eslah and the Hezb ut-Tahrir may point to recurrence of a similar process of 
adaptation of Islamism with local power bases by Jamiat-e Islami and Hezb-e Islami 
during the 1980s and 1990s. As chapter 4 showed, although both Hezb-e Islami and 
Jamiat-e Islami originated from the networks of Islamist students of the 1960s, in their 
competition for mass following overtime they coalesced around ethno-culture cores of 
Pashtuns and Tajiks respectively. However, if such a process of ethnicisation of the new 
generation of Afghanistan’s Islamists were to repeat itself, it would be a long-term 
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process and might become more apparent if these groups went beyond educational and 
cultural arenas and engaged with power politics.  
Ideology and Agency as Drivers of Social Appropriation Strategies 
How can one explain the divergent organisational patterns and social appropriation 
strategies as demonstrated by these four groups? It might be useful to begin by exploring 
the institutional context of public education Afghanistan as a site of contestation as well 
as a victim of more than four decades of violence and instability in Afghanistan.  
The Institutional and Historical Context  
In the period after 2001, the revival and expansion of the public education system became 
a key component of the statebuilding enterprise. Funded by foreign aid, the sector 
witnessed rapid expansion in terms of enrolment of students and opening of new schools 
and universities. Although mostly welcomed by the general population, the expansion of 
schools and universities was seen as a threat by groups such as the Taliban that blame 
universities and state-run schools for spreading foreign and secular values and ideologies. 
The Taliban attacked schools and universities, killing teachers and burning down 
hundreds of school buildings in several provinces. As a result of this campaign of 
violence, hundreds of schools were closed in many provinces of the country (Human 
Rights Watch, 2006). To mitigate the threats against schools, the Ministry of Education 
entered into informal arrangements with local Taliban groups to ensure the security of 
schools in return for allowing the Taliban to influence the curriculum and appointment of 
teachers in the schools of the insecure provinces (Giustozzi & Franco, 2011). While the 
overall effects and durability of such deals were not always clear, the challenge posed to 
the education sector by groups framing their violent opposition to the state in religious 
terms had the effects of further strengthening the role of conservative and Islamist forces 
in the education sector more generally. 
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The Taliban attacked schools and universities despite the fact that unlike the PDPA 
regime in the 1980s, the post-2001 governments in Kabul did not actively use schools and 
universities as centres of ideological indoctrination. On the contrary, the government 
strongly discouraged organised political activities in schools and university campuses. 
Although there are no formal laws restricting student political activities, in places such as 
Kabul University students who engage in politics are subject to ‘reprimand and event 
punishment’ by university administration and faculties, and ‘student activities are 
monitored by teachers but also by frequent visits of undercover staff from the 
government’s internal security organization, the National Directorate of Security, who 
students said are easy to identify but nevertheless maintain a watchful eye on any 
dissident behavior’ (Larson & Coburn, 2014, p. 11). These informal restrictions on 
student activism are products of fears of the country’s history with student politics and 
sudden expansion of its educated class as demonstrated in the 1960s. However, the policy 
of encouraging a quietist and careerist intelligentsia also meant that the education sector 
did not assume an active role in promoting liberal values. 
Despite the informal constraints, the students are deeply enmeshed in political networks 
of the country. In Kabul University, the country’s largest and oldest university, students 
engage in politics through forming informal study and activist associations and 
cultivating ties (often based on ethnicity or ideology) with political factions and elites 
who also see in the growing student population potential sources of support and networks 
of political mobilisation. A student who served as representative of Kabul University 
dormitory for three years provided an account of a highly dynamic, and at times very 
intense political atmosphere in the university. His account of student activism in the 
university was one of localism and fragmentation as well as national political 
organisation. He pointed to predominance of localised (provincial and district levels) 
associations among the university’s students. However, beyond the localised politics, he 
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emphasised that ‘religion’ and ‘ethnicity’ were the two predominant sources of student 
mobilisation that would bring together students from various regions of the country 
(Interview [28]).  
The Role of Ideology  
Ideology is an important source of the organisational and mobilisational approaches of 
these organisations. For example, for Hezb ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e Eslah, ideology 
determines their strategies the socio-political environment of Afghanistan. As 
Karagiannis (2010, p. 50), discussing similar strategic disagreements within Hezb ut-
Tahrir writes, 
 Ironically, this ideological division resembles the confrontation between the 
Stalinist and Troskyist [sic] factions of the Boshevik Party in the 1920s. As 
surprising as it may seem though, the communist ideology has some features that 
are not alien at all to Islam. Communism and Islam generally advocate emphasis 
on group goals over individual interests. In addition, both claim to be universal 
and seek to convert ‘unbelievers’. They offer a vision of a perfectly just society 
and they can justify violence to achieve this goal.  
Central to the strategic disagreement between Jamiat-e Eslah and Hezb ut-Tahrir is the 
question whether Islamisation can be pursued on a country-to-country basis. Ideologically 
opposed to the nation-state system, Hezb ut-Tahrir seeks to expand by establishing 
underground cells within and outside existing institutions such as universities and schools 
but refuse to align itself with national identity. By contrast, as a legally-registered 
organisation Jamiat-e Eslah actively invests in establishing its own institutions of 
education and learning while continuing to maintain a presence in state-run universities 
and schools. Furthermore, ideologically, the Hezb ut-Tahrir does not view educational 
and cultural activities as the primary areas of its activities. Some of its members even 
described such as activities as a deviation from the real mission of reviving the global 
caliphate. By contrast, for Jamiat-e Eslah the cultural and educational arenas are the 
central arenas for its mission of bottom-up socio-cultural transformation. Referring to the 
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Jamiat-e Eslah’s focus on cultural and charity activities, a member of the Hezb ut-Tahrir 
said,  
The distribution of books and charity are good activities but are not enough for 
attainment of power. Perhaps, they gain rewards12 (sawab) for preaching but 
we consider making [cultural activities] essential as opposed to method 
(menhaj) (Interview [40]).  
The ideological rivalries between groups such as Hezb ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e Eslah are 
also influenced by the ideological environment after 2001. The four decades of 
politicisation of the sector have also worked to create a strategic environment that favors 
conservative and religious forms of social and political mobilisation. As chapter 4 
showed, beginning from the 1960s Afghanistan’s public education sector became a 
central arena of contestation for ideological and political domination among the country’s 
various ideological groups. In stark contrast to the post-2001 period, the student activism 
of the 1960s was shaped by highly diverse groups, with the Islamists competing with a 
wide range of leftists and nationalist groups. During the 1980s, education and 
indoctrination became battlegrounds for the PDPA and the mujahedin groups that were 
backed by the Soviet Union and a coalition of western and Islamic countries respectively. 
While the PDPA regime used schools and universities as centres of recruitment and 
indoctrination in Kabul and other areas it controlled, the mujahedin organisations in 
Peshawar, supported by western donors, produced their own alternative curricula (Jones, 
2008). The mujahedin textbooks funded by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and produced by a centre of the University of Nebraska at Omaha 
promoted an Islamist ideology that aimed to encourage violent resistance against the 
Soviet occupation of the country. As Spink (2005, p. 199) put it,  
In fact, the textbooks of the time did not reflect a love for one’s country, but rather 
a love for militant ideology. Primary school maths books developed exercises 
around the number of dead and alive Russians. Children learnt division by 
                                                          
12 Sawab is an Arabic term meaning reward. In this context, it refers to spiritual attainment or 
rewards given in the other world to a Muslim for fulfilment of one’s religious obligations.  
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examples of how to equally divide bullets between commanders. Secondary school 
religious textbooks presented a very specific Deobandi ideal of being Muslim and 
clearly stated that if someone was not a ‘good Muslim’ then one must kill them. 
History books outlined three key threats to the Prophet Mohamed during his 
lifetime in the seventh century as, non-Sunni Muslims, infidels and communists!  
According to some observers, the unrivalled domination of the post-2001 university 
environment by the Islamist movements have had some important implications for the 
nature students’ politics and the quality of academic debate in the universities. Drawing 
a contrast between the 1960s and the post-2001 periods, a senior university professor in 
Kabul remarked,  
Because Marxism-Leninism was the dominant discourse [during the 1960s], other 
currents had also attempted to show that they were familiar with the literature of 
[European] enlightenment. If Islamic discourses were created, under the influence 
of those literature, [they] tried to present a brighter face of Islam. In other words, 
because of the dominance of the left the level of debate was higher. Unfortunately, 
now it is not the case. Now, the social sciences are presented at a very poor level, 
the level of understanding of students is very low. The dominant discourse and 
literature are unfortunately not enlightening. Even if new ideas such as human 
rights or the like are discussed, [they are presented] as if they are western projects 
(Interview [20]). 
A professor of Kabul University argued that the years of war have pushed what he 
described as enlightening forces (Nairohayi roshangar) to the margin, leaving the centre 
to be occupied by conservative and Islamist forces (Interview [16]). While the distinction 
between ‘enlightening’ and ‘conservative’ forces may carry an ideological undertone, the 
fact is that as a result of the years of war and upheaval, some of the most intellectually 
vibrant movements of the country were entirely marginalised. In short, in comparison to 
the 1960s, when university campuses were dominated by intense rivalries and debates, 
after 2001 the universities are dominated by Islamist and conservative faculties and 
students, with relatively smaller networks of liberal and secular groups. 
The Role of Agency and Resources 
However, ideology explains only part of the approaches of these organisations as its 
significance varies from one group to the other. As an organisation that is deeply 
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influenced by its own literature, Hezb ut-Tahrir is the most ideological of the four groups. 
By contrast, Afghanistan 1400 does not make any references to any overarching ideology 
or prescribe any particular literature to its members. Other key factors that shape the 
organisational approach and mobilisational strategy of these groups are the resource 
endowments of the founders of these groups, and the choices they make to exploit those 
resources. As Fligstein and McAdam (2012, p. 90) argue, 
One of the main factors shaping the eventual structure of a strategic action field 
is the initial distribution of resources in the field. Where resources are highly 
unequally distributed across groups, one would expect that one group or a set of 
dominant groups would be able to impose their will on the field. The resulting 
strategic action field is likely to have a hierarchical structure.  
As organisations, the four groups are embedded within broader socio-economic networks 
with varying levels and types of resources. In its broad conception, the resources that the 
initial networks bring to these organisations also include social and cultural capital. Thus 
in addition to material resources, the networks of founders are also predisposed to and 
familiar with particular organisational knowledge and social mobilisation strategies. The 
initial founders of Afghanistan 1400 were endowed with particular material and socio-
cultural resources that may explain their weak record in establishing a working 
organisational capacity and their particularly rapid change of leaderships. Dominated by 
middle class professionals with broadly equal socio-economic status and material 
conditions, and socialised and networked with one another in non-governmental 
organisations, consulting firms and workshops and conferences, the founders of the 
movement were comparatively less likely to submit to a centralised authority exercised 
by of one their peers. By contrast, the founders of Jamiat-e Eslah had spent several years 
as activists of the mujahedin organisations where leaders commanded respect and 
obedience through their charisma, and centralised and even personal control of resources.  
Beyond the initial distribution of resources, the basic organisational approaches chosen 
by the founders of these organisations also affected their chances of developing a mass 
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following. In this respect, Islamist organisations such as Jamiat-e Eslah invest a great 
amount of time and resources in building an effective organisation. While in Pakistan, 
many founders of the organisation appear to have been deeply exposed to modern 
organisational strategies and tactics through their contacts with Jama’at Islami of Pakistan 
and the activists of the Muslim Brotherhood. Consequently, leading a network of other 
organisations, Jamiat-e Eslah offers a wide range of incentives and entry points for new 
members through its schools, universities, charity organisations, media organisations and 
professional associations (See chapter 6). A senior member of NAJM describe how the 
organisation provides multiple opportunities for various youth groups to join the 
organisation,  
 Beyond completely social-religious circles, we have provided more extensive 
opportunities for the youth in NAJM. For example, if there were young people 
who were interested in entertainment and did not know about Jamiat-e Eslah, they 
knew there are entertainment programmes, for example the youth gathers to go 
for swimming, or they gather to climb a mountain, or Qunduz youth says let’s go 
the Abadan desert for scientific rehla (tour). The type of programme depends on 
the nature and seasons of each province. Similarly, we organise sport activities, 
and have created various football, cricket and volleyball teams. So some young 
people who did not know about Jamiat-e Eslah, they slowly came to know about 
us through football because that was what they were interested in. We also 
provided cultural opportunities, through a cultural association, Resalat Cultural 
Association, through which we gather youth who are interested in writing and 
poetry. Through the opportunities we provided, we helped introduce them to those 
who have experience in writing, and overtime their writing got better. Also we 
provided opportunities for publication of their articles in our magazines, and on 
the Najm website. This was the reason the youth section, became more famous a 
little more and sooner than we expected and it was felt a large number of youth 
are slowly joining Najm (Interview [8]). 
As this quote demonstrates, the organisational approach adopted by Jamiat-e Eslah 
enables it to offer a wide range of incentives to different constituencies.  
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have sought to highlight the role of group level dynamics and agency by 
exploring the organisational approaches and mobilisational strategies of the four groups. 
By focusing on the mechanism of social appropriation, I identified significant variations 
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in how these groups are organised, and how a tendency to adopt a particular organisational 
approach also shapes and constrains these groups’ strategy to expand by appropriating 
resources beyond their internal networks. A major pattern that emerges is that Islamist 
groups of Hezb ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e Eslah have achieved a high level of organisational 
capacity and mobilisational power in comparison to the secular Hezb-e Hambastagi and 
liberal Afghanistan 1400. Does this means that Islamists have an intrinsic advantage over 
their secular rivals? The explanation that emerges is that a range of factors shape social 
appropriation strategies of these groups. First, the broader ideological frameworks of 
these groups predisposes them towards particular courses of social mobilisation. As a 
rejectionist organisation, Hezb ut-Tahrir follows an appropriation strategy that is 
characterised by infiltration of existing institutions and formation of underground cells. 
As a transformationist organisation, Jamiat-e Eslah invests heavily in appropriating and 
inventing resources to establish an alternative networks of social control. As reformist 
and partial rejectionist groups respectively, Afghanistan 1400 and Hezb-e Hambastagi do 
not build structures of mass following. Second, in this chapter I also highlighted the 
resource endowments of the initial founders of these groups as encouraging particular 
social appropriation strategies. The role played by resources in its broadly non-
economistic conception also highlights the agency of these actors in making important 
strategic and tactical choices at important stages of developments of their organisations. 
 
Chapter 9: Taking to the Streets to Demand Security and Public Service 
Introduction  
In the previous three chapters, I sought to expound the dynamics of collective action and 
contention in Afghanistan through detailed analysis of four separate groups. In this 
chapter, I aim to expand the discussion further by providing a detailed analysis of three 
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specific protest activities. In analysis of these events I follow the mechanism-based 
explanation, focusing on mechanisms of collective attribution of threats and 
opportunities, social appropriation, and boundary activation.  
The first section sets the context of the chapter in the broader framework of this thesis by 
discussing the roles of formal organisations and informal social networks in organising 
protest events. The second section introduces the three main protest events of this study. 
The third section identifies the similarities and differences between these events by 
focusing on the mechanisms of collective attribution of threats and opportunities, social 
appropriation and boundary activation. The fourth section provides broader context by 
explaining how these movements emerged between 2014 and 2016, years of rapid decline 
in the Afghan government’s capacity and credibility. The fifth and concluding section 
returns to the main questions of the thesis by exploring how these particular events were 
shaped by the fragility of the Afghan state as well as the centralised presidential system 
that was created by the 2004 constitution.  
The presence and absence of organisations in contentious mobilisations 
The statebuilding enterprise that followed the 2001 US-led military intervention in 
Afghanistan set in motion another period of highly turbulent and contentious politics 
amidst the country’s protracted conflict and violence. While the Taliban and other 
extremist groups challenged the legitimacy and authority of the liberal democratic regime 
through an armed insurgency and violent tactics such as suicide bombings, many other 
groups chose repertoires prescribed by the new liberal democratic system. The latter 
groups formed associations, political parties and formal or informal coalitions to promote 
or defend their interests and values from within the state institutions created by the 2004 
constitution.  
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When formal and institutional politics failed to respond to social demands for inclusion 
and change, many turned to the streets, turning the post-2001 period a period of intense 
and passionate street politics. As reviewed in chapter 2, since the 1970s scholars of social 
movements have recognised the role of formal organisations as well as informal social 
networks in social mobilisation (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Social movement 
organisations play central roles in mobilising resources and people and sustaining protest 
activities over extended periods of time. However, organisations can take different forms, 
ranging from highly centralised and formalised to more flexible and participatory and 
grassroots structures (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, pp. 135-161). The diversity of 
organisational forms in Afghanistan was also illustrated by the four case study groups 
discussed in the previous three chapters.  
The four case study groups demonstrate an effort by various Afghan social and political 
groups to respond to the statebuilding enterprise in Afghanistan after 2001 in a more 
organised fashion. However, many other responses to the idea and practice of 
statebuilding were expressed through more informal social networks that linked wide 
ranges of formal organisations and grassroots activists. These networks of formal 
organisations and informal alliances came together to organise protest events, ranging 
from individual and collective hunger strikes and boycotts, through localised 
demonstration against district government authorities, to more national and even 
transnational mobilisation of people and resources.  
However, not all protest events of this period were organised in response to policies and 
programmes of the Afghan state institutions. Many were organised in response to policies 
or behaviours of foreign actors, including the US and NATO forces that were deployed 
in the country to fight the insurgency and help stabilise the country. For example, in 
February 2012 a series of protests were organised against alleged burning of copies of the 
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Quran at Bagram Airbase, the largest US military base in the country. After several days 
of violent protests in many provinces, which killed more than three dozen, including 4 
Americans, and injured 200 others (King, 2012), President Barak Obama was forced to 
write a formal letter of apology to Afghanistan’s President, Hamid Karzai, to express his 
‘deep regrets’ over the incident (Agence France-Presse, 2012). Still other protest events 
were organised in the diplomatic quarters of Wazir Akbar Khan and Shahr-e Naw of 
Kabul to demand that the international community and the United Nations support certain 
causes. For example, on 5 August 2007, more than a hundred women, widowed during 
the years of war, gathered outside the UN office to demand accountability for crimes 
perpetrated during the war (Agence France-Presse, 2007). Nonetheless, over time most 
protest events were organised to influence the policies and programmes of the Afghan 
state institutions. After its opening on the Darul Aman Road of Kabul in 2005, the 
National Assembly became a popular destination of regular protest rallies, petition 
campaigns and hunger strikes. For example, in October 2011, Simin Barakzai, a woman 
member of parliament from the western province of Herat, went on a 19-day hunger strike 
outside the parliament to protest against her disqualification from her parliamentary seat 
after an investigation into voter fraud in the 2010 parliamentary elections (Reuters, 2011). 
Barakzai’s hunger strike, which attracted significant public attention and media coverage, 
became an important precedent for a collective hunger strike by some 80 students of the 
Social Science Faculty of Kabul University. These students began their week-long strike 
on 20 May 2013 in front of the Parliament Building to demand reforms in Kabul 
University. The student protest, which attracted widespread support from civil society 
groups, led to rival protests by other students who opposed the demands for reform, which 
included removal of certain members of the faculty (Ibrahimi, 2013).  
The National Assembly as a site of protest offered protestors an important opportunity to 
gain political and media attention. However, as discussed in chapter 5, the parliament in 
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Afghanistan was a weak institution. Dominated by independent members with weak 
political affiliations and few programmatic or policy agendas, and overshadowed by the 
powers of the president’s office in the country’s highly centralised presidential system, 
the parliament had little influence over government policies. Consequently, for those 
protesters demanding change in government policies or programmes, the Presidential 
Palace, known as Arg, in the centre of the city is a favourite destination.  
From Single Events to Campaigns of Protests 
While most protests remained localised and ephemeral, ending with single acts of protest, 
others involved coordination of multiple events at national and transnational scales and 
over extended periods of time. In the words of Tilly (2004), these movements combine 
‘campaigns’, special social movement ‘repertoire’ with sustained public display of 
‘WUNC’ which he described as the following:.  
 ‘worthiness: sober demeanor; neat clothing; presence of clergy, dignitaries, and 
mothers with children;  
 unity: matching badges, headbands, banners, or costumes; marching in ranks; 
singing and chanting; 
 numbers: headcounts, signatures on petitions, messages from constituents, filling 
streets; 
 commitment: braving bad weather; visible participation by the old and handi-
capped; resistance to repression; ostentatious sacrifice, subscription, and/or 
benefaction’ (Tilly, 2004, p. 4). 
To explain the dynamics of the shift from single events of protests to sustained campaigns 
with western-style social movement repertoires, I will discuss the following three 
movements in greater details.  
The protests and counter-protests over the killing of Fakhunda March 2015 
One of the largest social mobilisations of the post-2001 period in Afghanistan was 
triggered by the mob killing of Farkhunda Malikzadah in the afternoon of Thursday 19 
March 2014. While visiting the Shahi Du Shamshirah shrine in the centre of Kabul, 
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Malikzadah, a 27-year old woman was accused by Zain Al-Abidin, a 57-year old 
attendant of the shrine, of having desecrated the Quran by burning copies of it. The shrine 
is one of the oldest and most popular of its kind in the centre of the city. The accusation 
mobilised a spontaneous mob of mostly young men who began beating Malikzadah and 
dragging her around the shrine before driving a car over her unconscious body and then 
finally setting her body alight. The acceptance of the accusations of Quran burning went 
beyond those who participated in the killing. A number of prominent officials and 
religious figures supported the killing. These included Simin Ghazal Hasanzadah, a 
woman who served as Deputy Minister of Information and Culture, Zalmai Zabuli, Chair 
of Complaints Commission of Meshrano Jirga, the Upper House of the Afghan 
Parliament, and Hashmat Istanekzai, a spokesman of Kabul Police, and Mawlawi Ayaz 
Nayazi, the Imam of Wazir Muhammad Akbar Khan Mosque in the diplomatic 
neighbourhood of Kabul (Aman, 2015). Furthermore, even the Kabul Police department 
appears to have accepted the accusation of Quran burning. In a move to defuse tension, 
police officials asked the family of Farkhunda to report to media that she was mentally ill 
(Goldstein & Shakib, 2015).  
The horror of the killing became apparent after the crowd dispersed and some of the 
participants shared footages of the incident on their social media platforms, including 
many who acknowledged their own role in it. These social media footages were 
subsequently used to arrest 22 suspects (Khamush, 2015). Despite the initial confusion 
and support for the killing, the broader social response quickly turned to collective moral 
outrage and indignation. Such brutal killing of a young woman in broad daylight, in the 
presence of police officers, and in an area only about two kilometres away from the 
presidential palace, shocked the entire country. For obvious reasons, Kabul’s professional 
women and rights activists were among the most outraged. A woman rights activists 
described her own shock and horror the moment she received the news.  
P a g e  | 251 
 
It was one of the last days of the year. My husband returned home and said “I 
think a woman has been set alight at the Shahe Du Shamshirah Wali”. I asked, 
“Why?” in shock. He said: “it is said that she has burnt a Quran”. [I said to myself] 
“Oh my God. No sane human being does this. She was either psychologically ill 
or it is a lie” (Interview [33]). 
As details of the killings circulated, Farkhunda became the symbol of intense debates 
over the situation of women in the country. Some of the country’s major newspapers 
dedicated special issues to bring together activists, journalists and poets to discuss the 
incident, (Etilaatroz Daily, 2015; Hasht-e Sobh Daily, 2016), major television networks 
organised extensive talk shows and produced documentary films and investigative reports 
about Farkhunda and the situation of women in the country more generally (BBC 
Newsnight, 2015; Saba Television, 2016; Parsa & Sabawun, 2017), and several groups 
took to the streets of Kabul and other provinces of the country to protest the government’s 
failure to protect women.  
However, while the collective shock and anger mobilised the public in opposition to 
violence against women, the social mobilisation that followed also exposed the country’s 
deep social divisions. In the course of one week after the incident, several protest events 
were organised in Kabul and other provinces. The burial of Farkhunda on 22 March 
became a major public protest event in itself. It drew thousands of people who 
spontaneously turned the event into a major occasion for expression of anger over the 
killing as well as over the religious figures and politicians who had initially approved the 
killing. In a highly powerful symbolic act of protest, dozens of young women activists 
assumed leadership of the event. As one participant said,  
The moment we arrived, her [Farkhunda’s) father was trying to take her body off 
the ambulance. We did not let him do that. We said, “Dear father! This body does 
not belong to you; it belongs to the women of Afghanistan” (Interview [33]). 
The women carried the coffin of Farkhunda on their own shoulders to the cemetery, 
refusing to allow the male participants to touch her coffin. In a move that further enraged 
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many conservative ulema, the participants refused to allow Nayazi, the Imam of Wazir 
Akbar Khan Mosque, to join the ceremony even though he had subsequently changed his 
initial remarks in support of the killing. These were highly symbolic acts of protest in a 
country where traditionally burial services are usually dominated by men and led by a 
cleric.  
Over the following days three major demonstrations were organised in Kabul. These 
events became symptomatic of the broader social and political responses to the incident. 
First, on 22 March, a day after the burial service, the first demonstration was organised 
by Hezb-e Hambastagi Afghanistan and Belqis Roshan, a former woman member of 
Meshrano Jirga, the Upper House of Afghan Parliament, from the province of Farah. 
Hundreds of members and supporters of the party gathered outside the Shah-e Du 
Shamshira shrine and marched through the street where Farkhunda was murdered. The 
demonstration ended with a pronouncement of a statement and planting of a tree at the 
location where Farkhunda’s body was set alight.  
The second major demonstration was organised on 24 March by a group that described 
itself as Faa’lin-e madani wa shahrwandan-e Kabul, Civil Activists and Citizens of 
Kabul. In contrast to the other two main protests, it was organised outside the Supreme 
Court. The event, which was organised by a range of groups and grassroots activists, 
attracted several thousand participants, becoming the largest single social mobilisation 
against this particular incident. The organisers included many former members of 
Afghanistan 1400 as well as members of a range of non-governmental organisations and 
political groups.13 However, the organisers decided to make the event as non-partisan and 
inclusive as possible. In my interviews, organisers of this demonstration described how 
                                                          
13 These former members of Afghanistan 1400 had parted ways with the movement after 
disagreements emerged over the movement’s strategy in 2014 (See chapter 6). 
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they deliberately avoided employing languages or symbols that could associate the event 
with any established social and political groups, including women rights NGOs. For 
example, participants were actively discouraged from holding banners and placards 
carrying the names and arms of existing political parties and NGOs, Similarly, prominent 
politicians were not listed as speakers in the conclusion of the event (Associated Press, 
2015).  
The third ally was organised on 26 March by a relatively unknown group called Majma-
e Tansiq-e Ulemay-e Afghanistan, the Forum of Organisation of Scholars of Afghanistan. 
The forum was led by Mawlawi Enayatullah Baligh, a politician and religious figure who 
was nominated by President Karzai as Minister of Haj and Religious Endowments in 2010 
but failed to secure the vote of confidence from the parliament. Baligh also served as 
Imam of the Pul-e Kheshti Mosque in the centre of Kabul. The rally brought together 
several imams of mosques and other religious figures along with several hundreds of their 
supporters. Similar to the Hezb-e Hambastagi, this group also chose the Shah-e Du 
Shamshira as the site for their rally. As will be discussed further below, the organisers of 
this demonstration combined the condemnation of the killing with a defense of the ulema 
and religious establishment against public criticism after the killing.  
Despite their important differences, these protests radically changed the public opinions 
towards the killing of Farkhunda, and forced the government to take action against the 
perpetrators. President Ghani formed a special commission to investigate the incident. 
The commission did not find any evidence of burning of the Quran by Farkhunda. In the 
meantime, the police arrested 49 suspects, including 18 police personnel. In the first trial 
of the suspects on 6 May 2015, four primary culprits, including Zain Al-Abidin, the shrine 
attendant, were given death sentences, 8 others were given 16-years prison terms, and 
four police officers were given one-year prison terms.  
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However, as documented in a detailed report by Alissa Rubin of the New York Times 
(2015), the initial momentum for prosecution of the perpetrators was lost in subsequent 
phases of the trial. Subsequent court proceedings were organised in the absence of the 
family of Farkhunda or their attorney, and there were major flaws in every step of the 
process. On 30 June 2015, the Appeal Court in Kabul changed the decisions of the 
Primary Court, reducing the death penalties for the four primary perpetrators to prison 
terms, and giving similar lighter sentences to others. According to a detailed investigation 
by by Hasht-e Sobh Daily and Payk (2017), a centre of investigative journalism in Kabul, 
in February 2017 only 11 of the civilians were still held in prison and all others were set 
free.  
Protests against the killing of the Zabul Seven: November 2015 
On 11 November 2015, Kabul saw one of the largest demonstrations in its history. The 
demonstration was organised in protest against killing of seven civilian Hazaras by 
militant groups in the southern province of Zabul. The seven victims, who became known 
as the Zabul Seven (Tolo News, 2015b), included Shukria a 9-year old girl along with her 
father, mother and brother. They were among dozens of civilian Hazaras who were 
kidnapped from buses and cars while travelling on various roads across the country 
(Goldstein & Shah, 2015). The Zabul Seven were abducted on 13 October while travelling 
on the road in the southern province of Zabul. After several weeks of captivity, on 7 
November 2015 bodies of the victims were found on the road side in an area outside 
government control. It was not clear which particular group was responsible for the 
abduction and killing as the area was contested by two factions of the Taliban and a group 
of foreign militants that were reported to have established links to the ISIS. Although in 
most reports the ISIS was blamed for the killing (Mashal & Shah, 2015; Reuters, 2015), 
the Taliban movement also has a long history of persecuting the Hazaras (Ibrahimi, 2017).  
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Regardless of which group was responsible, the killing became a rallying cry for 
expression of popular frustrations that were building up over the government’s inability 
to provide security. After the bodies of the victims were given to the officials in Zabul, 
the government planned to hand them over to their family members for burial in their 
home district of Jaghuri in Ghazni province. However, a spontaneously-organised group 
of activists in Kabul and Ghazni opposed the immediate burial of the victims. Instead, 
they demanded that the corpses be brought to Kabul where they also planned a 
demonstration against the government’s failure to protect the civilians against terrorist 
violence.  
The organisers of the protest faced formidable challenges. Time was of critical 
importance as according to Islamic traditions, dead bodies must be buried as quickly as 
possible. Within a period of two days, the organisers needed to organise transfer of the 
bodies of the victims through the highly insecure 150-km road from Ghazni to Kabul and 
plan what turned out to be one of the largest demonstrations in the city’s history. Thus, in 
addition to government reluctance and opposition, there were genuine security concerns 
that the predominantly Hazara convoy that accompanied the coffins could come under 
attack by the insurgents along the Ghazni-Kabul highway.  
What triggered the decision to organise a protest could not be ascertained. Some of the 
activists I interviewed claimed that a single post on Facebook mobilised the initial 
network of activists into action. Nonetheless, on 8 November the call for protest circulated 
through social media networks and on 9 November a network of activists was mobilised 
in Kabul and Ghazni; activists in Ghazni had secured the support of families of the 
victims. Before heading towards Kabul on 10 November, some two thousand people 
gathered to protest the killing in the city of Ghazni (Andalid, 2015). On the evening of 10 
November 2015, when the bodies of the victims arrived in Kabul, I was also in the city, 
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and thus had the opportunity to observe the event, beginning with preparation meetings 
that took place a night before the demonstration. The convoy of Hazara activists and 
family members took the coffins to the Musallaye- Shahid Mazari, a wide open space that 
is designated for mass prayers such as Eid prayers. Located in the Dasht-i Barchi district 
of Kabul, over the years the centre has also become the main venue for mass social and 
political gatherings of the Hazaras of the city (See below). 
As planned, on the morning of 11 November the crowd began marching from Musallay-
i Shahid Mazari towards the presidential palace. As it moved along the 10-km route, the 
crowd grew larger, attracting thousands of participants, including a significant number of 
participants from among other ethnic groups. By mid-day, the crowd of tens of thousands 
of participants had reached Pashtunistan Square outside the Presidential Palace.  
The sheer number and diversity of the participants of the event encouraged many 
commentators to see in the movement the signs of a new national solidarity against 
violence and terrorism and even a new ‘shift’ in politics of the country. For example, 
Robert Crews (2015), a long-term observer of Afghanistan argued that, 
The protests in Afghanistan—the largest popular demonstrations ever in the 
country—reflect a dramatic shift in Afghan politics. Inspired by many causes and 
ideologies, Afghans are mobilizing against their government on a scale that is 
unprecedented in the country’s history. 
While the protestors were united by a shared demand for security and outrage against 
terrorism (Yunespour, 2015), as the crowd grew the demonstration became an amalgam 
of social and political groups with different agendas and interests. This high level 
diversity of the participants had particularly important implications for collective 
representation of the demonstration and framing of their demands. The final resolution of 
the protest, which I had observed being drafted by a small group of organisers late on the 
previous evening, was clearly based on the primary concerns and security challenges 
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facing the Hazara community. Even among the Hazaras, the event was an amalgamation 
of several groups with different interests and agendas. As noted by van Bijlert (2015), 
The demonstration, which continued well into the night, became an amalgam of 
emotions and agendas: grief and horror over the attacks; defiance against 
brutality; exasperation over the perceived non-responsiveness of the government; 
calls for greater security, alongside the airing of more localised demands; and, 
possibly, among some, a hope to further undermine the government. The 
government initially focused mainly on the latter part, largely treating the 
demonstration as a threat and a slight, while ignoring the underlying emotions that 
brought so many people who had no direct link to the victims on the streets 
There was also an important confusion about how to end the protest. The confusion was 
also reinforced by how the government responded to it. In the words of van Bijlert (2015) 
the government responded ‘first with silence, then with a fairly impersonal presidential 
speech in the late afternoon and finally, around 9 pm, in a televised meeting with a 
delegation representing the protesters, which seemed a touch more acerbic than 
necessary’.  
The televised meeting at 9 pm was organised after some protestors had crossed the wall 
surrounding the Arg and a number of other important government offices. As the crowd 
gathered outside the presidential palace, in the early afternoon some younger participants 
began discussing the idea of climbing the high concrete walls that surround the Arg. 
Others suggested the idea of an indefinite sit-in in the Pashtunistan Square. Towards the 
end of the day, while many protestors dispersed several hundred remained outside the 
Arg. In the early hours of the evening some of those who remained managed to get into 
the Office of Administrative Affairs. In response, the Presidential Guards opened fire in 
the air, which was reported to have injured several protestors (Harooni, 2015).  
At the 9 pm meeting, President Ghani, and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah along with 
Sarwar Danish, and Muhammad Mohaqeq, both Hazaras and second Vice-President and 
second Deputy CEO respectively, met with a particular group of representatives of the 
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demonstrators. The group included Hazara members of parliament from the district of 
Jaghuri along with a few representatives of Shi’a ulema and elders of village of Dah 
Murdah from which the seven victims came. Consequently, the younger activists who 
organised the protest and represented more diverse socio-political groups were excluded. 
These activists framed the killing as part of a broader government failure to protect the 
civilians. By promoting village and district-level representatives as leaders of the protest 
the government also turned it into a local issue.  
Nonetheless, the meeting which was broadcast live on the Radio and Television of 
Afghanistan, proved to be highly contentious. Bashir Fahimi, a cleric and representative 
of Ayatulah Fayyaz, a Hazara and one of the most prominent religious authority based in 
Najaf, harshly criticised Ghani on a range of issues, including by pointing out to lack of 
Hazaras among the staff of the president’s office. President Ghani spoke at great length 
defending his government’s record in making every possible effort to secure release of 
the hostages. To the surprise of the Hazara activists, the strongest defense of the 
government came from Muhammad Mohaqeq. In his speech, Mohaqeq lashed out at the 
organisers of the demonstration, defending President Ghani against the accusation of 
indifference towards the abduction of civilian Hazaras and pointing to the broader 
suffering of all communities in the country. He accused them of ‘exploiting the bloods of 
martyrs’ to mobilise people against the government. More specifically, he claimed some 
of the organisers were motivated by their failures in the elections or secure jobs in the 
National Unity Government (Tolo News, 2015c).  
The Enlightenment Movement 
In May 2016, the Enlightenment Movement (Jonbesh-e Roshanayee) emerged in 
response to a cabinet decision to change the route of a 500 kV trans-regional electricity 
transmission line that was designed to import electricity from Central Asian republics to 
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Afghanistan and then Pakistan in South Asia. Known as TUTAP after the name of the 
participating countries (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan) 
the line was funded by the Asian Development Bank.14 The initiative was part of 
Afghanistan’s Power Sector Master Plan, a detailed plan for expansion of electricity 
services prepared in 2013 by Fichtner, a German consulting firm. The plan, which was 
also funded by the ADB, had recommended that the TUTAP line pass through the Central 
Highland region of Hazarajat, going through the Hazara-majority province of Bamyan 
before reaching Kabul. The other alternative route would go through the Salang Pass in 
the north of Kabul. Assessing the comparative advantages of both routes, the report 
suggested that ‘The Bamyan route will avoid the narrow space and difficulties along the 
Salang Pass, will allow connecting further generation by coal fired power plants along 
the route and will secure power supply of Kabul and south Afghanistan by using a 
separate route (Fichtner GmbH & Co. KG, 2013, p. 3).  
In January 2016, disagreements first emerged within the National Unity Government after 
the Ministry of Power and Energy and Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), the 
state-owned electricity company, decided to reroute the line through the Salang Pass. The 
intra-government disagreements first became public after a letter of Vice-President 
Sarwar Danish to DABS was published by Etillatroz Daily. In the letter, after assessing 
the technical, economic and environmental advantages of the Bamyan over the Salang 
route Danish (2016) argued that changing the route  
does not have any reasonable technical and economic justification, and is in 
contradictions with national interests, and [principles of] balanced development, 
social justice and other values enshrined in Afghanistan’s constitution, and [thus] 
                                                          
14 TUTAP was one of the two main trans-regional electricity lines that aimed to import electricity 
from the energy-rich Central Asian republics to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The other major line 
is CASA-1000 which is funded by the World Bank to bring electricity from Kyrghz Republic and 
Turkmenistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan. See podcasts of presentations of the projects by ADB 
and World Bank experts in an event organised by the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies in Washington (Centre for Strategic and International Studies 2014).  
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is not approvable by me. And the people of the central regions have repeatedly 
expressed their opposition to it, and have shared their reasonable demands with 
the government. Now, the respected Ministry of Energy and Water and the 
respected corporation of DABS must reconsider its master plan (because as it was 
mentioned some provinces were not included in the Master Plan), and execute the 
third line for transition of the 500 kV electricity from Pul-e Khumri to Bamyan 
through the province of Bamyan so that concentration of multiple electricity lines 
in an incident-prone route such as Salang is avoided [My translation]. 
In combining the demand for balanced national development with economic, technical 
and environmental reasons, Danesh’s letter was symptomatic of arguments by protestors 
who dominated the movement. The movement was built around a collective narrative, 
which among other things, was publicized through frequent public statements and 
resolutions that were issued by its Shuray-e aali mardumi, or People’s Supreme Council 
and widely shared through social media. Between 1 May 2016 and 4 May 2017, the 
movement issued 50 separate statements and resolutions, which in July 2017 they were 
preparing to publish as a volume called goftaman-e roshanayee (Jonbesh-e Roshanayee, 
2017). Besides the demand for balanced national development, the organisers of the 
protest emphasised the broader advantages of the Bamyan route over the Salang Pass, 
highlighting its significance for the national economy of the country, and increasing the 
security of energy supply for cities such as Kabul by adding an alternative route to the 
avalanche-prone Salang route. Two such reasons cited by movement in its first statement 
on 3 May 2016 are worth highlighting here. First, the statement argued that extension of 
the power line through Bamyan had important additional advantages for the national 
economy of the country. They argued the line could make sufficient electricity available 
for extraction of the country’s largest iron ore deposit in Hajigak in Wardak province15. 
                                                          
15 In 2011, a $10 billion contract for extraction of four blocks of the Hajigak mine, one of the 
largest untapped deposits of its kind in the world, was awarded to a consortium of Indian 
companies led by the Steel Authority of India. However, because of subsequent worsening of 
security conditions, the company did not make any actual investment in extraction of the mine. 
In May 2015, Indian press reported that the consortium was considering withdrawing from the 
project altogether. The report was subsequently rejected by Indian authorities ((The Times of 
India 2015). 
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Furthermore, they argued the electricity transmitted through the line could be used to 
generate even more domestic electricity by activating coal-fired power plants near coal 
deposits in Bamyan and Samangan provinces. Second, the statement pointed to 
environmental Hazarads of the Salang Route, highlighting the Salang Pass’s narrow 
valley and long winter and heavy snowfalls. They argument was that extension of all lines 
through the treacherous mountains would make Kabul and other regions in the south of 
the Hindukush completely dependent on a single route which was highly vulnerable to 
avalanches. As a result, they argued that another line through Bamyan would reduce the 
risk associated with overdependence on the Salang Route (Jonbesh-e Roshanayee, 2017, 
pp. 17-19).  
Many prominent organisers of the movement participated in several television 
programmes where they debated with government officials, challenging the rationale for 
changing the route. In response, in a series of debates on television networks (Tolo News, 
2016a; Khurshid TV, 2016) government officials cited pragmatic and practical reasons. 
They cited a different document by Fichtner which recommended Salang as a cheaper 
and faster route. Government officials also argued that preparation for the Salang route 
was already underway as the project was already designed and ready to be tendered. For 
example, in a video statement on 9 May 2016 President Ghani argued  
This project, which was supposed to have started a long time ago and already be 
operational by 2016, was delayed for several years. At this juncture, we had to 
consider the development opportunity cost. As our financial resources are sadly 
insufficient, our current dependence on funding has meant that our options 
regarding national projects are also limited and dependent on conditions, which 
are presented mostly with a particular perspective of economic rationality. For 
this reason, we had to use this last chance and deadline and take the final steps 
towards the implementation of this national project in order not to lose this 
important development opportunity (Ruttig, 2016). 
For organisers of the movements, these economic, technical and environmental 
arguments were underpinned by an underlining factor that was central to the claim of the 
movement: a government policy of discrimination against the historically-persecuted 
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Hazara people of the country. Although the movement was formed around claims of 
discrimination against Hazaras and thus had a strong ethnic element from the outset, the 
ethnic identity and rhetoric of the movement gained greater salience over time. Initially, 
leaders of the protest framed the claim around the provisions of the country’s 2004 
Constitution that demand the government to ensure enkeshaf-e mutawazen, or balanced 
development at the national level. Thus, the core argument was that by excluding the 
Hazara regions from major infrastructural projects, the government was violating its 
obligation of ensuring balanced national development. Over time, the movement placed 
greater and clearer emphasis on the rerouting of the electricity line as an example of 
broader discrimination against Hazaras of the country. Beginning with its statement 
number 9, the movement began referring to fighting ‘systematic discrimination’ as one 
of its primary goals (Jonbesh-e Roshanayee, 2017, p. 34). The shift from rational and 
technical claim-making towards more open assertion of systematic discrimination against 
the Hazaras occurred through a series of events in which the movement organisers 
interacted with the government while trying to build its constituency and respond to its 
critics. The following main events16 were central to a chain of organisers’ protest and 
government responses that shaped the movement’s identity and rhetoric.  
 On 9 January, the first protest against the rerouting of the line was organised in 
Bamyan. 
 In response to mounting criticism, on 11 January the National Unity Government 
formed a technical committee, consisting of representatives of DABS, the 
Ministry of Energy and Water and the office of Vice-President Danesh, to reassess 
the advantages and disadvantages of each route. The committee submitted its 
report to the government on 10 March, which presented the government with two 
                                                          
16 The description of these events are based on Ruttig (2016) and other media sources.  
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options: TUTAP be built through Bamyan, or continue through Salang Pass but a 
separate 220 KV line be extended from the TUTAP line from Baghlan to Bamyan.  
 On 30 April, the cabinet approved the Salang Route. 
 On 6 May, the first significant demonstration was organised in Bamyan under the 
name of Junbeshe-e Roshanayee followed by similar protests in Day Kundi and 
Herat provinces.  
 On 9 May, the movement’s High People’s Council held its first major gathering 
in Musallay-e Shahid Mazari. The event was attended by all major Hazara 
political groups, including Vice-President Danesh and Deputy CEO Mohammad 
Mohaqiq, and former Vice-President Karim Khalili. In a highly symbolic act, 
these former and current government officials left the podium to sit on the ground 
among the people.  
 On 12 May, supporters of the movement organised a protest in London where 
President Ghani was attending a major anti-corruption summit. On the same day, 
three Hazara activists disrupted President Ghani’s speech at the Royal United 
Services Institute (Sengupta, 2016); 
 On 14 May, 31 mostly Hazara members of Wolesi Jirga, the Lower House of the 
National Assembly, walked out of the parliament in protest against the 
government decision to reroute TUTAP.  
 On 15 May, President Ghani suspended work on the Salang route and announces 
another 13-member National Commission to re-assess the routes of the power 
line. The commission would include some of the organisers of the movement. The 
High People’s Council of the movement declared revocation of the rerouting 
decision as a precondition for any negotiations.  
 On 16 May, the movement’s first major demonstration attracted tens of thousands 
of participants. The protestors gathered from various predominantly Hazara 
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neighbourhoods of West Kabul before marching towards the Presidential Palace 
through the Deh Mazang Square, one of the two narrow valleys that connect the 
west of the city with its administrative and commercial centre. The government 
responded by closing off all streets leading to the Presidential Palace by erecting 
barriers with some 560 separate shipping containers (Tolo News, 2016b). Vice-
President Danesh and Deputy CEO Muhammad Mohaqeq did not participate in 
the demonstration, marking the first major split in the movement between the two 
major Hazara officials in the government and the protestors. 
What is clear is that by May 2016, the Enlightenment Movement had emerged as a fully-
fledged social and political movement, presenting the government with one of its most 
sustained grass-roots challenges. The 16 May demonstration was a highly critical event 
in the trajectory of the movement. On the one hand, it marked a major fracture in the 
initial consensus among the Hazara elites as Danesh and Mohaqeq parted ways with the 
movement, henceforth becoming major objects of criticism and ridicule by the movement 
supporters. Karim Khalili and Sadeq Modabber, second Vice-President and Head of 
Administrative Affairs in the Karzai government, respectively, withdrew from the 
movement ahead of its second major demonstration on 23 July. On the other, the popular 
turnout in the demonstration encouraged a younger generation of politicians and activists 
to stay the course.  
Those who left the movement were partly motivated by the government’s offer to 
negotiate and partly by a fear of rise of a new generation of activists who threatened the 
hegemony of the dominant Hazara political elites over the political representation of the 
Hazaras. The National Commission announced by President Ghani on 15 May included 
six Hazara members, including Ahmad Behzad, a leading organiser of the movement and 
a Hazara member of parliament from the western province of Herat. However, only one 
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of the six Hazara members accepted the appointment, which led to appointment of three 
pro-government Hazaras to the commission on 18 May (Bjelica & Ruttig, 2016). On 24 
May, the National Commission presented its report to the President, which as organisers 
of the movement had suspected, confirmed the previous cabinet decision. Citing the 
previous government reasons, the report concluded  
Neutrally assessing the trajectory of events and expressed opinions for and against 
the two routes, the commission has come to believe that the recommendation of 
the Fichtner company in its first report (although it was not based on field 
investigation) on the preference of Bamyan route looks more logical, and probably 
it was better that the relevant agencies had acted upon it. However, over the past 
three years the events have developed to a direction that today it is impossible to 
reverse to the initial position (Etilaatroz Daily, 2016b) [My translation]. 
The commission also recommended that the government upgrade the alternative line for 
Bamyan by increasing its capacity to 300 megawatt electricity for the entire region of 
Hazarajat. While the commission’s recommendations strengthened the position of 
Hazaras in the government, for the younger members of the movement it appears to have 
had the effect of confirming their suspicion that the government was using negotiation to 
derail the movement without genuinely renegotiating the 30 April cabinet decision. 
Henceforth, the intra-Hazara conflict assumed greater significance in the politics of the 
movement. The High People’s Council continued meeting and issuing statements without 
the representatives of Vice-President Danish and Deputy CEO Mohaqeq.  
In July, the confrontation between the Hazara officials in the government and the 
movement intensified further. On 10 and 11 July, Danesh and Mohaqeq issued separate 
statements criticising the movement. In response the Enlightenment Movement issued 
another statement (Statement 21) in which it accused the government of ‘continuing a 
policy of “divide and rule”’ and aiming to reduce ‘advocacy of the Enlightenment 
Movement to an erosive and trivial intra-ethnic conflict’ (Jonbesh-e Roshanayee, 2017, 
p. 68). Further, the movement argued that  
P a g e  | 266 
 
Our target is the government of Afghanistan, regardless of the ethnicity of state 
officials. Ethnicity is not an issue here. If we address the President and the Chief 
Executive Officer, it is because of their authorities and responsibilities, not their 
ethnic identities’ (Jonbesh-e Roshanayee, 2017, pp. 69-70). 
To maintain the social momentum, the activists continued gathering at the Mosallay-e 
Shahid Mazari throughout June and July. Declaring the nights of Ramadan (6 June – 6 
July 2016) as nights of enlightenment they continued gathering at the Mosalla. On 8 July, 
during a major gathering on the occasion of Eid, which it called enlightenment Eid, the 
movement gave the government two weeks to revoke the 30 April cabinet decision. If not 
heeded, it threatened to organise an open-ended demonstration (Jonbesh-e Roshanayee, 
2017, p. 64). As might have been expected, the government did not revoke the 
government decision. In response, the movement announced 23 July 2015 as the date for 
an unlimited demonstration, beginning with marches from 10 separate routes towards the 
Presidential Palace (Jonbesh-e Roshanayee, 2017, pp. 72-73). The 23 July demonstration 
attracted several thousand people but as it reached the Deh Mazang Square it encountered 
barriers set up by the government, using shipping containers. While most of the 
demonstrators dispersed after 1.30 pm, several hundred remained, intending to set up a 
tent at the square. Within minutes after 2.30 pm, the remaining crowd was attacked by 
two suicide bombers, who ISIS claimed were its members. According to a subsequent 
UN investigation, the first attacker who managed to explode his suicide vest killed 85 
people and injured 413 others. The second attacker died by partial detonation of his own 
explosive vest (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2016, p. 8).  
The attack on the peaceful gathering raised many questions about the future of peaceful 
protest movements in the country. For one thing, it made clear that the outcome of protest 
movements was not shaped by interaction between protest movements and the 
government alone. Anti-state forces such as the ISIS and the Taliban were as opposed to 
the government as to peaceful activism of a rising generation of activists and politicians 
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who saw their future in the success of the liberal-democratic state. Among the supporters 
and critics of the movement, the attack raised some hard questions. Some asked whether 
in view of such risks the movement leaders were culpable in exposing large numbers of 
people to such lethal attack. In fact, one day before the demonstration, the government 
reportedly had warned the leaders of movement of ‘a credible but non-specific terrorist 
threat’ (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2016, p. 4) in Kabul for which 
the demonstration could become a target. The argument was subsequently taken by other 
critics of the movement, including those associated with Muhammad Mohaqeq to attack 
the organisers of the protest. However, it is clear that leaders of the movement did not 
heed the warning of security threats as they suspected the government would use security 
warnings as a ploy to neutralise the movement.  
Rising Protests amidst Declining Government Capacity and Credibility 
How did these three protest movements emerge in this particular period of the history of 
Afghanistan? This is an important question to ask because these movements became the 
largest social protests since the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. Furthermore, 
they emerged in a period when the post-2001 statebuilding enterprise faced its most 
formidable security, socio-economic and political challenges. The years 2014-16 saw 
rapid declines in government credibility and capacity, marked by shrinking security space 
and deteriorating socio-economic conditions. In 2014, Afghanistan experienced three 
major transitions. First was a presidential election that would facilitate the first change of 
leadership of the post-2001 highly centralised presidential system. Hamid Karzai, who 
had served as President of the Interim and Transitional Administration (December-2001-
December 2004) and later as popularly elected President, following elections in 2004 and 
2009, was barred by the constitution from running for another term. Second, a military 
and security transition that followed the drawdown of the US and NATO forces and 
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transfer of the overall security responsibility of the country to the Afghan security forces. 
Third, an economic transition resulted from sudden implosion of the war economy and 
reduction of foreign aid that followed the withdrawal of most of the US and NATO forces. 
The effects of these transitions combined to create a highly volatile political, security and 
economic environment (Maley, 2016).  
The first round of the presidential elections on 5 April 2014 failed to produce a clear 
winner with more than 50 percent of the votes. The results of the run-off on 14 June 
between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, the two front runners who had secured 45 
and 31.5 precent of the vote respectively, placed Ghani ahead of Abdullah who then 
accused the electoral commission of orchestrating mass fraud in favour of his rival. The 
results, which some international observers estimated contained more than 2 million 
fraudulent votes (Goldstein, 2014), were so tainted by fraud and irregularities that several 
weeks of audits by a team of international experts could not determine the actual winner 
of the vote. The political crisis that followed stopped short of a civil war after a political 
agreement, mediated by the then US Secretary of State, John Kerry, brought the two 
contenders together in a government of national unity. Ghani became the President and 
Abdullah was given the semi-prime ministerial role of Chief Executive Officer 
(International Crisis Group, 2017). 
Beset by deep internal disagreements and factionalism, the National Unity Government 
faced rapidly shrinking economy and mounting insurgency (International Crisis Group, 
2017). Ghani, a former World Bank official, was accused by many of centralising power 
in a small group of mainly Ghilzai Pashtuns and running the government in highly 
autocratic manner (Constable, 2016). As figure 1 shows, the country’s annual GDP 
growth, which was highly volatile throughout the post-2001 period, fell from 14.4 in 2012 
to just 1.3 and 1.1 percent in 2014 and 2015 respectively. Similarly, the security 
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conditions deteriorated significantly, with the Afghan Security Forces losing control of 
large numbers of districts. In May 2017, the US Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that 59.7 percent of Afghanistan’s 407 districts were 
under government control or influence. Another 45 districts were under the insurgent’s 
control or influence and some 119 districts were contested by both the insurgents and the 
government forces (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2016, p. 
88). The figures showed that the Afghan government control or influence over its districts 
had declined by 15 percent since the end of 2015 (International Crisis Group, 2017, p. 
13). 
Figure 2:  Annual GDP Growth in Afghanistan, 2003-2016. Source: World Development 
Indicators 2016 
 
The civilian population of Afghanistan bore the brunt of the armed conflict. As 
documented by the UN (2017), between 2009 and December 2016, the conflict led to 
killing of 24,841 civilians and injury of 45,347 others. According to the same UN report 
3,498 were killed and 7920 others were injured in 2016 alone (p. 3). While most civilian 
casualties occurred in the course of active armed conflicts or during insurgent attacks on 
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government and foreign military targets, in 2015 the insurgents began deliberately 
targeting civilian Hazaras. The same UN report also noted that in 2015, the insurgents 
abducted 226 Hazaras in 26 separate incidents (pp. 67-68). The number of such 
abductions dropped to 16 incidents in 2016 but the militant groups stepped up their attacks 
on Hazara targets in Kabul and other cities (pp. 34-35). These attacks, which included the 
23 July suicide bombing of the Enlightenment Movement rally, killed and injured 
hundreds of Hazaras, greatly straining relations between the Hazara activists and the 
National Unity Government.  
Figure 3: Level of Optimism in the Future Direction of Afghanistan. Source: The Asia 
Foundation Survey of the Afghan People (2016) 
 
Not surprisingly, as figure 2 shows the effects of the deteriorating security and weakening 
government capacity and credibility was most clearly reflected in popular optimism about 
the future direction of the country. According to the Asia Foundation’s annual Survey of 
the Afghan People, the number of people who believed the country was headed in the 
right direction fell from 55 percent in 2014 to just 29 percent in 2016. By contrast, the 
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number of respondents who believed the country was going to a wrong direction increased 
from 40 in 2014 to 66 percent in 2016.  
The declining government capacity and shrinking security after 2014 overlapped with the 
rise a new generation of Afghan intelligentsia who grew up after 2001. The new 
generation was the product of expansion of public education and exposure of the society 
to the forces of globalisation. The level of educational attainment of the victims of the 23 
July attack on the Roshanayee Movement illustrates the role of the new generation in 
organising these protest movements. Among those killed, 7 had MA degrees, 25 had 
bachelor degrees and 40 were active university students (1TV Kabul, 2015).  
These rise of protest activism at a time of declining state capacity and credibility point to 
some important dynamics of contentious politics in Afghanistan. At the core of these 
protest activities was a general fear of rising threats against both the ideas and practices 
of the liberal democratic state in the country. Consequently, although apparently a 
challenge to the authority of the National Unity Government, these protests pointing to a 
deepening of the post-2001 state in the Afghan society and the rise of a new generation 
who viewed their future in terms of the success of the state to enforce its authority and 
provide security and basic services.  
Explaining the Mechanisms of Social Mobilisation  
Despite their important differences, the organisers of the three protest movements were 
united by a shared goal of demanding that the government perform its basic functions in 
providing services and ensuring security. Consequently, none of the movements aimed to 
challenge the authority of the government. On the contrary, these protestors were seeking 
to demand that the government give effect to its avowed policies of providing security 
and public services. However, as organisers of the movements interacted with the 
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government and engaged in broader social mobilisations these policy-level conflicts 
gained broader foundational and programmatic dimensions. To explain these shifts, I will 
explore the key mechanisms involved: collective attribution of threats and opportunities, 
appropriation of social resources, and identity construction.  
Collective Attribution of Threats and Opportunities 
To explore how the organisers of the three protests responded to the declining government 
capacity and credibility, I begin by assessing the primary factor that triggered these 
movements. To begin with, all three movements were triggered by government’s failure 
to provide security and public services. The protests against the killing of Farkhunda and 
the Zabul Seven emerged in response to government failures to provide security. The 
Roshanayee Movement was initiated in response to a deliberate decision to change the 
route of a major power supply line but at the core of the protest was the government’s 
failure to provide electricity as a basic public service. Furthermore, as the detailed 
description of the events leading to the rise of the movement showed, the movement’s 
rise and evolution was more profoundly shaped by the limited ability of the state to make 
and enforce a policy decision authoritatively.  
It is important to situate the immediate causes of these protests in broader contexts. While 
at the national level, violent groups such as the Taliban and the ISIS saw in weakening of 
government capacity and credibility an opportunity for further deligitimisation and 
destabilisation of the post-2001 political order, the protest movements reacted to the 
shrinking of security and social and political space by asserting their voices in the public 
arena and demanding that the government discharge its responsibility to provide security 
and services. A collectively-felt urge to act to preserve and protect the post-2001 civil and 
political space was a common theme that appeared in many of my own interviews with 
organisers and observers of these protests. Seeking to go beyond their offices to develop 
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a mass following, many civil society and NGO leaders spoke of the need to move from 
‘projects’ to ‘process’. For Hazara organisers of the Enlightenment Movement the 
TUTAP power line became a symbolic object of protest for what were commonly felt to 
be years of ‘loss of opportunity’ for socio-economic development of the Hazara region 
after 2001.  
 For the organisers of the Roshanayee Movement, the government decision to change the 
route of the power transmission line was seen as part of broader pattern of exclusion of 
the historically-marginalised and mountainous region of Hazarajat from developmental 
and reconstruction efforts. Among the Hazaras, the movement was an expression of a 
sense of exclusion of the Hazara regions from reconstruction efforts after 2001. As most 
of the foreign aid and reconstruction efforts were diverted to the mainly insecure regions 
of the south and east as part of a strategy to win ‘hearts and minds’, peaceful regions such 
as Hazarajat became part of what was described by the World Bank as ‘lagging regions’, 
comprising provinces with the highest rates of poverty and the lowest foreign aid 
spending after 2001. The poverty headcount rate in some areas of these regions was more 
than 50 percent as compared to the national average of 39 percent. Yet the average per 
capita foreign aid spending in these regions was half that of the more affluent regions 
(The World Bank, 2015, pp. 15-16).  
Against this background of widespread poverty and exclusion from major developmental 
and reconstruction efforts, many Hazara activists saw rerouting of the electricity line as 
another indication of a broader pattern of the exclusion of their region. Demand for 
electricity was particularly high. In 2016, US authorities estimated that although access 
to electricity had significantly improved from just 6 percent of the population in 2002, in 
2016 only 30 percent had access to reliable electricity, and more than 80 percent of the 
available electricity was imported from neighbouring countries (Special Inspector 
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General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2016, p. 10). Some provinces such as Bamyan 
were entirely excluded from the national electricity network of the country. For several 
years, Hazara activists in Bamyan had regularly protested to attract the attention of the 
central government and foreign aid donors, with electricity being one of their main 
demands (Chiovenda, 2014). 
Similarly, the mass protests against the killing of Farkhunda and the Zabul Seven were 
popular responses to the threats of general deterioration of security for civilians, and 
women in particular. There were, however, important differences among the organisers 
of the protest movements. For organisers of the protest event against the killing of Zabul 
Seven, the threat came from outside the political system, from terrorist groups who were 
motivated to target the Shi’a Hazaras. What motivated the insurgents to target the Hazaras 
was mostly likely a combination of sectarian hatred of the Shi’a and an instrumental 
calculation as part of their strategy of destabilising the government by exposing its 
inability to protect its citizens. By contrast, for organisers of the protest events against the 
killing of Farkhunda, the threat came from within the society: young men and 
conservative religious groups who, in comparison to most of the country’s rural 
population, lived under control of the central government in Kabul and benefited from 
relative stability and the socio-economic changes that the city had experienced after 2001.  
However, besides the shared goal of demanding security and services, there were 
important differences in how organisers of each protest reacted to threats and 
opportunities that emerged in the course of contentious politics. These event-level 
differences can be further illustrated by the choice of venues in which the three main 
events were organised after the killing of Farkhunda. For civil society groups, the threat 
came from the failure of the state institutions to uphold the rule of law and consequently 
they gathered to protest outside the Supreme Court in Kabul. By contrast, the ulema and 
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the Hezb-e Hambastagi chose to gather at the site of the mob attack in the centre of Kabul, 
bringing their rival and competing positions to the masses. Furthermore, the public horror 
that followed the killing created an unprecedented opportunity for criticism of the 
religious establishment, and hence a rare opportunity for secular and liberal groups to 
challenge and question the authority of religious groups. In response, in their protest on 
26 March, the ulema attacked the very concept of civil society and called on the 
government to stop activities of ‘anti-religion and irreligious currents’ (Sediqi, 2015). 
Despite these important differences, the killing of civilians by a spontaneous mob of 
vigilantes in Kabul or armed militants in the remote districts of the province of Zabul 
shared an important parallel: declining government capacity to ensure security and the 
efforts by non-state and anti-state actors to use violence to impose their own systems of 
political and moral control.  
Appropriation of Resources 
Although after 2014 the general socio-economics situation deteriorated significantly, 
between 2001 and 2014 a new generation emerged that had acquired greater 
mobilisational capabilities. While warlords and corrupt politicians benefited most from 
the inflow of foreign aid, many new groups also accumulated significant resources – 
material, social and cultural capital - that they could mobilise to engage in sustained 
protests. As the four case study groups of this thesis show, many of these groups sought 
to break with the patron-client networks of the groups that dominated the politics of the 
country. At the level of the three protests discussed in this chapter, the organisers of each 
protest mobilised particular material, social and cultural resources that they had 
accumulated after 2001. For example, the four events that followed the killing of 
Farkhunda were characterised by particular social appropriation strategies. Civil society 
groups used offices of non-governmental organisations and private consulting companies 
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as sites of coordination meetings. The ulema tended to gather in mosques or offices of 
religiously-oriented social organisations and foundations. The HHA used its own party 
office in Kabul where its leaders met to organise and coordinate its activities. Finally, the 
Hazara activists who organised the Zabul Seven rally and the Roshanayee Movement’s 
rallies used a far more diverse range of social spaces including private universities, cafes, 
and NGO and private offices, and mosques that are located in the predominantly Hazara 
districts in the west of Kabul. 
Despite their evident difference in the types of claims they make, diverging social 
appropriation strategies, and the language and other symbolic resources they employ, the 
organisers of these events reinforced one another to constitute ‘continuous streams of 
contention’ (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2004, p. 24). At the least, each event inspired 
other protests by establishing a precedent and a model that could be emulated. In fact, the 
organisers that I interviewed described in detail how social networks built in one event 
were subsequently activated to organise other events. For example, some of the main 
organisers of the civil society rally against the killing of Farkhunda continued to work 
together after March 2015. In fact, during the months in which I conducted field research 
(August-December 2015), many organisers of these protest events had built their entire 
personal identities around the notion of civil society. Widely known as faalin jamea 
madani (civil society activists), this new generation of activists had emerged out of the 
comforts of their NGO and consulting offices to lead rallies, criticise the government on 
television, develop mass following on the country’s social media, and speak on behalf of 
civil society in international conferences.  
On 6 April 2015, several civil society activists set up a tent, which they called Advocacy 
Tent, at Zarnegar Park at the centre of Kabul to press the government to secure the release 
of 31 civilian Hazaras who were abducted by the militant groups in Zabul on 23 February 
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2015. The tent hosted several family members of the hostages, and dozens of civil society 
activists who worked together to maintain public and media interest in the plight of the 
hostages for several months. During this period, the organisers used the tent to organise 
cultural activities such as poetry nights, street theatre, and musical performances. These 
activities maintained the interest of the media which regularly interviewed the organisers 
and family members of the hostages. As documented by the organisers’ Facebook page, 
the site became such an important object of public attention that several high level 
officials visited it to express their sympathy with the organisers and families of the 
victims. On 10 April Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the Chief Executive Officer of the National 
Unity Government visited it. On 14 April, Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, the Speaker of the Wolesi 
Jirga came to express his support for the organisers. The tent and its network of organisers 
remained active until November 2015 when the protest against the killing of the Zabul 
Seven activated more diverse social networks.  
In its capacity to organise and coordinate multiple protest events over extended periods 
of time, the Roshanayee Movement also became the most successful in appropriating a 
wide range of resources. However, the movement went beyond the notion of civil society 
by bringing in members of parliament, representatives of political parties and a much 
more diverse range of younger activists. It was led by what was called Shuray-e a’li 
mardumi, or People’s Supreme Council. Designed to include all influential social and 
political groups in Hazara community, the council included representatives from the main 
Hazara political parties,17 Hazara members of the Upper and Lower Houses of the 
                                                          
17 The most prominent Hazara political parties were: Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan led by 
former Vice-President, Karim Khalili; Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Mardum-e Afghanistan led by 
Muhammad Mohaqiq, a former minister in the Karzai government and Second Deputy of the 
Chief Executive Officer Abdullah in the National Unity Government formed in September 2014; 
and Hezb-e Ensejam-e Milli Afghanistan led by Sadiq Modabbir, a former senior official in the 
Karzai government;  
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Parliament18 as well as representatives of university students. By maximising 
participation of various Hazara groups, the movement also lost the multi-ethnic character 
of the civil society groups. The Musallaye Shahid Mazari, a vast public space in the 
Dashti-e Barchi district of west Kabul, became the central organising hub for both the 
Zabul Seven and the Roshanayee movement. Located along Shahid Mazari Road, the 
only main road that connects the vast sprawling district to the rest of the city, over the 
years the venue has become the most significant centre of social and political activism 
for the Hazaras. The place is named after Abdul Ali Mazari, the Hazara politician who 
was killed by the Taliban in March 1995. Mazari is widely respected by Hazaras as a 
symbol of unity and struggle for the rights of the community for his role in unifying 
various Hazara mujahedin factions into the single party of Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami 
Afghanistan in 1989 (Ibrahimi, 2009). 
Boundary Activation: Identity Formation Processes 
The three events also offer important insights into the processes of construction and 
articulation of a collective identity in Afghanistan during this period. The organisers of 
the three separate events that followed the killing of Farkhunda constructed their 
collective identity around three separate identities. First, the demonstration by Hezb-e 
Hambastagi was organised in the name of the party, a pre-existing social category with 
its own particular history and symbolic meaning. Second, the largest demonstration that 
took place outside the Supreme Court defined its highly diverse participants around the 
notion of civil society. The third event organised by the ulema in Kabul used an existing 
                                                          
18 It is not clear whether all the Hazara members of the parliament participated in the meetings of 
the council. However, some MPs took a leading role in the leadership of the movement. These 
were Ahmad Behzad from Herat, Arif Rahmani from Ghazni, Ghulam Husain Naseri from 
Wardak, Shah Gul Rezayee from Ghazni, Jafar Mahdawi from Kabul. 
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organisational identity, although a rather ambiguous one with little prior organisational 
history.  
One might ask why should events organised to condemn a specific brutal crime invoke 
such highly-divergent notions and social categories. In an important respect, the identities 
of these groups and events were shaped in the process of interaction and competition as 
they attempted to bring their various symbolic and interpretive frameworks to provide 
meaning to the brutal killing of Farkhundah. However, these different approaches were 
also informed by underlying divisions of the society. A central driver of the various 
identity construction mechanisms is the broader and pre-existing divide in the Afghan 
society along a religious-secular continuum. Hezb-e Hambastagi and most organisers of 
the civil society events tended to be secular and thus use less overtly religious language 
and symbols. By contrast and for more obvious reasons, the ulema of Kabul employed 
religious language and symbols. For example, the notion of civil society, which is 
employed for its assumed non-political nature, was at the core of the contestation. The 
notion employed by the organisers of the 24 March event outside the Supreme Court 
served well their purpose of bringing together a wide range of groups, including NGO 
activists, members of Afghanistan 1400, and supporters of Rawand-e Sabz, Green Trend, 
a socio-political movement led by Amrullah Saleh, a former Director of National Security 
Directorate. However, the very unifying role of the subject for participants of this event 
became a major source of contention between the secular and the religious groups. The 
ulema, who had come under unusually widespread public criticism for their silence 
towards or even support for religiously-inspired violence, attacked the very notion of civil 
society. In their final statement, on 26 March, the ulema declared that,  
This is an undeniable crime that [is perpetrated by] some activists and extremists 
of the civil society who reveal their hostility to Islam and the Muslim nation and 
[seek to] institutionalise the goals of the enemies of Islam and of this homeland. 
Some irreligious and extremist activists of civil society have active and central 
P a g e  | 280 
 
roles in disruption of security, peace, [and] national unity, [and in spread of] of 
discord and disunity, and promotion of depravity (fohashah), shamelessness and 
moral corruption. As a result, we, the ulema, see it our responsibility to eradicate 
this evil tree, destroy it and nip it in the bud [My translation]. 
However, the secular-religious divide is only one part of the dynamic. There were 
important divisions among the secular camp. For example, the organisers of the separate 
civil society Hezb-e Hambastagi rallies did not even consider organising a joint event, 
even though the organisers of both even tended to be secular. While the protest against 
the killing of Farkhunda sparked competitive identity-construction processes along 
secular-religious fault-lines of the country, the Enlightenment Movement represented an 
effort to invent a new identity, a new social category that refused to align itself with any 
existing institutional and social categories. Central to identity construction was the notion 
of roshanayee (light or enlightenment), which they used to refer to its literal as well as 
metaphorical meaning. In a statement on 13 May 2016, two days ahead of its first major 
demonstration on 16 May, the organisers of the movement declared that,  
“Our dream” is to hate “darkness” and to reach “light”. We do not just mean the 
literal meaning of roshanayee. [Rather] its metaphorical meaning is more 
important. We come to the street for realisation of justice; we come to the street 
to bury in the cemetery of history the sick and dark-thinking brains, and minds 
saturated by discrimination and prejudice. We come to the street to shine as an 
effulgent/radiant electricity at the heart of everything that is dark (Jonbesh-e 
Roshanayee, 2017, p. 29) [My translation].  
By employing abstract notions such as enlightenment as its identity marker, the 
movement sought to appeal to a new generation of Hazara activists with new socio-
cultural sensitivities, on the one hand, and refuse to align itself with the existing ethnic 
and sectarian divisions of the country, on the other. Nonetheless, the movement was 
unambiguously shaped by the historical persecution of the Hazaras and their precarious 
socio-political conditions in the post-2001 period. It framed its core claim against what it 
described as ‘systematic discrimination’ against the Hazaras. The employment of ethnic 
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narratives and symbolism increased even further after the 23 July bombing of its 
demonstration. 
Conclusion 
The previous two sections highlighted a number of factors that are critical to 
understanding how state fragility as characterised by poor state capacity and credibility 
shapes contentious politics in Afghanistan. Two major themes that run through the 
discussion of the three events are worth highlighting here. First, the three protest events 
were driven by shared desires for basic security and social services. Although the 
protestors may use Islamic language and symbols to promote their claims, the demand 
for security and public services undercuts ideological divides, including that between 
Islamist and their secular rivals. Second, protests against specific policy failures or policy 
changes involved a series of underlying programmatic and foundational conflicts as 
shown by the contestation over the notion of civil society. I explored the two themes 
through a discussion of underlying divisions in the Afghan society through the 
mechanisms of collective attributions of threats and opportunities, appropriation of 
resources, and constructive of collective identities. The recurrent shifts from policy to 
deeper conflicts are closely linked to the condition of the Afghan state. Three aspects of 
the relationship between state fragility and protest movements are worth highlighting 
further here.  
Challenges of Poor State Capacity  
The three protest movements underline a series of challenges that result from poor 
capacity of the Afghan state. In fact, the movements were triggered by the state’s failure 
to provide security and basic public services. The environment characterised by the failure 
of the state to provide security shapes collective action in more complex ways. On the 
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one hand, nearly four decades of uninterrupted cycles of violence and instability have 
created a particularly high-risk environment in which engagement in contentious politics 
always carries the risk of lethal violence. Such risks were most powerfully illustrated by 
the 23 July 2016 bombing of the Enlightenment Movement. Taken together, the three 
cases also demonstrate that the inability of the state to provide security and public services 
creates opportunities for anti-state groups to expose its weakness even further.  
The security environment also shaped the manner in which the state responded to mass 
protest events. In the case of the Roshanayee Movement one might expect that given the 
object of the protest, relevant civilian ministries of the state such as the Ministry of Energy 
and Water or DABS would be the primary points of contact for the protestors. However, 
throughout 2016, the National Security Council and National Directorate of Security 
became the lead institutions in negotiating with leaders of the Enlightenment Movement. 
Given the security environments of Kabul, there were important reasons why the security 
agencies of the state became an important interlocutor of mass protest movements. 
However, the preeminent role given to security institutions also led to securitisation of 
the government approach towards the protestors.  
Challenges of Poor State Credibility  
After nearly four decades of instability and conflict, in addition to challenges of poor 
capacity, the Afghan state also suffers from extremely low public trusts in its institutions. 
Ravaged by consecutive conflicts and foreign influences since 1979 and having served as 
instruments of mass repression, after 2001 Afghan state institutions faced enormous 
challenges in gaining the trust of the society. For these particular protest movements, as 
discussed above, the credibility of state institutions also suffered from the way in which 
the National Unity Government was formed and the general security and socio-economic 
conditions of the country after 2014.  
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The combination of weak state capacity and credibility creates an environment in which 
reliable information is scarce, trust is low, and rumours and conspiracy theories are 
pervasive. The fact that a rumour had the power and potency to motivate a group of young 
men to murder a young woman in the presence of police officers reveals an environment 
rife with distrust in both the society and in the state institutions. The other two protests 
were also deeply shaped by widespread rumors and conspiracy theories. In August 2015, 
when I visited Kabul, there were multiple conspiracy theories circulating in the city 
(unsupported by any direct evidence) about malign intentions of the government and 
some organisers of the Roshanayee Movement. Two such theories are worth highlighting 
here.  
 Many in the Roshanayee Movemetn believed that the 23 July attack on the 
movement’s rally was in fact planned by the National Security Council. There 
were two versions of this theory. Some believed that the government security 
agencies had directly planned the attack. But how could the government recruit 
suicide bombers? The explanation was that the government had a significant 
number of suicide bombers that were detained by security forces and then were 
held in government detention centres. The proponents of this theory claimed that 
the government agencies could direct these suicide bombers to attacking a target 
by arranging a mock release back to a bogus Taliban network. Another version of 
the theory claimed that while the government was not directly involved in 
planning the attack, certain circles in the government was still responsible for the 
attack by allowing it to proceed despite their prior knowledge.  
 Many in the government believed that there were larger and more sinister goals 
behind the movement. Some pointed to the alleged ties between some movement 
leader and the former President Hamid Karzai to argue that Karzai was behind the 
movement. Others even claimed that the movement, being predominantly led by 
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Shi’a Hazaras, were in fact supported by Iran, even if the vast majority of the 
movement’s leaders were secular and even opposed to Iranian influence. 
Government security officers had circulated the theory of Iranian involvement 
among the diplomatic community in Kabul.  
The low trust in state institutions played an important role in failure of the negotiations 
with the presidential commissions to resolve the conflict. These negotiations were mostly 
designed to take place through ad hoc commissions and often through the security 
institutions. But throughout the period after 2001, many of these commissions even failed 
to meet or produce any public report or outcome. These included the commission that 
was appointed by the President Ghani to investigate the 23 July 2016 bombing in Deh 
Mazang, which never released its finding. In other words, the presidential commission 
was a well-worn mechanism with little credibility. As discussed above, the level of trust 
in state institutions was so low that the leaders of the Enlightenment Movement did not 
heed warnings of an impending attack provided to them by the National Directorate of 
Security. 
The Perils of Presidentialism  
The effects of poor state capacity and credibility are compounded by the highly 
centralised presidential system that was created by the 2004 constitution. The ‘perils of 
presidentialism’ in investing both symbolic leadership and policy making and inter-
agency coordination in a single office were powerfully illustrated by Linz (1990). The 
dangers of such concentration of power in one office becomes even more obvious when 
the presidency lacks the capacity and credibility to meet the high expectations it 
generates. The institutional structure of the presidential system created in the 2004 
constitution shapes contentious politics encouraging certain forms of contentious politics 
over other forms of political activities. The concentration of political leadership and 
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policy making in the institution of presidency by the 2004 constitution also turn it into 
the central object for expression of public anger and frustration. The Arg becomes the 
central object of protests because as provided in the constitution it is the centre for both 
political leadership and policy design and implementation.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion  
Introduction  
In this thesis, I have sought to contribute to two sets of literature. First, I have sought to 
contribute to the literature on internationally-sponsored statebuilding efforts in 
Afghanistan by offering a fresh perspective through analysis of social movements and 
contentious politics in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2016. By highlighting the 
mechanisms and processes of peaceful social mobilisation I have aimed to complement 
those aspects of existing scholarship that focus more on the high politics of statebuilding 
and the violent insurgency. A study of contentious politics offers another perspective into 
processes of social and political change during this period in the country. Second, I have 
sought to engage critically with literature on social movements and contentious politics 
by drawing on its insights to explore dynamics of collective action and social mobilisation 
in a socio-cultural and political environment characterised by state weaknesses and 
ongoing violence.  
More specifically, I have set out to answer two interrelated questions: First, how might 
state fragility shape contentious politics? And second, do state fragility and disruption 
create conditions that favour particular groups or forms of contention? The first question 
seeks to contribute to the contentious politics literature by examining mechanisms and 
processes of contention in a context characterised by limited state authority, poor service 
provision and a dearth of effective and legitimate institutions. The second question aims 
to examine critically a claim in recent years that in Muslim-majority countries ‘Islamists’ 
enjoy a ‘political advantage’ over their rivals in mobilising the masses.  
 In the preceding four chapters I have attempted to answer these questions through 
detailed analysis of four groups and three events between 2001 and 2016. In this 
concluding chapter, I highlight some of the main themes that have emerged from the 
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empirical chapters of the thesis before attempting to explain how they answer the primary 
questions of this thesis.  
Research Gap 
In my review of the literature on social movements in chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis I 
argued that as they had developed from the 1960s, social movement theories were largely 
based on studies of movements in liberal democracies. Over the past two decades, these 
theories have been applied to a wide range of contexts. However, in their application to 
these contexts, particularly to countries characterised by state disruption and fragility, the 
theories suffer from three major interrelated shortcomings. First, the literature is highly 
state-centric, focusing on types of political regimes and extant power relations to account 
for variation and evolution of contentious politics. Second, it is underpinned by an 
interest-based assumption about politics. In this conception, it is assumed that actors 
engage in contentious politics predominantly in defence or promotion of their interests, 
and thus it does not sufficiently take into account value-based and symbolic forms of 
contention. Third, even when extended to studies of movements outside liberal-
democratic countries, the literature is dominated by an underlying normative preference 
for study of western-style liberal movements over other movements.  
Restating the Approach of the Thesis 
In this thesis, I have aimed to address some of the gaps in the contentious politics literature 
by (a) taking a multi-institutional view of politics, in which the state is a major actor but 
only one of multiple actors engaged in competitive struggles for domination and control 
in the society; (b) highlighting the nature of social conflicts by making distinctions 
between three levels of conflict (foundational, programamtic and policy); and (c) 
underlining symbolic and ideological dimensions of contention alongside interest-based 
politics.  
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Methodologically, I compared and contrasted four groups and three events to examine 
the dynamics of mutual interaction between state weakness and contention in 
Afghanistan. The four groups (Afghanistan 1400, Hezb-e Hambastagi Afghanistan, 
Jamiat-e Eslah and Hezb ut-Tahrir) and three protest events (rallies in March 2015, 
November 2015 and in May and July 2016) represent four distinctive positions along the 
religious-secular spectrum as well as exemplifying models for peaceful political action in 
Afghanistan.  
In examining these groups and events, I focused on the relational and interactive nature 
of contentious politics by highlighting the mutual interaction of group-level dynamics and 
shifts in social and political environments. To explore the interactive relations, I focused 
on mechanisms of collective attribution of threats and opportunities, social 
appropriation, and boundary activation to explore how the four groups and events 
emerged in response to changes in the social and political environment of Afghanistan 
between 2001 and 2016. However, I emphasised that groups and protest events do not 
respond to all changes equally. Understanding the nature and scope of environmental 
changes in societies struggling to overcome protracted conflict is particularly important, 
because by virtue of their complexity, rebuilding states and societies ravaged by war 
involves or induces far-reaching social, cultural and political changes. In Afghanistan, the 
international intervention in 2001 and the statebuilding enterprise that followed it entailed 
predictable socio-economic, cultural and political changes or helped generate new 
changes.  
Key Empirical Findings 
The empirical research of this thesis reveals the following: 
First, the four groups defy the institutional logic of the post-2001 state in Afghanistan. 
Hezb-e Hambastagi Afghanistan is registered as a political party but functions as a protest 
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movement, and Jamiat-e Eslah, registered as social organisation, plays an increasingly 
assertive political role; while Afghanistan 1400 is divided over whether to assume the 
role of a political party or a civil movement; and the unregistered Hezb ut-Tahrir finds 
significant levels of support for its anti-institutional forms of politics.  
Second, while all of these groups benefited from the social and political freedoms and 
changes introduced after 2001, not all of them supported the principles and practices of 
liberal democracy as it was introduced in the country. Based on the distinctions made 
between the foundational, programmatic and policy levels of conflict, the four groups 
represents four different responses to the post-2001 statebuilding in Afghanistan: 
reformist (Afghanistan 1400), transformationist (Jamiat-e Eslah), partial rejectionist 
(Hezb-e Hambastagi), and full rejectionist (Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan). In taking these 
strategic positions, these groups were motivated by a combination of interest-based and 
symbolic and value-based considerations. In fact, taken together the four groups 
demonstrate a vibrant and dynamic politics focused on the symbolic dimensions of the 
statebuilding process. This is evident in the deep ideological divides that the four groups 
represent over the role of religion in politics, as well as in the reluctance of these groups 
or most of their members to participate in the political process fully. Consequently, as 
statebuilding was simultaneously symbolic and material, the responses by these groups 
were also shaped by a range of interest-based and symbolic considerations.  
The divergence between prescribed institutional avenues for political action and divergent 
patterns emerged as a result of interactive process of group level mechanisms, (for 
example, attribution of threats and opportunities) and environmental changes. First, the 
institutional design of the 2004 constitution, characterised by a highly centralised 
presidential system and the adoption of the SNTV electoral system, limited incentives for 
programmatic and institutional participation. When one person can head the executive 
government, when the electoral system militates against the existence of strong and 
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effective political parties, those with concerns to voice are driven in the direction of 
contentious politics. Second, the neopatrimonial nature of state-society relations created 
a wide gap between the promises and the practices of the liberal democratic state, making 
participation in institutional politics morally compromising and highly unpredictable, 
even for its supporters. Third, the ongoing contestation over the nature and model of state 
sovereignty creates an uncertain environment in which groups respond to threats and 
opportunities from state, non-state and anti-state actors. In this environment of flux and 
uncertainty, conflicts over policies often involve deep programmatic and foundational 
dimensions.  
The three events demonstrated that the escalation of contentious politics in 2015 and 2016 
was closely linked to declines in the state’s capacity to enforce its authority, provide 
services, and develop effective and legitimate institutions, following the triple political, 
security and economic transitions of 2014. While the rise of these protest activities 
underscored the emergence of a new generation of activists who demanded that the 
government discharge its basic functions, social protests over government policy 
failures/changes often give rise to deeper conflicts, highlighting the fragile nature of the 
post-2001 political settlement and deep social divisions. Launched in response to policy-
level changes and failures by state institutions, these events involved deep programmatic 
and foundational conflicts, highlighting underlying state-society tensions over ethnic 
distribution of power and religious-secular conceptions of state-society relations. 
Consequently, social protest as a strategy for bringing social and political change can be 
overshadowed by broader conflicts and violence over the nature of state-society relations.  
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State Weakness as both Opportunity and Constraint 
The empirical chapters of the thesis clearly demonstrate that state weakness presents both 
threats and opportunities for social mobilisation. In this concluding chapter, it is worth 
revisiting these two aspects of state weakness in some detail.  
 State Weakness as an Opportunity 
The weakness of the state in performing its basic functions creates opportunities for rise 
of challenging groups. Challenging groups may use the opportunity to assume some of 
the functions of the state by creating alternative structures of authority and providing basic 
services. Alternatively, some groups may use the social and political space created by 
state weakness to engage in anti-state activities. How groups respond to opportunities 
created by state weakness can be usefully illustrated by the four case-study groups 
examined in this thesis. While each of the four groups shared some degree of fears of full 
participation in the state over concerns of corruption, in general the four groups responded 
in four distinctive ways: the liberal Afghanistan 1400 took a reformist posture and the 
Hezb ut-Tahrir Afghanistan took a rejectionist stance. Hezb ut-Tahrir used the weakness 
of the state to engage in anti-systemic and rejectionist activities. Between the two poles 
of full rejection and reform, Hezb-e Hambastagi adopted a partially-rejectionist stance 
whereas Jamiat-e Eslah followed a more ambitious strategy of transforming state-society 
relations through a bottom-up programme of Islamisation and assuming some of the state 
functions by providing basic services such as education and welfare services. 
In important respects, Islamists appear to be more successful in exploiting the 
opportunities created by state weakness. After all, a sense of crisis that results from the 
failure of modern states in the Islamic world is central to both the rhetoric and 
mobilisational strategy of the Islamists. In Afghanistan, Islamism has emerged as a 
dominant perspective in the course of gradual weakening and failure of the state during 
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nearly four decades of war and instability since1978. However, in evaluating whether the 
Islamists have a political advantage over their rivals, three factors need to be taken into 
account. First, in their rise to prominence in Afghanistan, the Islamists have appealed to 
highly diverse groups of people and appropriated a wide range of concerns and causes 
that are typically secular in nature. The need to appeal to local communities and the 
resultant appropriation of secular socio-economic grievances and concerns also transform 
the Islamists. It was through these processes of Islamist expansion and local adaptation 
that the first generation of Afghanistan’s Islamists, who dominated the ant-Soviet 
resistance, were fragmented along the lines of ethnic and regional identities. 
Subsequently, the former mujahedin dominated the post-2001 political process, including 
elections. As ideologically-motivated groups, in comparison to more moderate groups 
who are motivated by a wide range of factors, Islamists tend to invest greater amounts of 
times and resources in pursuit of their goals of social and political change. However, 
because of the process of local adaptation it is hard to prove with any certainty whether 
the political success of these groups is a result of their Islamist agenda or their underlying 
ethnic, regional and other socio-economic dynamics. The failure of the Afghan Islamists 
to form an Islamic state in the 1990s and their subsequent change and transformation 
clearly point to the validity of the Roy’s thesis that political Islam has failed (Roy, 1994) 
and Bayat’s argument regarding the change of Islamist movements (Bayat, 1996). 
However, the changes do not necessarily lead to a post-Islamist society. Nor do these 
changes indicate that Islamists are wholeheartedly embracing the principles of liberal 
democracy. As the examples of Jamiat-e Eslah and Hezb ut-Tahrir in Afghanistan 
demonstrate, the local adaptation of the former Islamists and their involvement in 
corruption and patron-client politics of the post-2001 period created conditions for the 
rise of a new generation of Islamists who claim to advance more a ‘authentic’ long-term 
agenda of Islamisation.  
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Second, these groups exhibit nearly all the alleged sources – ideological, organisational, 
and access to resources – of the Islamists’ political advantages as summarised by Cammet 
and Luong (2014). However, while in contrast to Afghanistan 1400 and Hezb-e 
Hambastagi, Jamiat-e Eslah and Hezb ut-Tahrir have certainly achieved greater success 
at the level of organisations, the ability of these groups to translate these organisational 
gains into political outcomes could not be proven. As discussed in detail in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis, these groups do not participate in elections, either because they are 
ideologically opposed to electoral democracy (Hezb ut-Tahrir) or because they are not 
sure they can win enough votes to be an effective player in the parliament (Jamiat-e 
Eslah). Furthermore, these groups do not have any advantage in bringing the masses to 
the streets. In fact, as the three protest events demonstrate, the largest protest events of 
the 2001-2016 period were organised in response to state failures to provide security and 
services. This proves an obvious point, that politics in societies suffering from 
government failures is most likely to be driven by demands for more effective and 
legitimate states that can ensure security, rule of law and provide socio-economic 
opportunities.  
Third, the rise of Islamism over the past four decades in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the 
Islamic world cannot be understood without looking at the broader political and strategic 
shifts over the past decades. In this respect, the provision of vast financial, political and 
military support for Islamist groups, first by the United States and Arab world during the 
Cold War, and later as part of rivalries between countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and 
Pakistan, trumps any resources the Islamists gain from their access to mosques and 
religious endowments. Obviously, some groups such as Hezb ut-Tahrir position 
themselves against the interests of powerful states; but the durability of other Islamists, 
including violent groups such as the Taliban, would not be possible without the financial, 
political and even military support they receive from powerful states in the region.  
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State Weakness as a Constraint 
A state’s weakness in enforcing its authority, providing public services, and developing 
effective and legitimate institutions creates a number of constraints that are relevant to 
social movement formation and evolution. First, the success of social movements in 
achieving their policy and programmatic goals requires a state with minimum capacity 
and credibility in performing basic functions such as provision of security and rule of law. 
As the 23 July 2016 bombing of the Roshanayee Movement demonstrated, the failure of 
the state to provide security of peaceful assembly dramatically changes the conditions in 
which social mobilisation takes places.  
Second, social movements often respond to changes that result from enactment and 
enforcements of policies and programmes by state institutions. Movements can either 
proactively demand enactment of certain policies or programmes, or respond to policies 
and programmes initiated by the state. For example, a women’s rights movement might 
demand that state authorities enact a particular policy for promotion of the rights of 
women, or an environment movement might respond by mobilising against a government 
policy that harms the environment. However, the emergence of policy and programme-
level movements presupposes a basic political settlement and a state with basic legitimacy 
and capacity to enforce its authority. As the case studies of this thesis demonstrated, 
foundational conflicts over the terms of state-society relations continue to undermine 
development of programmatic and policy-level movements and parties. In this 
environment, actors respond to shifts and changes in a multitude of institutions and actors. 
For example, some Islamist groups may not stand against anti-state actors because either 
they share deeper ideological affinities with the armed insurgency or simply out of 
instrumental reasons of maintaining security of movement and their members.  
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The underlying puzzle that emerges here is whether weak and fragmented state authorities 
also give rise to weak and fragmented movements. In other words, do movements that 
emerge to address some of the challenges of political fragmentation and divisions 
themselves become victims of what they attempt to solve? Writing on the Taliban 
movement, Gopal (2016) has recently argued that the historical institutional 
underdevelopment of the Afghan state also inhibits the development of national 
movements beyond the original networks of trust and personal contacts. As chapter four 
of this thesis showed, kinship and local identities historically offered the main vehicle for 
rebellions and challenges against state authority. Furthermore, the case studies of this 
thesis demonstrate that state weakness and institutional underdevelopment present 
important challenges for social and political movements. However, the cases also 
demonstrate a wide range of approaches and strategies by Afghan social and political 
groups to overcome the challenges created by state weakness. Furthermore, the broader 
socio-economic transformation that Afghanistan experienced after 2001 has created 
conditions for broad-based politics beyond the narrow networks of personal trust and 
contact. In this respect, each of the four groups and the networks of activists behind the 
protest events point to the rise of a new generation of activists that have gained the 
resources and capacity to move beyond networks of kinship and personal trust.  
Future Avenues for Research  
States disrupted by protracted violence and suffering from endemic corruption, present 
highly-challenging contexts for all forms of collective collection. Understanding the 
processes and challenges facing collective action in these societies can contribute to fuller 
understandings of how state weakness, political instability and violence feed one another; 
and potentially suggest better policy responses. Since the focus of this thesis has been 
groups and events, it offered a meso-level perspective. While bringing the mid-level 
perspectives helps complement the existing scholarship on Afghanistan and statebuilding 
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in important ways, the thesis also suggests the perspective can be extended further by 
looking at the micro-level and macro-level dynamics. Two relevant ideas are particularly 
worth exploring further. First, at the macro-level, this thesis focused on understanding the 
role of state weakness in shaping social movements and contentious politics. However, 
while highly limited in their capacity to exercise authority effectively and uniformly, 
when backed by international recognition and foreign political, financial and military 
supports, weak states can be in a position to dominate other players. While these states 
lack the bureaucratic capacity and resources to enforce their power across the society 
uniformly, they can overpower challengers through their ability to dispense patronage 
and bestow symbolic recognition selectively. In other words, rulers in these states may 
have great capacity for manipulating rifts and divisions that already exist in the society.  
Second, focusing on groups and events, this thesis did not address how protracted 
violence and political instability affect dynamics of participation in contentious politics 
at the level of individual participants. However, the interviews with activists and 
organisers involved in the groups and events pointed to some of the complexity and 
challenges of participation in contentious politics. As the attack on the Roshanayee 
Movement on 23 July 2016 showed, participation in protest movements in a country 
ravaged by war and violence comes with the risks of particularly high costs. The threat 
of physical violence, however, is only one aspect of how protracted instability and 
violence can affect decision-making at the level of individuals. The effects of instability 
and violence can be felt in risks and uncertainty of day-to-day social life in which 
individual and group survival becomes the overriding priority. The politics of survival 
can privilege high-levels of flexibility and pragmatism over deep commitment to 
collective action. Understanding the daily uncertainty and adjustments better might offer 
insights into how patterns of domination and resistance, including violence and 
instability, are created and enacted in these societies. 
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